The development of equity capital markets in transition economies: Privatisation and shareholder rights. by Willer, Dirk
The Development of Equity Capital Markets 
Transition Economies: Privatisation and 
Shareholder Rights
Dirk Wilier
Submitted to the faculty of the University of London 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
London School of Economics
September 1998
UMI Number: U113734
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U113734
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
'TBOBttTllW&WW'j \Xi
leoijiiOfj loAicxji L»s*»iJi
Contents
1 Introduction 12
1.1 Partial Privatisation .................................................................................  13
1.2 Corporate G overnance..................................................................................27
1.3 The Structure of the T h e s is ........................................................................ 33
2 A fter Initial Privatisation: W hy is th e  D ivestiture o f Residual 
State-O w ned Stakes D elayed ? 35
2.1 Introduction.................................................................................................... 35
2.2 The M odel....................................................................................................... 42
2.2.1 A gen ts................................................................................................. 42
2.2.2 Time P a t te r n .....................................................................................42
2.2.3 Firms ................................................................................................. 43
2.2.4 Information Structure ..................   44
2.2.5 S tra teg ie s ........................................................................................... 44
2.2.6 Equilibrium C o n c ep t........................................................................ 47
2.3 Separating and Pooling Equilibria............................................................... 48
2.4 Social W elfare................................................................................................. 55
2.5 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 58
2.6 Appendix A ................................................................................................... 61
2.6.1 Proof of Proposition 2 . 1 ................................................................... 61
2.6.2 Proof of Proposition 2 . 2 ................................................................... 66
2.7 Appendix B ................................................................................................... 68
Shareholder R ights in Russia: A n Em pirical Investigation 72
3.1 Introduction..............  72
3.2 Which Firms Honour Shareholder Rights ? A Simple Framework . . .  76
3.2.1 Complete Management C o n tro l .......................................................76
3.2.2 Limited Management C o n tro l ..........................................................80
3.2.3 Two Caveats ......................................................................................83
3.3 The D a t a .......................................................................................................85
3.3.1 The Dependent Variables: Shareholder Rights Indicators . . .  85
3.3.2 Independent V ariab les...................................................................... 92
3.4 Testing the Hypotheses.................................................................................97
3.5 Conclusion.....................................................................................................114
3.6 A p p e n d ix .....................................................................................................116
3.6.1 The index z\ .................................................................................... 116
3.6.2 Additional data and regressions..................................................... 117
Corporate G overnance in th e A bsence o f S tate G uaranteed Share­
holder R ights 122
4.1 Introduction..................................................................................................122
4.2 The Two Period M odel................................................................................ 127
4.2.1 Management...................................................................................... 127
4.2.2 Investors...............................   131
4.2.3 T im ing................................................................................................132
4.2.4 Equilibrium C o n cep t....................................................................... 132
4.2.5 Optimal D iv idends.......................................................................... 134
4.2.6 A Case where Shareholder Rights are Never Introduced . . . .  135
4.2.7 Two Cases where Shareholder Rights are Introduced ................135
4.3 The Three Period G a m e .............................................................................142
4.3.1 Allowing for Money-Laundering........................ ..........................144
4.3.2 Conditions for Introduction of Shareholder R ig h ts .......................145
4.4 Social W elfare................................................................................................148
4.5 Conclusion......................................................................................................150
4.6 Appendix A ...................................................................................................155
4.7 Appendix B ...................................................................................................155
4.7.1 Proof of Lemma 4 .1 .......................................................................... 155
4.7.2 Proof of Proposition 4 . 1 ................................................................. 156
4.7.3 Proof of Lemma 4 .2 .......................................................................... 157
4.7.4 Proof of Lemma 4 .3 .......................................................................... 157
4.7.5 Proof of Proposition 4 . 2 .................................................................158
4.7.6 Proof of Lemma 4 .4 .......................................................................... 158
4.7.7 Proof of Proposition 4 . 3 .................................................................159
3
4.7.8 Proof of Proposition 4 . 4 ................................................................160
4
List of Figures
2.1 Sequential privatisation..................................................................................36
3.1 The Effect of Stealing.....................................................................................82
4.1 The Game Managers P l a y ..........................................................................131
4.2 Relative Size of Capital Stocks and Controlling Stakes........................... 140
4.3 Two Inefficiencies......................................................................................... 150
5
List of Tables
1.1 World Bank Survey of 439 Industrial Firms, mid-1994 .........................  14
1.2 Survey of 7 Regional Property Funds, August 1994 ............................. 14
1.3 The Russian National S u rv e y ..................................................................  15
1.4 State Ownership by Percentile.................................................................. 15
1.5 Partial Privatization in the Oil Industry ...............................................  17
1.6 Blockholders in Russian f i r m s ..................................................................  18
3.1 Premia of Ordinary Shares over Preference Shares as Percentage of
Ordinary Share P r ic e .................................................................................... 86
3.2 Correlation of Indicators of Shareholder R ights..........................................91
3.3 Ownership of Russian F irm s .........................................................................95
3.4 Fall in Output and Change in Prices by Industry ....................................97
3.5 OLS regressions with L ................................................................................ 102
3.6 PROBIT regressions with L .......................................................................103
3.7 OLS regressions without L .......................................................................... 107
3.8 PROBIT regressions without L .................................................................108
3.9 PE regressions ............................................................................................ I l l
6
3.10 PE regressions without index ..................................................................113
3.11 Correlation Between Issues and Shareholder R ig h ts .............................114
3.12 List of Variables.......................................................................................... 117
3.13 Shareholder Rights by In d u s try ...............................................................118
3.14 Ownership by In d u stry .............................................................................. 118
3.15 Measures of Association*........................................................................... 119
3.16 OLS regressions without L2 ..................................................................... 119
3.17 PROBIT regressions without L2 ...............................................................120
3.18 Three stage least squares regressions without i n d e x .............................121
4.1 Shareholder Rights in the Two Period C ase............................................ 141
4.2 Definition of V ariab les .............................................................................. 155
7
A bstract
The thesis focuses on two issues that have arisen during the development of equity 
capital markets in transition economies. First, it has typically been observed that 
the divestiture of state assets in Russia has not been implemented comprehensively. 
Following an introductory chapter, the second chapter develops a model to explain 
this observation in an environment where the objective of the state is to maximize 
revenues from the sale of its shares on the equity capital markets. If the state has 
private information about the future macroeconomic environment or about poten­
tial improvements of the firms’ qualities due to improved corporate governance it 
can signal its private information to investors. This can be achieved by choosing a 
percentage of the state’s shareholdings to be held back from the immediate sales.
A second issue which has typically slowed down the development of capital equity 
markets in transition economies has been the violation of shareholder rights. Gov­
ernments have often not guaranteed such rights. However, management might have 
incentives to introduce shareholder rights voluntarily. The third chapter develops 
a simple static framework to think about the issue of shareholder rights and tests 
some of its predictions. The chapter presents evidence from a sample of the 140 
largest Russian joint stock companies. Only a minority of firms in this sample do 
honour shareholder rights and the chapter analyzes which firms are more likely to 
do that. It turns out that large firms are more likely to introduce shareholder rights, 
possibly because the expected value of stealing profits is smaller. Furthermore, there 
is some evidence that large outside blockholders, as well as the state in its role as 
shareholder, are able to press for shareholder rights.
The fourth chapter develops a dynamic model for the introduction of shareholder 
rights where the firm’s ownership is endogenised. The chapter shows that in the 
short run, management might be willing to introduce shareholder rights in case it 
has received a sufficiently large portion of the firm’s voting shares in the privatisation
8
process. In the long term, more firms will introduce such rights, but only after they 
have stolen a sufficient part of the firms profits to build up a large equity stake.
9
Acknowledgm ents
The transition of the formerly communist economies towards some form of capi­
talism is surely one of the main economic and political events of this century. I 
consider it a great privilege to have been able to work on such a fascinating topic 
during the last years. I would very much like to thank my joint supervisors Richard 
Layard and David Webb for giving me the opportunity to do that. I am deeply 
indebted to Richard Layard for taking me to Russia. Working as part of his team 
I have benefited greatly from his insights into the Russian economy and politics. 
Furthermore, I am very grateful for Richard’s remarkable generosity in providing 
a stimulating working environment at the Centre for Economic Performance. I am 
equally indebted to David Webb, who has been a wonderful teacher of finance over 
the years. I was fortunate to work with him and his encouragement has been invalu­
able. In particular, I have by now grown very accustomed to our weekend meetings 
and it will be difficult to do without the Hampstead pizzas.
This thesis has been influenced by many discussions with my colleagues and friends 
which were in some way involved with the Russia effort of the LSE’s Centre for 
Economic Performance and the Russian European Centre for Economic Policy (RE- 
CEP): In the first place I would like to thank Peter Boone without whom this thesis 
could not have been written in this form and with whom I now have the privilege to 
continue the collaboration in the private sector. I would also like to thank Alisdair 
Breach, Clemens Grafe, Liam Halligan, Rory MacFarquhar, Simon Johnson, Oleg 
Larichev, Yaroslav Lissovolik, Roland Nash, Peter Orszag, Sergei Prudnik, Andrea 
Richter, Kaspar Richter and Pavel Teplukhin, not least for their pleasant company. 
I am also grateful to Sergei Pavlenko, Head of the government’s Working Centre for 
Economic Reform, and Sergei Vasiliev, Deputy Minister of the Economy, for being 
very supportive of my research.
Comments by Vassilis Hajivassiliou, Steve Machin and Alan Manning have improved 
the empirical chapter considerably and I am very grateful for their support.
10
I would also like to express my gratitude towards Norbert Reetz for getting me inter­
ested in economics in the first place. Furthermore, I would like to thank Gilles Alfan- 
dari, Stephen Barber, Joseph Blasi, Dieter Boes, Markus Brunnermeier, Ulrike Bur- 
chardi, Leonardo Felli, Per Mellstroem, Jim Nail, Max Steuer, Anthony Richards, 
Kevin Roberts and seminar participants at the London School of Economics and 
the 1996 European Economic Association Annual Conference for comments. Sug­
gestions by Saul Estrin and Cohn Mayer have improved the thesis considerably and 
I would like to thank them for their helpful comments as well.
Lastly, in many ways this dissertation would not have been possible without the 
constant encouragement and support of my parents, Helga and Erich to whom I 
would like to dedicate this dissertation.
Financial support of the European Commission, the Studienstiftung des Deutschen 
Volkes and the ESRC is gratefully acknowledged.
11
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis addresses two different but related topics that can arise during the devel­
opment of equity capital markets and which could possibly hinder their development: 
partial privatisation and shareholder rights. Both issues are developed in the context 
of transition economies in general and Russia in particular. Chapter 2 puts forward 
a theory of partial privatisation, i.e. a model that aims to explain why the state 
keeps some residual shares. Several recent surveys for Russia have shown that the 
state does often not actively use the voting rights of its residual shares. If this was 
true, partial privatisation could entrench management and hinder restructuring. It 
would also limit the supply of shares, which could lead to low liquidity. This would 
be likely to slow down the development of the equity capital market. However, the 
model in chapter 2 predicts that the remaining share packages are going to be sold 
off in the future. Another issue which holds back the development of this market 
is the fact that shareholder rights cannot be guaranteed by the state due to weak 
institutions. Chapter 3 contains an empirical examination of which firms honour 
shareholder rights and also provides a direct link between this problem and partial 
privatisation. Maybe surprisingly, some weak evidence is presented that shows that 
the residual state holding does not exert a negative influence with respect to the in­
troduction of shareholder rights, but might even be a weak positive force. Chapter 4 
proposes a mechanism, which could limit the problem of non-enforceable shareholder
12
rights over time.
This introductory chapter aims to give some empirical background for the partial 
nature of the privatisation process in Russia and derives different hypotheses from 
the literature for why this might be observed. The thesis does not aim to distinguish 
between the different hypotheses empirically, but instead adds one more model to 
the list which also could explain partial privatisation. Several qualitative arguments 
are provided for why this particular model is one of the more plausible ones in the 
context of Russia. In a second step this introductory chapter puts forward different 
hypotheses from the literature on the optimal amount of management ownership 
with respect to efficient corporate governance. The thesis adds the case where 
management should be allocated a comparatively large stake. Chapter 4 illustrates 
why this would be the optimal privatisation policy in the context of the introduction 
of shareholder rights.
1.1 Partied Privatisation
Partial privatisation is defined as privatisation where the state keeps some remain­
ing shares. Conceptually, a period where the state is a shareholder in a firm can 
be the outcome of two different strategies. First, it can be the desired outcome of 
the privatisation process that the state remains a shareholder. Second, partial state 
ownership can be a transition state when the desired outcome is complete privatisa­
tion. This is the case when the preferred sell-off process is a gradual one. A gradual 
sell-off process can consist of at least two, but possibly more auctions. Russia is one 
case where the sell-off process has been gradual so far. In the first stage of privatisa­
tion, lasting from 1992 to 1994, shares were auctioned off in exchange for so-called 
vouchers, which had been given for free to the population. In these auctions, on 
average, 30% of chartered capital was auctioned off. Another 50% was given away 
in closed auctions to insiders according to the most popular privatisation option. 
Vouchers stopped being traded by the end of the first stage of privatisation. These 
privatisation auctions were followed by the second stage of privatisation. On July
13
22 1994 President Yeltsin released a decree determining the basic concept of the 
second stage. According to this decree the remaining shares held by the state were 
to be divested through cash auctions and investment tenders, where the shares on 
offer were sold to the highest bidder. As will be shown below, these sell-offs were 
implemented, in general, not with one last auction, but often by several.
There are several data sources on residual state ownership in the case of Russia. 
Two early surveys of 1994 show the extent of the residual state ownership after the 
first stage of privatisation. First, according to a survey by the World Bank in mid 
1994, 30% of firms in the sample were still state controlled (SO), and the mean 
state holding amounted to 89%. In worker controlled firms (WO) the mean stake 
was 10%; in manager controlled (MO) it was 13%; and in outsider controlled (0 0 ) 
it was 12%. Overall, this implies a residual state ownership of 34%. The variance 
of the state stake was substantial.
_______ Table 1.1: World Bank Survey of 439 Industrial Firms, mid-1994
State ownership SO WO MO OO DN Total
mean 89 10 13 12 1 34
std dev 21 14 15 13 5 40
% of firms in sample 30 37 11 10 12 100
Source: Earle, Estrin, !jeshc renko, 1996
Second, a survey of seven regional state property funds provides data for 1994 also. 
In 28.7% of cases the state still held more than 20% after the voucher privatisation 
had largely been concluded.
Table 1.2: Survey of 7 Regional Property Funds, August 1994
Retained State Ownership 0 0.1-5 5.1-10 10.1-15 15.1-20 >20 Total
% 34.9 8.6 8.7 9.2 9.6 28.7 100.0
Source: Privatisation Project Regional Fund Survey, in Pistor and Turkewitz, 1994
Clearly, a substantial remaining share ownership by the state was to be expected 
towards the end of the first stage of privatisation, given the mechanism used for
14
privatisation. To assess the divestiture of the residual state stakes, more recent data 
provided by the Russian National Survey can be used. In this survey, a smaller 
sample of firms was analysed and a smaller average share ownership by the state is 
reported. Importantly, this survey indicates that the average ownership of the state 
was constant in 1995 but fell sharply in 1996. This indicates that the second stage 
of privatisation only gathered pace in 1996.
__________________ Table 1.3: The Russian National Survey
1994 1995 1996
State ownership 
Number of firms in survey
13
142
13
322
9
357
Source: Russian National Survey, in Blasi et al, 1997
More detailed information on state ownership reveals that in 1996 the median state 
ownership was 0% in the Russian National Survey as well as in the data that will be 
presented for the largest traded firms in chapter 3. The state seemed to have held 
on to relatively large stakes in a small number of firms. It is also noteworthy, that 
the state held on average higher stakes in the largest traded firms than in the more 
representative Russian National Survey.
Table 1.4: State Ownership by Percentile
Percentile of State ownership 
Russian National Survey, 1995 
Russian National Survey, 1996 
Large traded firms, 1996
5%
0
0
0
10%
0
0
0
25%
0
0
0
50%
9
0
0
75%
20
20
20
90%
38
32
40
95%
49
44
51
Source: Russian National Survey, in BIasi et al, 191)7
While this data shows the extent of the residual state ownership and the effect of 
the second stage of privatisation on the overall state ownership, this data is silent 
on how the residual stakes were being sold. Unfortunately, comprehensive data on 
the extent of sales in different firms is not available. However, table 1.5 illustrates 
several auctions in which the state sold off only a fraction of its remaining stake in
15
one given auction. This data is provided for the oil industry. The reason is that 
among the large firms, for which data is collected by financial firms, the oil industry 
has been the one for which the second stage of privatisation was implemented first.
In some cases listed in table 1.5, the state had not previously sold any shares in 
auctions to insiders or to the population. This was the case as some of the most 
valuable assets had been excluded from the general privatisation program. Further­
more, some of the firms are holding companies, created only after privatisation had 
already started. In this case it would have been the subsidiaries, of which shares 
had previously been sold in voucher auctions.
Outside the oil industry, there are some other examples of a partial privatisation 
strategy. For example, in Q3 1997 50% of Svjazinvest, the long distance commu­
nications firm, were sold off. The government has announced that another 25% is 
going to be sold during H2 1998. Perotti (1995) provides some evidence of partial 
privatisation in the early stages of the Hungarian privatisation program.
The shares in auctions in the second stage were sold to blockholders. The presidential 
decree that initiated the second stage of privatisation explicitly states that one goal 
of that stage is to create blockholders who could play a positive role in corporate 
governance. This was achieved by allocating the full package of shares that was put 
up for sale to the highest bidder. The sample of Blasi et al presented in table 1.6 
does show a slight increase in blockholdings. By early 1996 average blockholders 
held close to 30% in the Blasi et al sample as well as in the data presented in chapter 
3. This is due to the second stage of privatisation as well as block-building on the 
secondary market.
For partial privatisation there have been several explanations proposed in the litera­
ture, mostly in the context of privatisation programmes in Western countries. First, 
there are two different hypotheses which would tend to result in a permanent state 
holding of some shares. In particular, it has been proposed, that the state only 
partially sells off firms in order to be able to keep some influence over the firms. 
There are several hypotheses linked to this argument, depending on the underlying
16
Table 1.5: Partial Privatization in the Oil Industry
Company Date of auction % of shares sold remaining state ownership
Sibneft 2-2-96 14.3 85.7
1-9-96 15.0 70.7
20-9-96 19.0 51.7
30-12-98 0.7 51.0
12-5-97 51.0 0.0
KomiTEK 21-1-97 38.0 51.0
21-4-97 29.3 21.7
19-9-97 20.6 1.1
Lukoil 7-12-95 5.0 27.0
22-12-97 0.3 26.7
planned for Q2 1998 6.0 20.7
VNK 8-12-97 50.0 35.0
24-11-97 34.0 1.0
Slavneft 22-1-97 2.1 87.9
14-11-97 2.1 85.8
planned for 1998 19.7 66.1
TNK 18-6-97 40.0 51.0
20-12-97 48.7 2.3
16-3-98 0.1 2.2
Rosneft 30-3-98 75.0 25.0
planned for Q4 1998 21.3 3.7
Source: Brunswick Warburg
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Table 1.6: Blockholders in Russian irms
1994 1995 1996
Average holding of blockholder 11% 15% 16%
Companies with at least one blockholder 57% 71% 74%
Source: Blasi et al, 1997
assumption on the objective function of the state. First, Boes (1991) assumes that 
the state maximises social welfare while private owners maximise profits, denoted 
by II. The compromise between private and public shareholders takes place at the 
level of the board and the bargaining power depends on the extent of the residual 
shareholding of the state, denoted by 0 . The objective of the partially privatised 
firm therefore is to choose a price p for its output which maximises
* = e[s(p) + n(p)] + (i -  e)n(p) (1.1)
where S  denotes the consumer surplus. A 100% private firm maximises only profits, 
while a 100% public firm maximises only welfare. A privatised firm with some 
remaining public share-ownership maximises a weighted average of the two. On the 
other hand, Boes assumes that the larger the extent of privatisation (i.e. the smaller 
0 ) the further is the production possibility frontier shifted outwards. This implies 
that in general an optimal 0  > 0 is found in cases when the firm is active in less than 
fully competitive markets. Under perfect competition profit maximization implies 
maximization of welfare at the same time. This limits this theory to some extent. 
A second limitation is the implicit assumption that a private firm will be allowed 
to maximise profits even in a monopolistic market. However, this freedom is in 
general restricted by regulation. Boes consequently adapts his model by introducing 
asymmetric information. In particular, he assumes that the state as a shareholder 
learns about shocks to demand as well as about shocks to costs. The state as a 
regulator, on the other hand, only knows about the distributions of such shocks. 
The author can then show that partial privatisation is, under certain restrictions,
18
still the optimal outcome of the privatisation process, as regulation under incomplete 
information faces severe problems.
HYPOTHESIS la  (Boes, 1991): The observation of the state holding on to a resid­
ual package of shares can be explained by its improved access to information and 
increased influence on the management’s decision due to its representation on the 
board of directors. This improved information allows the state to maximise a 
weighted average of welfare and profits, as opposed to only profits, in industries 
that are less than fully competitive.
However, the assumption of the state as a benevolent dictator is a strong one. In 
particular, in transition economies, one principal reason for privatisation has been 
that the state was thought to have objectives other than profit maximization, such 
as employment, which could be detrimental to restructuring 1. Such objectives could 
result in inefficiencies and underperformance (see, for example, Estrin and Perotin, 
1991). Boycko et al (1992) as well as Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that gov­
ernments will find it harder to induce privatised firms to non profit-maximising be­
haviour, because government might have to ‘bribe’ management with money raised 
through distortionary taxation to implement certain policies. As in the setting of 
Boes, these arguments have to be placed in a setting of asymmetric information, as 
otherwise regulation could be used to fulfil the state’s objectives. Hart (1995) also 
stresses that even in the presence of agency costs, differences in asset ownership do 
not matter as long as contracts are complete. Privatisation in the context of asym­
metric information is, for example, modelled by Schmidt (1996), who argues that 
the crucial difference between privatised and state-owned firms is that the govern­
ment has less information about the firm if it does not also own it. If management 
has information superior to that of government it can be harder for the government 
to fulfil its other objectives. This, in turn, can increase the efficiency of privatised 
firms. To the extent that partial state ownership allows the state to keep receiving 
information on the firm, this could also explain residual share ownership by the
1 Furthermore, the literature on political economy illustrates that the objectives of politicians 
who maximise their election results do in general differ from those of a benevolent dictator.
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state.
HYPOTHESIS lb  (based on Schmidt, 1996): The observation of the state hold­
ing on to a residual package of shares can be explained by its improved access to 
information due to it being able to put directors on the board. This improved infor­
mation allows the state to implement its objectives other than profit maximization, 
such as securing a certain level of employment.
Estrin (1994) is more concerned with (ex ante) political constraints. He points out 
that distributing the shares to the general population does not take into account the 
interests of management and workers, who can potentially derail the privatisation 
process. For example, with enterprise managers well represented in the Russian 
parliament, a privatisation law favouring outside investors might never have been 
passed. In the context of partial privatisation, it can be argued that insiders were 
willing to allow for privatisation of some percentage of a given firm, but prevented 
the full sale. This could be a possibility, as the residual state ownership could have 
been thought to prevent a hostile take-over, at least in case managers expected that 
the state would not use the votes attached to its shares.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (based on E strin , 1994): The observation of the state holding on 
to a residual package of shares can be explained by political constraints, which did 
not allow for the complete sell-off of the firms.
In case the state is concerned about the revenues of privatisation the following four 
hypotheses have been proposed:
HYPOTHESIS 3a (based on Demougin and Sinn, 1992): The observation of the 
state holding on to a residual package of shares can be explained by its objective 
of minimising the costs of privatisation due to insufficient liquidity for a complete 
sell-off.
This hypothesis assumes that there is only a limited amount of capital that could 
be used to buy the shares, i.e., that investors are credit constrained. If the pool of 
capital is restricted, prices would clearly have to be lower for a large issue than for
20
a small one. Such an argument seems mainly applicable to an economy which is 
closed with respect to capital flows.
A similar argument has been put forward by Jenkinson and Mayer (1994), who 
argue that a disposal of assets in stages is the best strategy to avoid mispricing. 
While in the first auctions for many British privatisations underpricing was sub­
stantial, this effect decreased in subsequent auctions.
HYPOTHESIS 3a (Jenkinson and M ayer, 1994): The observation of the state 
holding on to a residual package of shares can be explained by its objective of 
minimising the costs of privatisation due to the mispricing of shares.
This argument implicitly assumes that the market-price that results in the secondary 
market the day after the initial privatisation auction, is closer to the fundamental 
value of the assets than the price set by the state for the privatisation auction. If 
the state had better information, the difference between issue price and market price 
would not necessarily be a cost of the privatisation process. The assumption that 
the market has superior information might be justified since the price in the capital 
market aggregates the information of all the participants in the trading process. 
This argument is related to Dewatripont and Roland (1993), who make a point on 
the timing of reforms in general, incorporating imperfect knowledge about optimal 
reforms on the side of policy makers. The main ingredient is that policy makers are 
learning about which reforms are optimal and/or how to implement them. The price 
set for the initial tenders could be interpreted as one issue about which policy makers 
will learn over time. Their model would also imply that the sell-off of state shares 
should be gradual. However, one question raised by these arguments is why the 
state does not immediately use a tender to avoid mispricing. Such tenders would 
result in a situation where the price in the initial auction is already the market 
price. If such mechanisms were employed, there could still be some underpricing, if 
investors are risk-averse and are less willing to bid if the outcome is highly uncertain. 
However, the marginal investor could be risk-neutral and in this case this would not 
apply. Moreover, the assumptions about the distribution of information in the above 
argument are rather strong. In the case of initial public offerings (IPO) of firms, it
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is assumed by most of the literature that the seller, i.e. the entrepreneur, has inside 
knowledge, whereas the market is at an informational disadvantage. Chapter 2 of 
this thesis provides a model which retains the assumption of a revenue maximising 
state, but assumes that the state as a seller has private information. Under these 
assumptions it is shown that the state can signal the quality of the firms (and the 
future macroeconomic environment) by retaining some shares in the firms to be 
privatised.
HYPOTHESIS 4 (chapter 2 of this thesis): The observation of the state holding 
on to a residual package of shares can be explained by its objective to maximise 
revenues and its ability to do that by signalling inside information on the value of 
the assets by a strategic choice of the amount of shares to be sold off.
The model is related to models of IPOs and in particular to Leland and Pyle (1977). 
One key difference is that the value of the firm in the model of chapter 2 depends 
on how much is sold off, whereas Leland and Pyle have to rely on a risk-averse 
entrepreneur whose utility rises the more is sold off due to improved diversification. 
Furthermore, Allan and Faulhaber (1989) propose a model where the firm has 
inside information. In their model firms can use underpricing in the initial share 
issue as a signal that the firm being sold is of high quality. Bad firms cannot copy the 
behaviour of good firms, because only good firms can underprice and nevertheless 
pay a high dividend in the next period. Subsequently, further equity is sold off 
and the price in the second issue depends on whether a firm was able to signal 
its high quality in the initial issue or not. Clearly, such a strategy only makes 
sense in the case of partial privatisation, as otherwise there would be no subsequent 
share-issue where the state could be rewarded for selling at a discount in the initial 
auction. However, for the case of a privatisation, a price signal as in the Allan and 
Faulhaber model is not possible. The high quality firm which is privatised is not able 
to signal its quality by artificially lowering its proceeds in the initial auction and 
paying dividends nevertheless, because the state obtains the revenues from the initial 
auction. Therefore, the proceeds from the first auction have no impact whatsoever 
on the financial situation of the firm.
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HYPOTHESIS 5 (Perotti, 1995): The observation of the state holding on to a 
residual package of shares can be explained by its objective to maximise revenues 
and its intention to demonstrate to market participants that it will refrain from 
expropriating shareholders.
Only if it is believed that the government is not going to expropriate shareholders 
will management operate efficiently and will investors attach a high valuation to 
the assets. One problem with this set-up is that it assumes that the policy maker 
does not change. In case political changes were expected the market price would 
not depend on whether the present government would be of an expropriating type 
or of a non-expropriating type.
It is difficult to distinguish between the different hypotheses and this thesis does 
not attempt to do this empirically. However, there are several arguments which - 
for the case of Russia - make hypothesis 4 more likely than rival hypotheses. First, 
it has to be realised that there is a very basic difference between the privatisation 
processes one would observe according to hypotheses 1 and 2 on the one hand and 
hypotheses 3 to 5 on the other hand. Both of the former hypotheses would argue 
for a privatisation process that is and remains partial, as the benefits which the 
state obtains from its holdings are in general constant over time. With respect to 
hypothesis 2 this is true unless the political environment would have changed in a 
way that allows further privatisation. Hypotheses 3 to 5, on the contrary, would 
imply that the observation of residual state ownership would be a temporary phe­
nomenon and that the final outcome of the privatisation process would be 100% 
private firms. For the oil industry, table 1.5 shows that the state has sold off its 
total residual holdings in some firms, providing some evidence in support of hypoth­
esis 3 to 5. However, in other industries residual holdings remain. As underlined 
by the objective of the Russian Ministry of Finance to collect about USD4bn in 
privatisation revenues for the federal budget during 1998, the privatisation process 
in Russia is not yet finished. In the absence of facts on the final sell-off patterns, 
only statements of government plans can be analysed. And indeed, according to 
the presidential decree on the second stage of privatisation the aim seems to be to
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transfer 100% of stakes into private hands apart from several ‘strategic enterprises’, 
which are going to remain state owned and are mostly in the defence industry, but 
also include some monopolies in other industries. This also would tend to provide 
some support for hypothesis 3 to 5. The privatisation plans seem to be driven by 
severe fiscal imbalances, which are typical in the first years of transition. In this 
situation, the generation of budget revenues has been of high importance to policy 
makers. This is in particular the case, as it has turned out to be very difficult to 
raise sufficient taxes in some of the transition economies (in particular in the FSU) 
since the countries are plagued by a comparatively large shadow economy. At the 
same time, taxation is rather costly in these economies as high tax rates on the 
official sector of the economy lead to large distortions in that sector. For example, 
high taxation is one of the reasons why more and more Russian firms use barter to 
escape taxation (see, for example Russian Economic Barometer). Given that it is, 
in general, the case that government debt markets are not very well developed in 
the initial phase of reforms, privatisation is seen as an important way to solve fiscal 
problems. Of course, privatisation only matters in this context if capital markets are 
imperfect or if there are gains in efficiency (i.e. if the firms become more valuable 
under private ownership). Otherwise, the state could borrow against future income 
from its state-owned firms, which would alleviate its fiscal constraint in exactly the 
same way as an outright sale. This line of argument, centering on a fiscal story can 
also be fitted to the initial privatisation program in Hungary, which was saddled 
with a very large stock of foreign debt. However, due to the perceived slowness of 
the privatisation efforts in Hungary the government changed tack and proceeded to 
sell off a larger extent to insiders than had previously been planned.
The other argument against hypothesis one, for the case of Russia, would be that 
partial privatisation has been the observed outcome in many firms which operate 
in industries where conditions are close to competitive, and the state is therefore 
unlikely to hold further shares in order to improve social welfare. The same argu­
ment can be used against the proposition of Perotti, as the state can most easily 
expropriate shareholders in regulated industries. Many Russian privatised firms are
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not regulated by the state in any meaningful way.
The argument against hypothesis lb) is slightly more difficult to make, as it relies on 
the unobservable attitude of government towards privatisation. If the government 
wanted for exogenous (maybe political) reasons to keep maximising employment as 
opposed to profits, it would be keen to keep a director on the board in order to obtain 
sufficient information to allow it to do so. However, this would go very much against 
the grain of the privatisation process and the initial impetus behind it. Accounts of 
the privatisation process so far stress how the process was pushed through in order 
to de-politicise the firms (Boycko et al, 1992). In this situation it seems unlikely 
that the privatisation process was implemented only partially in order to prevent a 
full depolitisation. However, it might have been the case that the state subsequently 
discovered that its voting rights attached to the shares could help it to push for other 
objectives on the reformist agenda. In particular, chapter 3 of this thesis presents 
some weak evidence, that the state as a shareholder might be able to increase the 
likelihood that shareholder rights are honoured. To the extent that the mechanism 
that is proposed in chapter 4 to overcome the problem of insufficient shareholder 
rights is second best, the state can raise welfare by pushing for shareholder rights.
The validity of hypothesis 2 is difficult to assess empirically. While there was sig­
nificant evidence of ex-ante political constraints on the privatisation process, which 
had to be passed by the communist dominated Russian parliament, there is less 
direct evidence that management can prevent the sell-off of the residual shares the 
state still holds. However, the absence of this direct evidence does not mean that 
hypothesis 2 does not explain some of the residual state holdings.
Hypothesis 3a is unlikely to hold for Russia. Boycko et al (1992) have been argu­
ing that lack of liquidity has not been the case during privatisation in Russia as 
foreign participation was in principal possible and Russia was characterised by very 
large capital outflows. In case domestic investors would have perceived shares in 
privatisation auctions to be underpriced due to a lack of liquidity (and not to be 
priced correctly at very low levels because of the high risk involved in these firms) 
this capital could have been used in the privatisation process. Also, there were no
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1restrictions for Russian banks to borrow abroad. Such borrowing could have been 
securitised with the shares to be acquired. In particular, if the shares were per­
ceived to be sold at undervalued prices due to liquidity constraints Western banks 
would have found it in their interest to provide such loans. However, illiquidity in 
the absence of tight legal restrictions preventing any international capital flows is 
interpreted by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) as being due to asymmetric information. 
Illiquidity implies that prices fall to a large extent when a given amount of shares 
is sold. Glosten and Milgrom argue that this is the case as buyers suspect that the 
seller has inside information. This is exactly the mechanism underlying hypothesis 
4 and allows the state to signal its inside information.
Hypothesis 3b is unlikely to hold for the case of Russia, as many of the firms had 
already been privatised in the first stage of privatisation. Following this stage, a 
market for shares had developed (taking over from the relatively liquid voucher 
market) and a market price was therefore already available. However, for some 
individual cases of privatisation this line of argument might well be relevant. For 
example, 51% of the telecom holding company Svjazinvest was sold off in late 1997, 
which is going to be followed by two more auctions for 25% in the course of 1998. 
For this firm, there had been no initial voucher privatisation which led to some 
uncertainty with respect to the appropriate price in the initial auction. However, this 
uncertainty was mitigated as many of the subsidiaries of Svjazinvest had been traded 
before the initial auction.. The same is true for some of the oil companies, most 
notably Rosneft. As pointed out above, hypothesis 3 also relies on the assumption 
that the state has no inside information vis-a-vis the (potentially foreign) buyer. 
This does not seem plausible, at least not for every firm.
With respect to hypothesis 5 it has to be realised that one basic characteristic 
of Russia has been the almost constant threat of a reversal on the political side. 
This is demonstrated by the victories of the Communists in the 1995 parliamentary 
election as well as the 1996 regional elections. In addition, there was a highly 
uncertain presidential election in 1996 and several health scares with respect to 
President Yeltsin between 1996 and 1998. This would undermine one of the most
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important assumptions of Perotti and makes it unlikely that investors are willing 
to pay higher prices based on the characteristics of the present government. All 
these factors underline the relevance of hypothesis 4 for the case of Russia. The 
underlying model for this hypothesis is developed in chapter 2 .
1.2 Corporate Governance
The question of corporate governance is closely connected with privatisation. The 
outcome of privatisation in terms of ownership structure is a key determinant for 
how well the corporate governance system works. However, an efficient system of 
corporate governance is also closely linked to another aspect of transition: the build­
ing of institutions. Whether institutions like a bankruptcy procedure or shareholder 
rights are implemented by governments does affect the functioning of corporate 
governance. However, to some extent firms can introduce such rights even in the 
absence of state guarantees.
One of the most important issues with respect to corporate governance, in particu­
lar for transition economies, is the issue of ability versus incentives of management. 
From a theoretical point of view, a system of corporate governance has to be con­
structed which facilitates that the most able person is allocated the job of manager 
and that his incentives are optimal. However, those two objectives are not necessar­
ily consistent with each other. Assuming that the productivity of the firm depends 
both on the manager’s ability as well as on costly efforts by the manager, there is a 
moral hazard problem. In a standard principal agent setting, the cost of the man­
ager of generating a profit n is denoted by C(tt, t), where t represents the ability of 
the manager. The principal does not know t, but knows the distribution from which 
it is drawn. An extreme example for the costs of management to increase profits 
could be that he stops to expropriate shareholders by stealing. To induce some effort 
from management, the principal must offer a compensation schedule that depends 
on profits, for example in a linear form: s +  r 7r, where s and r are constants. As
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management maximises his payoff, it sets optimally
dC(7r, t)
dn = r (1 .2 )
Managerial effort is set efficiently in case r = 1. However, such a payment scheme 
might induce short-term profit maximization, possibly by running down the assets 
of the firm (Holmstroem, 1982). Therefore, the payment must be linked to future 
profits as well. McMillan (1995) observes that this is done in Western countries 
by stock options, which are in general not available in transition economies due to 
the rudimentary state of the stock markets. McMillan points out that a possible 
solution of this incentive problem is to give management shares. Pinto et al (1993) 
report evidence for Poland where state-firm managers motivation was long run as 
they expected that they would acquire shares at low prices when the firms were 
eventually privatised. But clearly, if r  is interpreted as the percentage of shares 
given to management, the higher r, the less likely is it that management with a 
low ability can be removed, at least if there are significant private benefits from 
controlling the firm such that management is not easily bribed out of its job. Due 
to this trade-off it is a priori not clear how policy makers should structure the 
corporate governance system2.
HYPOTHESIS 6  (McMillan, 1995): In general management should hold a positive 
stake in the firm, but less than 1 0 0 %; 0  < r <  1 .
For transition economies there is a presumption that pre-privatisation management 
is often of low ability, as the skills needed under the state-planned economy were 
very different from the ones required in a market environment. Empirically, Bar- 
beris et al (1995) present some evidence from Russian privatised retail shops that 
restructuring was not significantly correlated with management’s incentive schemes, 
but strongly with new management. Johnson and Loveman (1995) obtain similar 
conclusions from Polish case studies. Such findings would tend to imply that the 
firm should optimally be sold off to outsiders, preferably using auctions. In case
2In this context preference shares, i.e. shares without voting rights, could in general improve 
efficiency.
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there are no large differences in private benefits of control among different bidders, 
such auctions would tend to result in the investor winning the auction which can 
install the most able management3. To the extent that the expected ability is higher 
for management that is installed after an auction than for incumbent management, 
this new management should then receive more high-powered incentives than would 
be optimal for incumbent management: r> r.
HYPOTHESIS 7 (based on Feldman and Mehra, 1993): Firms should be sold by 
auction, which increases the likelihood that the most able bidder is going to run the 
firm. Given that the expected ability of the auction’s winner is in general higher 
than the expected ability of the incumbent management, the winning management 
should get more high powered incentives (ownership) than incumbent management: 
r> r
It has been argued that benefits of sales to outsiders in an environment of weak legal 
institutions should take the form of block sales. For Russia, chapter 3 presents some 
evidence that shareholder rights are not easily enforceable. The variability of the 
index for shareholder rights indicates that many firms do not honour shareholder 
rights, presumably due to weak legal institutions. Bergloef (1995) hypothesises that 
in such an environment control-oriented finance (i.e. investors with concentrated 
equity or debt holdings, which do intervene actively in the firm’s investment policies) 
is superior to arms-length finance (holding a diversified portfolio without direct 
interference) as it relies less on a well defined legal system. His hypothesis is given 
some credence by La Porta et al (1996). They find that in countries with weak 
legal systems, equity and debt holdings are typically very concentrated. Chapter 3 
gives some evidence that large outside blockholders do seem to have some power to 
press for the introduction of shareholder rights. Similarly, Blast and Shleifer (1996) 
report that the likelihood of outside board representation increases with the size 
of the outside share ownership. However, this policy prescription seemed difficult 
to implement due to political pressure. In particular, there were formidable ex-
3 Comelli and Lee (1995) have shown that auctions should take on a more comp heated form in 
case private benefits are likely to differ significantly.
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ante political constraints against outsider privatisation (see Boycko et al, 1995). 
The Russian parliament, largely dominated by the Communist Party, managed to 
prevent such a privatisation programme. Furthermore, management seems to try 
to prevent sales of shares to outsiders. One of the main buyers of shares sold by 
workers has been management. The ownership resulting in the Russian case is 
described in most detail by Blast et al (1997). In their sample of small and medium 
sized firms, insiders owned 58% of shares in 1996, down from 65% in 1994. Top 
management held 10%, up from 7% directly after the privatisation in 1994. In a 
separate question, management professed on average to aim for ownership of 50%. 
In 1996 employees were majority owners in 65% of firms. These figures underline 
the high extent of inside ownership. Employees have sold some of their shares to 
outsiders, but about half of their shares were sold to management. Management 
apparently could not prevent sales to outsiders completely, but managed to slow 
the process down. However, these developments were mainly recorded between 1994 
and 1995. In 1996 the stake of insiders even rose slightly. From the theoretical 
point of view, management would have tried to block the sales of shares to workers 
in the same way as it blocked sales to outsiders if it had believed that it could 
not prevent workers from selling their shares to outsiders. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that management succeeded in preventing workers from selling out their 
shares. Frydman et al (1996) find in a survey of voucher funds, that management 
coerced workers into not selling and also, that workers would frequently be unwilling 
to sell. They believe that the latter might be true as workers are aiming to keep 
the firm insider dominated in order to keep their jobs. Furthermore, they point 
out that Russian voucher funds, one of the most important outside shareholders 
in the direct aftermath of privatisation, were regulated such that they would focus 
on the trading of securities, rather than on taking large stakes in individual firms. 
In particular, funds were limited to acquire no more than 10% in a single firm4. 
Filatotchev et al (1995) report that many companies require that the buyer and 
seller of a share need to attend the company’s registered office in order to transfer 
shares. Furthermore, some company charters include the requirement to offer shares
4However, it turned out that this particular restriction was never enforced.
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to management first. Shleifer and Vasiliev (1996) report that managers were also 
employing formal trust agreements to prevent workers from selling to outsiders. Such 
behaviour resulted in insider ownership being preserved for longer than had initially 
been hoped. Nevertheless, blockholder (defined as holding more than 5% of charter 
capital) existed in 57% of firms surveyed by Blasi et al During the second stage 
of privatisation, shares were allocated to one winner of the auction, whereas the 
voucher auction resulted in much more disbursed share-ownership, as every person 
who entered his voucher into the auction received a corresponding allocation of 
shares. The distribution of shares to insiders also resulted in disbursed ownership, 
as the bulk of the shares were in general allocated to workers. Therefore, the second 
stage of privatisation helped to increase the number of blockholders in the Russian 
firms, in spite of difficulties in creating blocks by purchases in the secondary market. 
Data for the increase in the average holding of the blockholder as well as in the rise 
in the share of companies with at least one blockholder has been presented above.
Secondly, even if outside shareholders managed to build up a significant stake in a 
firm, there is some evidence that their control over management remains limited. In 
particular, the variability of the index of shareholder rights indicates that many firms 
do not honour shareholder rights, in spite of the existence of outside blockholders. 
While chapter 3 provides some evidence that an increase in the size of the largest 
blockholder increases the likelihood of shareholder rights being introduced, there is 
some evidence that even large blockholders can have severe difficulties in controlling 
management. Blasi et al (1997) report that in 1994 outsiders were in general denied 
to place directors on the board, although they owned on average 2 1 % of the firm in 
their sample. Only in a few cases did outsiders and insiders find a compromise, which 
resulted in some outside representation on the boards. This left the large majority 
of firms in the control of management. From 1995 the representation of outsiders 
rose. This was mainly achieved not through open voting in shareholder meetings, 
but through private deals between management and some outsiders. In 1996, 31% 
of seats were held by outsiders. However, this figure is likely to overstate the true 
extent of outside influence, as management controlled firms are counted as outsiders.
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Also, it is likely that outsiders more easily gain representation in firms which are less 
valuable (where more restructuring is necessary), as insiders fight less in order to 
keep these assets under their control. In any case, even a board representation of 31% 
is not enough to exert control against the 69% held by management and the state, 
in particular, as the state until 1996 in general voted in fine with managements’ 
proposals. This would still leave the majority of Russia’s valuable firms in the 
control of management. Similarly, Blasi et al (1997) report that of the 30% of firms 
that had exchanged their directors between 1992 and 1996, 80% of the replacements 
were from within the company. Furthermore, as late as 1996 60% of managers were 
opposed to making financial data available to outside investors5. Boycko et al (1995) 
report that some managers physically threaten challengers at shareholder meetings, 
rig shareholder votes or illegally change corporate charters. More generally, Boone 
and Fedorov (1997) report for the case of Russia, a widespread disregard for the 
law at every level of decision making. Given this evidence a model is developed 
in chapter 4 in which incumbent management cannot be replaced and therefore, 
ability is not modelled. In particular, the model focuses on investment decisions 
and shareholder rights in relation to management ownership.
HYPOTHESIS 8  (based on Chapter 4): To the extent that institutional weaknesses 
make it impossible (or very costly) to replace incumbent management, the trade-off 
between ability and incentives collapses and management should be given further 
increased ownership r> r . Institutional weaknesses can to some extent be mitigated 
by management behaviour.
It is noteworthy, that in the context of chapter 4 preference shares for management 
would not increase efficiency since there is no mechanism to replace management, 
even in cases where management does not hold any voting rights.
Empirically, Earle, Estrin and Leshchenko (1996) do not find that differences in
5 A good example of how management cannot easily be made accountable to outside shareholders 
is the case of Komineft, where management in 1994 diluted outside shareholders in an apparently 
illegal manner. This violation could not be rectified by a court as laws were unclear and the local 
administration was on the side of management.
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ownership translate in different strategies when it comes to restructuring. Similarly, 
changes in sales cannot be explained by differences in ownership. Capacity utilisation 
is similar among firms with dominant worker ownership, management ownership and 
state ownership. Lastly, when abstracting from de-novo firms, they do not find an 
impact of ownership on changes in employment. Blasi et al (1997) report that 
worker dominated firms did in general not pay higher wages or offer better social 
benefits to its workers. Blasi et al (1997) report that firms with outside directors 
on the board are more likely to restructure, but the evidence is not very strong and 
holds only for some measures of restructuring. Changing the director does not seem 
to matter for most indicators of restructuring; maybe that is the case because in 
80% of such cases directors were replaced by insiders. The percentage of outside 
ownership and the amount of outside blockholding also does not have any influence 
on restructuring in the Blasi et al (1997) sample. However, Earle and Estrin (1996) 
find that privatised firms are more likely to restructure and tend to have higher 
productivity. Furthermore, they find that it is in particular management ownership 
which spurs increases in productivity as well as long term restructuring, measured 
by the correlation between the products sold before and after the introduction of 
reforms. This seems to give some limited empirical foundation for hypothesis 8 .
1.3 The Structure o f the Thesis
Chapter 2  develops the model on which hypothesis 4 of this introduction is based. It 
adds one more plausible theoretical explanation for the partial nature of privatisation 
in Russia. Chapter 4 puts forward the theoretical model on which hypothesis 8  of 
this introduction is based. It provides a theoretical argument for distributing a 
comparatively large amount of shares to management of privatized firms. This is 
done in the context of an analysis of the introduction of shareholder rights. The 
model is a dynamic one where management builds up stakes in firms over time. 
Only once management has built up sufficiently large stakes are shareholder rights 
introduced. Chapter 3 provides an initial empirical look at the question of the
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introduction of shareholder rights and sets the stage for chapter 4. The model is a 
static one and is to some extent a stripped-down version of the fuller model developed 
in chapter 4. It is nevertheless useful for an initial empirical analysis. First, given the 
data available it is not possible to test the dynamic model of chapter 4. In particular, 
data on insider ownership, which is the driving force of model 4, is not available. 
Furthermore, I have only data at one point in time, which makes it ill-suited for 
testing a dynamic model. Second, the data of early 1996 should provide very much 
an initial look on the issue of shareholder rights, given that the second stage of 
privatisation is still on-going in 1998. A static model therefore seems appropriate 
for the early 1996 data.
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Chapter 2
After Initial Privatisation: W hy is 
the Divestiture of Residual 
State-Owned Stakes Delayed ?
2.1 Introduction
There is a considerable variation across transition economies with respect to the 
implementation of privatisation programs. In Russia privatisation is comparatively 
far advanced. At the end of 1995, about 80% of the industrial enterprises (measured 
by employment) had been ‘privatised’. However, the label ‘privatised’ does not mean 
that the state has transferred all shares in these companies to private agents. On 
the contrary, a World Bank Survey carried out in the summer of 1994, found that 
only in 35% of ‘privatised’ Russian firms the state held no shares. In 17% of firms 
the state ownership was between 0% and 10%, and in 19% of firms between 10% and 
20%. In Hungary, the state still held shares in 34% of large firms, in 23% of which 
the state holding was below 50% (Pistor and Turkewitz, 1994)■ However, this was 
partly a result of the fact that the privatisation in Russia happened in two stages. 
In the first stage, shares were allocated to insiders and sold in voucher auctions to 
the population. This phase ended in 1994. The residual share-ownership reported
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by Pistor and Turkewitz are the ones at the end of the first stage of privatisation. 
During the second stage of privatisation, which was introduced by a presidential 
decree in July 1994, shares were sold off for cash in auctions or investment tenders 
to blockholders.
Figure 2 .1 : Sequential privatisation
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This chapter is concerned with the second stage of privatisation. In this sense 
privatisation can be a misnomer for some firms. In case more than 50% of charter 
capital has been sold in the first stage of privatisation, the firm was already privatised 
and the auctions in the second stage are more precisely referred to as a divestiture 
of residual shares held by the state. Only in case less than 50% had been sold off 
in the first stage (which is true only for a minority of the Russian firms) the second 
stage of privatisation is a privatisation in the precise sense of the word. However, 
given that the term ‘privatisation’ is in general use also for the second stage, I shall 
stick to this term throughout this chapter.
In the auctions of the second stage it can be observed that the state did not always 
sell-off its complete residual holdings in one single auction, but sold only a fraction 
thereof, as has been shown for the case of the oil industry by the data reported in 
the introduction. These findings raise two questions: Why did the state not sell 
everything, given the prior commitment to privatisation ? And secondly, how can 
the variation in the withheld stakes be explained ?
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The answer to the first question is given using a signalling framework: A model is 
constructed where the state has private information about the future macro-state of 
the economy. Its objective is to maximize proceeds from privatisation. The stakes 
the state keeps in the firms can then serve as signals. The larger the retained stakes, 
the more likely is a good macro-state in the future. These signals can be credible 
because they are costly. Assuming that the sale of a block of shares to a private 
investor improves corporate governance and therefore the value of these firms, the 
state pays a price when holding on to some shares. In this context it should be noted 
that during the first stage of privatisation, shares were largely sold to dispersed 
owners (workers and the population). Only in the second stage were shares sold 
to blockholders which were better positioned to improve corporate governance. On 
the other hand, signalling a good future macro-state increases the price investors 
are willing to pay for the shares sold today. A revenue maximizing state then 
might find it rational not to sell off 100% of its stakes. With different corporate 
governance gains for different firms the model can also explain why different degrees 
of privatisation are observed. If the potential corporate governance gains for a given 
firm are large, the state has a larger incentive to sell the firms today to realize these 
gains. Therefore, it is likely to sell more of firms with large potential corporate 
governance gains.
There exists an extensive literature on the sequencing of reforms, and in particular 
on the sequencing of privatisation. Most papers have so far focused either on the 
efficient allocation of resources or on political economy considerations ( e.g., Roland, 
1994 or Boycko et al, 1992). However, in the recent past, the revenue generating 
function of privatisation seems to have become more important. This was mainly 
driven by the severe difficulties the federal government encountered in financing 
its deficit. Up to and including 1994, the government was still relying on direct 
credits from the Central Bank of Russia. This changed after the initiation of the 
IMF program in 1995. In 1995 about 50% of the federal budget deficit of 6 % of 
GDP was financed by the sale of domestic debt at an average real interest rate of 
more than 150%. Such rates led to a very quick build up of the stock of federal
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domestic debt, which reached 19% of GDP at the end of 1996 - from close to 0% 
at the beginning of reform in 1992. In this situation revenues from privatisation 
were seen as a potentially very important source of revenue. The prime importance 
of this objective of privatisation was explicitly mentioned in a presidential decree 
of July 22 1994, which laid out the basic concept for the so called second stage of 
privatisation. That the importance of maximizing revenues (as opposed to letting 
the firms use the money for investment) was rising over time becomes apparent from 
two further presidential decrees. On May 1 1  1995 President Yeltsin signed a decree 
which altered the shares different institutions received from privatisation revenues. 
Not surprisingly, the share intended for the federal budget increased substantially 
from 1 0 % of revenues to 35%. A further presidential decree of September 18 1996 
raised the share of privatisation revenues that goes to the federal budget to 71%. 
This happened mainly at the expense of the share of the actual enterprise to be 
privatised, which previously had received 14% of revenues, but which would from 
then on not receive any money from the sale. The local budgets also saw their share 
cut. Lastly, the fact that enterprises were sold in auctions to the highest bidders, 
and not at a pre-set price as had been the case in some of the British privatisations, 
would also imply that revenues were maximized.
If one accepts that the government has indeed been trying to maximize revenues, 
there is still the question to be answered why this should be the case ? After all, 
citizens are presumably indifferent between the state giving firms away for free to 
the population and higher taxation on the one hand and selling the firms at high 
prices and correspondingly lower taxation. This would in particular seem to be the 
case as the use of voucher auctions would eliminate potentially unwarranted distri­
butional consequences of a sale. However, this argument would tend to ignore two 
things. First, there is a real efficiency gain from allocating large shareholdings to 
blockholders as opposed to giving them away to the population. While these block­
holders could then subsequently be taxed instead of acquiring shares at a high price, 
management might well try to hide any profits which makes subsequent taxation 
difficult. Therefore, not maximizing revenues would lead to unwarranted distribu­
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tional consequences, i.e. a transfer from tax payers to the blockholder who obtains 
the shares. Second, maximizing revenues is in general an efficient mechanism to al­
locate the firms to the bidder who can use the assets most efficiently, at least when 
there are no significant differences in private benefits between different bidders (for 
an exception see Comelli and Lee, 1995). If the state was not maximizing revenues 
and would as a result allocate the shares to an inefficient buyer, social welfare would 
be lower as well. Lastly, taxation induces inefficiencies, unless lump-sum taxes can 
be implemented. One standard result of public sector economics shows that taxing 
consumption leads to a deadweight loss the size of which is proportional to the tax 
rate to the power of two. This implies that increasing tax rates further raises the 
welfare costs substantially. If the alternative to privatisation revenues was taxation 
of personal income, distortionary effects are also likely to be significant. In a study 
by Hausman (1981), it is shown that the US federal taxes at 1988 rates reduced 
labour supply by about 6.5%. Furthermore, the deadweight loss from all taxes on 
labour for the average married man were 13.5% of revenues raised by these taxes. 
These distortions are likely to be even more important in transition economies. In­
direct evidence for this point comes from several sources: first, the mere size of the 
shadow economy implies that tax rates for the formal economy have to be relatively 
high (as expenditures are distributed in general to the whole economy, but revenues 
are only raised from the formal economy). Given that the cost of taxation increases 
rapidly in line with higher tax rates, increasing tax rates would be especially dis­
tortionary in an economy like Russia. Secondly, the fact that the government is 
apparently finding it difficult to raise taxes, largely because of tax avoidance, would 
also tend to underline that taxation must be comparatively distortionary in Rus­
sia. The difficulties in raising taxes are demonstrated by the fact that Russia has 
collected only 32% of GDP in general government revenues in 1996, of which it is 
thought that less than 60% was collected in cash. It is underlined further by the fact 
that the IMF has delayed several tranches of its loan to the Russian government, 
citing as the main reason that the floor for cash revenue collection as specified in 
the IMF agreement has not been met. In such circumstances it would be rational 
for policy makers to maximize revenues from privatisation.
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Although it seems clear that political economy type of objectives are still of impor­
tance in most transition economies, the model outlined below can be used to analyse 
the relative shift in the objective function of policy makers towards the generation 
of revenues.
There are two strings of literature related to the topic of timing of privatisation. 
First, there is the literature on the issue of seasoned securities (equity) as pioneered 
by Myers and Majluf (1984) and developed further by Krasker (1986). These pa­
pers use signalling models to describe equity issues. In particular, they show that 
whenever management has positive inside knowledge about the old assets of a firm, 
management might not want to issue new equity for a new investment project as 
then new shareholders might capture some of the returns of the old assets. However, 
there exist important differences to the model presented in this chapter. First of all, 
these papers assume that management maximizes the wealth of old shareholders, 
who keep their shares and who are assumed to be passive (i.e., they do not buy the 
new issue). In this model, only the proceeds from the sale are maximized. This also 
allows one to examine how the welfare of the old shareholders changes. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that the percentage of the equity sold by the state affects the value of 
the company (due to improved corporate governance) 1.
Secondly, Leland and Pyle (1977) analyse signalling by an entrepreneur who wants 
to go public, but does not sell 1 0 0 % of the shares in order to signal the high quality of 
his firm. Here, the cost of signalling arises because the entrepreneur cannot diversify 
the project-specific risk optimally. However, the value of the project in their model 
does not depend on the amount of equity sold. In the model presented in this 
chapter there is a feed-back between the amount of equity sold and the value of the 
firms. Furthermore, if risk-averse agents were introduced, and assuming that the 
state is risk neutral, results exactly opposite to Leland and Pyle are obtained. For 
considerations of the firm inherent risk, it is more efficient for the state to hold on
Tt is also possible that the total revenue generated affects the value of the company due to a 
better chance of stabilizing the economy. However, this should be modelled in a political economy 
framework and not in a corporate finance setting.
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longer to the shares until that risk has decreased. More recently, Rock (1986) sparked 
a wave of papers on Initial Public Offerings. These models are mainly concerned 
to explain the apparent underpricing of new issues (relative to their subsequent 
valuation in the secondary market). Most of these models explain this phenomenon 
with rationing by an underwriter and often hinge on the modelling of the financial 
intermediary. However, the behaviour of underwriters does not seem to be crucial 
with respect to transition economies2. Allan and Faulhaber (1989) propose a model 
without underwriters where the firm has inside information. In their model firms 
can use underpricing as a signal that they are a good firm. Bad firms do not copy the 
behaviour of good firms, because only good firms can underprice and nevertheless 
pay a high dividend in the next period. Subsequently they sell further equity and 
get the price that is adequate for a good firm. Observing the low shareprices in 
transition economies it is tempting to examine whether low prices are used as signals. 
However, a price signal as in the Allan and Faulhaber model is not possible because 
the state obtains the proceeds, not the firms. Finally, Perotti (1995) applies a 
model to privatisation where the amount of shares a state owns in a firm serves 
as a commitment device not to interfere by adverse changes of regulatory policies. 
However, with respect to macroeconomic stabilisation, it is unlikely that such a 
commitment device is needed. Even after the state has sold all its firms there would 
still be very high costs of discontinuing macroeconomic stabilisations. Furthermore, 
in Perotti*s model governments cannot commit the following government to good 
policies. In unstable political situations as in transition economies, it is therefore 
more likely that governments signal information instead of restraining their actions. 
Furthermore, this model analyses the sale of a portfolio of firms. While complicating 
the signalling game this allows for some interesting results (which will in particular 
become clear when the existence of pooling equilibria is analysed)3.
Against this background, my model focuses on questions different from those in the 
corporate finance literature. First, this chapter analyses whether the amount of
2In transition economies there are often no underwriters involved in equity issues.
3In the Perotti model, the state could signal its commitment by keeping some of the firms in
its portfolio instead of using partial privatization.
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privatisation can act as a screening device between good and bad firms still held by 
the state. This is linked to the question whether the state has an incentive to sell 
good or bad firms first. Second, it examines whether it can be optimal to sell all of 
the state-held shares immediately, or whether it can be rational to hold on to these 
shares for a longer time.
The chapter proceeds in the following way: In section 2.2, a model is presented where 
the state has inside information when selling its firms. In section 2.3 separating 
as well as pooling equilibria are constructed. Both equilibria are interpreted and 
their properties are examined. Section 2.4 examines the welfare effects of signalling. 
Section 2.5 reaches conclusions.
2.2 The M odel
2.2.1 A gents
There are two agents, the state and investors. The state owns stakes in two firms, 
denoted by subscripts 0 and 1 respectively. Both holdings are normalized to 1 . The 
state has already decided to sell its stakes to the investors, but it is not able to 
commit itself to do this under all circumstances. The state still has to decide about 
the time pattern of the sale.
2.2.2 Tim e Pattern
For simplicity it is assumed that there are only two time periods in which the state 
can sell shares of the firms. At to the state determines a fraction of its holdings of 
firm 0  (ao) and a fraction of its holdings of firm 1 (ai) to be sold at t0. Obviously, 
0 < cii < 1 . At ti the rest of the states’ shareholdings (1  — a*) are sold off.
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2.2.3 Firms
The two firms are of different types: one of the firms is good and one is bad (denoted 
by subscripts g and b, respectively). The variable 5 is a binary variable, which 
denotes which of the two firms is the good one. If 5 equals 0 firm 0 is good and if s 
equals 1 firm 1 is good. The value of a firm at the end of the game depends on its 
type. This type-dependent part is called /*. Also, the value of both firms depends 
on the variable n, denoting the state of nature at t\. Let Vu denote the value of firm 
i at time t. Its value at t\ equals
Vn = n  +  /i(ai),Vi € {0,1} (2.1)
where
> f[(a) fo r  s =  0 (firm 0 is good)
/ 5 (a) and f 0, /J > 0  (2 .2 )
< / i ( a) f 07 3 =  1 (firm 1 is good)
The first order derivatives of both type-specific parts of the firm values with respect 
to the amount of the shares sold, //, is positive, as gains from corporate governance 
make the firm the more valuable the more is sold to private investors at to- If s = 0, 
i.e. firm 0 is the good one, the marginal corporate governance gains from the sell-off 
are larger for firm 0 than for firm 1 and vice versa4. In particular, it is assumed that 
f(a )  has been linearised and therefore
fi(ai) = f t +  7 Vi € {0,1} (2.3)
where ft, 7 * are constants and 7 5 > 76  > 0. This means that the true value of a 
firm depends on the state of nature as captured by n, on a constant (3 according 
to its type, on the amount of shares sold off at to as well as on a type-dependent 
constant 7 . A motivation for this function can be found in appendix B5. In principal, 
it would not have to be the case that a linear function is chosen. While a closed
4In this sense, ‘good’ firm is a misnomer. To be more precise, a ‘good’ firm is a firm with large
potential corporate governance gains.
5Essentially, it is a linearized version of a f(a) function derived in the framework of Shleifer and
Vishny (1986).
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solution without specifying f(a) is not possible, the model could be solved for other 
specifications of f(a). As long as this function has a positive first order derivative 
with respect to a, which is continuous, the results are robust. In particular, it 
is straightforward to see that a second order polynomial would lead to analogous 
results6.
2.2.4 Information Structure
At to nature draws the random variable n  from the (ex-ante) cumulative distribution 
function Q(n), defined from 0 to oo. The ex-ante expected value of n is denoted by 
ne. Nature also draws s which is 0  or 1 with equal probabilities. The two variables 
are independently distributed. Both variables are only observed by the state. At 
ti, s and n are revealed to the market. The distribution of s, Q(n), the objective 
function of the state and the functions fi are common knowledge. The introduction 
of the variable s as a modelling device is helpful as it allows to specify both sources 
of uncertainty explicitly, which facilitates the notation of the model. It also clarifies 
that the problem the investors have to solve is one with two unknown variables and 
two signals, a0 and a\.
2.2.5 Strategies
The objective of the state is to maximize the present value of its revenues. Its 
strategy is a mapping of the two random variables s and n on aQ and a im.
Ss : { s ,n } -  > { c l q , c l  1} (2.4)
6However, in case the function /  becomes discontinuous, the modelling becomes more compli­
cated as different cases must be distinguished. In particular, if corporate governance gains only 
start after a minimum amount has been sold, this would imply that the state can only reach a 
separating equilibrium in case a sufficient amount of shares has been sold. The gains from such an 
equilibrium would then need to be traded off against selling more than would be consistent with 
the true value of n. Using such functions /  would tend to put further restrictions on the existence 
of a separating equilibrium.
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It is assumed that there is a large number of identical and risk-neutral investors who 
maximize their expected wealth at t \ .  Furthermore, it is assumed that investors 
do not face any wealth constraints. The two assets are the only ones available 
to investors apart from the risk-free asset which yields the known interest rate r. 
Therefore, they demand all the shares the state issues if the expected yield is greater 
than, or equal to, r. They demand nothing if the expected yield is smaller than r 
7. If two investors offer the same amount for an asset, a coin is tossed to determine 
the new owner8. The strategy of the investors is the following: at to they will bid 
hio for each firm and at t\ they will bid hn for firm 0 and 1. Their strategy is a 
mapping of ao and a\ on the prices they pay in the two periods:
Sinv : {flo?ai } — >  { h o o j h o i , h i o , h i i }  (2.5)
Given that at t \  all information is public and investors behave competitively, hn  
will exactly equal (1  — a i )V n , i.e. the true value of the remaining shares up for sale. 
Therefore, the focus is on the strategies of investors at t Q,
S in v ' =  {aojai } — >  {^oojfiio} (2.6)
Having observed how much the state sells in each firm, investors update their beliefs 
conditioning on these signals. Their conditional beliefs are a mapping that associates 
each pair of quantities ao, ai with probability functions p(.|ao, a\) on [0 ,1] where 
p(s|ao, ai) is the probability investors attach to the type of firm, i.e. to the value of 
s, given the two quantities sold at to- Similarly, Q ( . \a o ,a i )  denotes the cumulative 
probability function of n, the state of nature dependent part of the firms’ values, 
after investors have observed ao and a i.
In the context of the second stage of the Russian privatisation program, this model 
can be interpreted in the following way: n can be thought of as representing the
7Instead of a perfectly competitive environment it can be assumed that two homogeneous in­
vestors act in a Bertrand fashion. This would result in the same outcome but is presumably a
more realistic description of the market for privatized firms.
8 Given these assumptions all investors will always bid the same amount and the winner will
always be determined by the toss of a coin. However, this chapter does not focus on which investor
will buy the shares. For an examination of these issues see Comelli and Lee, 1995.
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state of nature at t\, a large n resembling a good (reformist) state and a low n 
a bad (reactionist) state. At to, policy makers know better than anyone else how 
influential they will be in the next period. Therefore, they can make a more informed 
judgement on whether t\ will be a reformist state of nature or not. Alternatively, 
the value of n could depend on some unobservable characteristics of policy makers: 
only they themselves know their personal objective function. The assumption that 
the state has superior information on the type of firm can be justified because the 
state has been the owner of the assets for the last decades and often still owns a 
considerable amount of the shares. Furthermore, the state is likely to have some 
inside information on how good the management of a particular firm is, given that 
management had been installed by the state. In this case the state has inside 
knowledge about potential gains from corporate governance, at least vis-a-vis outside 
investors. Privatisation is assumed to improve the corporate governance mechanism 
so as to increase profits of the privatized firms. This is in fine with empirical findings 
of Boardman and Vining (1989). Therefore it is the sell-off as such which affects the 
valuation of the firm. Furthermore, the larger the stake an outside investor buys 
in the firm, the more likely it is that he is powerful enough to improve the firm’s 
performance9. However, in Russia, most of the firms in which shares were sold 
during the second stage of privatisation, had already private owners as shares had 
been sold to insiders and in voucher auctions to the population. Would an additional 
sell-off nevertheless improve efficiency ? As the first stage of privatisation has failed 
to create major blockholders, it can be argued that it was only the second stage, 
that would create blockholders, which in turn would tend to monitor management 
more closely and make the firms more efficient. This would in particular be the case 
given the evidence provided in the introduction on how management was aiming to 
prevent the sales of workers’ shares to outsiders, i.e. the creation of blockholders on 
the secondary market. Interestingly, Boardman and Vining provide some evidence 
that enterprises in mixed ownership also perform worse than 1 0 0 % private firms. 
While their evidence is not clear on whether mixed ownership firms perform better
9 See also appendix B for a theoretical derivation as well as Chapter 3 for some related empirical 
findings.
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or worse than state owned firms, this finding would indicate that there should be 
substantial efficiency gains from further sell offs.
Given this interpretation of n and /(a ), the question could be raised whether f should 
not depend on n. And indeed it seems plausible that the extent of the benefits of 
corporate governance depend on the state of nature at t\. However, to simplify the 
analysis, the problem can be thought of as having been linearised in a way as to 
separate the two different sources of uncertainty over the final value of the firms. 
This does not seem to be too strong an assumption as conceptually, the solution of 
the model does not change. As long as investors know the functions f g(a,n) and 
fb(a, n) and the corporate governance gains of the same firm are larger in all states 
of nature n, they fundamentally still have a problem of 2  unknowns and 2  signals 
to solve10.
2.2.6 Equilibrium Concept
Given the structure of the model, an equilibrium can be calculated based on the 
strategies defined above. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in this context is a pair of 
strategies (Ss,S invr) and conditional beliefs p(.\ao, «i) and Q(.|a0, ai), such that
(i) for all {ao,ai} in the range of Ss , p (-\clq, ai) is the conditional probability of 
s, and Q(.\ao,ai) is the conditional cumulative probability function for n, obtained 
by updating the prior probability distributions ( |,  and Q(n) respectively, using 
{a0 ,a i} in a Bayesian fashion.
(ii) for all {a0 ,ai} and assuming that there exists a function mapping ao and ai to 
hoo and /ioi
oo
f  ndQ(.\a0, ai) +  f g(oi)p(s = i|a0, ax) +  / fc(a<)p(s ±  z|a0, ai)
hio(ao, ai) = —----------------------------------7~---------------------------------------7 (2.7)14-r
10For example, in case /» is of the following form: fi(a, n) — d{ +  gidi +  hiiii +  V* G {g, b}
with hi,i{ being some constants, such that for  all n, the solution to the model would
be exactly analogous to the case analyzed.
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Vz € {0 .1 }.
(iii) for all {s,n}
1 1 -ona,i G argmax 53 [aihio(a,Q,ai) +  *V i^(a<)],Vi G {0,1} (2.8)
1 i=o 1 +  r
Condition (i) stipulates that investors have rational expectations, conditions (ii) 
and (iii) are the requirements that investors as well as the state are optimising 
(given rational beliefs). The argument concerning the optimization of investors 
is the following11: given that at least two homogeneous investors compete in a 
Bertrand fashion, they know that they will only obtain the shares, if they bid more 
or equal to the discounted expected value of Vn, using ao and a\ to make inferences. 
However, they never bid any more than this expected value since they would expect 
to incur a loss. Their expected value of the firm is the expected value of n using 
their conditional belief Q(.|do, &i) plus the expected value of /  using the conditional 
beliefs p(.|ao,ai). Condition (iii) states that the state chooses the amount it sells 
in each firm in a way which maximizes total revenues from the sales at to and t 1? 
given the prices the investors are going to bid after they observed the amounts sold. 
Based on this equilibrium concept the following section will derive the three different 
equilibria that fulfil these criteria.
2.3 Separating and Pooling Equilibria
In this section three different kinds of equilibria will be proposed and motivated. 
The analysis is similar to traditional rational expectations models (e.g. Kyle, 1985). 
The key difference from a technical point of view is that two different signals are 
sent as opposed to one. The two signals can be consistent or inconsistent with each 
other.
PROPOSITION 2.1: For a finite n, there exists a unique separating Perfect Bayesian
11 This is a simplification as it allows not to model the utility function of the investors explicitly.
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Equilibrium. Ss and Sinv> are given by:
{ ® S  ---- i^s =  e "/b}, (2.9)
ft -7 jM « o ) +  /*(“o) t - 7 »ln(a1) +  / l (a1) 1 ;t _  _ ,olnN
{/ioo =  -------------------  j/iio —----r~;-------------1 “ a° > °i» (2-10)1 +  r  1 + r
rL ~7bln(ao) +  fb(ao) - % M ai ) + /»(ai) i :r _ „ _{/ioo =  ---------r -;------------ j ftio = --------- r~ ------------ j  it ao < 0.11 +  r  1 +  r
under the following two conditions12:
(0S -  A) < (7s -  7k)(l- (2-11)
n > mmax, (2 .1 2 )
where ramax, formally defined in appendix A, denotes the value of n that makes the 
state exactly indifferent between signalling the true n  by holding on to a part of the 
shares on the one hand and selling off all shares in both firms at tQ on the other 
hand. The proof for this proposition is provided in appendix A.
In this equilibrium, different amounts of shares of the two companies are sold. The 
state keeps holding a fraction of its shares in each firm. This allows investors to
identify the type of each firm. Given that investors know a firm’s type they can use
either signal (ao or ai) to learn the value of n. The two signals are consistent with 
each other in equilibrium. Consequently, the investors’ bids are equal to the true 
value of each firm. The equilibrium is fully revealing. The two conditions 2.11 and 
2.12 will be examined in more detail following proposition 2.5. They are derived 
in appendix A. Intuitively, (2 .1 1 ) can be interpreted as a condition under which 
the state has no incentive to cheat by sending a wrong signal about which firm is 
of which type. If this condition does not hold the state can not credibly commit 
itself to do so because the gains from fooling investors are larger than losses from 
inefficient corporate governance for the good firm. Condition 2.12 states that the
12It needs to be noted that conditions 2.11 and 2.12 could equivalently be written in a form 
which uses ao and ai instead of n.
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separating equilibrium breaks down if the true value of n is so small that the gains 
from signalling to investors are outweighed by the corporate governance gains from 
selling off all shares at to-
Furthermore, there exist two different pooling equilibria:
PROPOSITION 2.2: There exists a unique pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
where the state holds on to some of its shares (ao =  ai =  a < 1 ). S3 and Sinv> are 
given by:
_  2n
a = e i9+ib (2.13)
- (%  +  7k) ln(o)+ £  fi(a)
{ftoo = ----------- 2 ( 1  +  r) ^   ^ ’ ^ 10 =  (2-14)
This PBE exists if condition 2.11 does not hold and condition 2.12 does. The proof 
for this proposition is provided in appendix A.
In this equilibrium, the same amount of shares is sold in both firms. Consequently, 
investors cannot infer which firm is of which type. They therefore use their priors 
(equal probability of each firm being the good one) to determine their bids. The 
state again sells less than 100% of its shares signalling the true n to investors. While 
the state would prefer a separating equilibrium, it cannot credibly commit to sell 
more of the good firm if condition 2.11 does not hold. If condition 2.12 holds, the 
state prefers not to sell off everything at t0. This is not true in the third equilibrium:
PROPOSITION 2.3: There exists a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium where all 
shares are sold off immediately. Then Ss is {1,1} and Sinv> is:
2  nm+ £  fi(a)
{/ioo = ------2(1+ r) ’ hl° = (2-15)
It exists whenever condition 2.12 does not hold.
Proof : If the state decided not to signal anything about n (by, for example de­
ducting an arbitrarily small e from either ao or ai, such that n cannot be inferred 
in a consistent manner) investors’ beliefs about n are nm as defined in appendix 
A. Given these beliefs it is optimal for the state not to signal n but to collect the 
complete corporate governance gains by selling off all shares (apart from e) at to
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iff Rn > Rs in the case of a separating equilibrium and if R ^> R p  in the case of 
a pooling equilibrium. This is exactly true, if condition 2.12 does not hold, as can 
be seen in appendix A. The updating of investors’ beliefs about n from ne to nm is 
rational since nm is exactly the expected value for n given that it is rational for the 
state not to signal anything. □
In this equilibrium all shares are sold at t0 and investors cannot distinguish between 
the two firms. As pointed out above, this is to be the case whenever the gains from 
signalling n are outweighed by the corporate governance gains from selling off all 
shares at to-
PROPOSITION 2.4
(a) In the separating as well as in the pooling equilibria, more shares are sold in 
each firm the worse the state of nature, i.e. ao and ai are the larger the smaller n.
(b) In the separating as well as in the pooling equilibrium described in proposition 
2 .2  the amount of shares the state optimally sells is larger the larger the marginal 
gains from corporate governance, 7  ^ and 7 *>. It is ambiguous, though, if larger 
and 7 b increase the likelihood of reaching equilibria where all shares are sold, as 
described in proposition 2.3.
P roo f: (a) can easily be verified by calculating the partial derivatives of equations 
3.17 and 2.13. Furthermore, if condition 2.12 does not hold, the state sets ao =  a\ =  
1 . Condition 2 .1 2  is less likely to hold if n is small. However, it is not clear whether 
condition 2 .1 2  is also less likely to hold for large 7 *. Totally differentiating condition 
2.32 shows that this depends on the ex-ante distribution of n.
dm 2dEWn<m) _  2  +  e-% +  e- f b
-3— = — — —-------------------s:---- —  ,V*£{3 >6} (2-16)dgi i _ ( i  +  a ) e~
While the denominator is unambiguously positive, the sign of the nominator depends 
on N. □
An intuitive explanation is that there is a trade-off between selling at to and ob­
taining the benefits from better corporate governance on the one hand and keeping
some of the shares such that the market believes that the state really has inside 
information that justifies higher prices on the other. If the state sold off everything 
at to, the market would think that n is small which will depress shareprices. Also, 
because the benefits from better corporate governance differ between good and bad 
firms, it can be optimal for the state to choose ag different from a .^ In that case a 
fully revealing separating equilibrium is obtained in which the state sells more of the 
good firm. The market (knowing /;) is then able to distinguish between good and 
bad firms. This is a natural equilibrium, as the corporate governance gains that are 
not made if the state holds on to its shares are larger for the good firm. The reason 
why the equilibrium is fully revealing is simple. There are two signals (a0 and ai) 
and two unknowns: n and s. With two equations and two unknowns the investors 
can in general infer the two unknowns from the action of the state. Only when the 
state destroys the signalling equilibrium (if n < mmax) is the equilibrium not fully 
revealing.
It could be argued that the above equilibria axe not credible as the state has an 
incentive to sell a positive amount of shares directly after it sold the first batch at 
to. However, in reality this is unlikely. It seems reasonable to expect an exogenously 
given minimum period of time dt between two sales. This positive dt could be 
caused, for example, by the process of organizing an auction or by legislation that 
needs to be passed before each sale13. This dt, in particular in transition economies, 
could be substantial. Given that dt > 0, it is possible to find equilibria similar to the 
ones described in propositions 2.1 to 2.3. This is true as the state still incurs a cost 
of signalling, equivalent to the present value of obtaining the corporate governance 
benefits only at t0 + dt instead of at to. A further cost to the state would be the 
fact that in a follow-up auction, the winner of the first auction would have some 
bargaining power. This is true because the way the corporate governance gains are 
motivated (see appendix B) relies on the fact that one investor obtains the whole 
package of shares that is sold by the state. Without having homogeneous investors
13 Alternatively a fixed cost of having an auction could be assumed, which should give a similar 
result.
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competing for the shares, the state would not be able to extract all the gains from 
improved corporate governance.
The three equilibria are mutually exclusive. Their existence depend on the two 
conditions 2.11 and 2.12. The next proposition describes how different parameters 
affect the likelihood of different equilibria, followed by a more detailed interpretation 
of the two conditions.
PROPOSITION 2.5: A separating equilibria is more likely
(a) the smaller the type-specific value independent of corporate governance of the 
good firm and the larger the one of the bad firm, i.e. the smaller 0g and the larger 
0b, and
(b) the better the state of nature, i.e. the larger n, as long as n>ramax.
(c) A separating equilibrium can be more or less likely with respect to the marginal 
gains from corporate governance, 7 g and 7 *,, depending on Q(n) and n.
P roo f: Part (a) is true as the partial derivative of the left hand side of condition 
2.11 with respect to 0g is positive and negative with respect to 0b. Part (b) is 
trivially true due to condition 2 .1 2 , as ramax does not depend on n. Furthermore, 
the signs of the derivatives of the right-hand-side of condition 2 .1 1  with respect to 
7 i depend on n and, as shown in appendix A on Q(n). □
Condition 2.11 is a condition under which the state tells the truth: if it does not hold 
the state cannot commit credibly to sell more of the good firm than of the bad firm. 
Then investors anticipate that the state has an incentive to cheat. Therefore the 
investors would value the firm of which a large stake is sold as if it was the bad firm. 
A pooling equilibrium results. This is more likely if (0g—0b) is positive and relatively 
large and if j g is relatively small and % relatively large. This is true, because by 
cheating the state realises less of the corporate governance gains but obtains more of 
0g and less of 0b by fooling the market. Furthermore, the incentive to cheat is larger 
if a relatively large stake is sold of the bad firm and a relatively small stake of the 
good firm. In that case the punishment for cheating is smaller as the state realizes
53
less corporate governance gains at t\. This happens if is relatively large and 75  
is relatively small. Therefore the signs of the respective derivatives with respect to 
7 g and 7 b are unclear.
If condition 2.12 does not hold, the corporate governance gains from selling the 
states’ stakes off at to outweigh the potential gains from signalling the correct n. 
Therefore, it is optimal for the state to sell off everything and no separating equi­
librium exists. As is expected, the larger n, the more likely is condition 2.12 to 
hold. Furthermore, it should be noted that if condition 2.12 holds, the state obtains 
the full value of the firm, including the gains that will accrue due to better corpo­
rate governance. This is a result of the assumption of perfect competition among 
symmetric investors.
The state never prefers a pooling equilibrium to a separating one (if 7 5 ^  7 5 ) if the 
separating one can be obtained. This is true as a pooling equilibrium places one 
more restriction on the maximization problem of the state. However, this is not 
sufficient to demonstrate that the state cannot do worse in a separating equilibrium 
because the beliefs of the investors are defined in a different way for the case of a 
pooling equilibrium. However, appendix A demonstrates that it is nevertheless true. 
This is an interesting result because it also indicates that it can be rational from 
the point of view of a revenue maximizing state to split up its firms into different 
units before selling them off. A pooling equilibrium exists when either condition 2 .1 1  
or 2.12 does not hold. In particular, when condition 2.12 does not hold, a corner 
solution results where everything is sold at t0. As long as n is a finite number and 
7 i > 0, Vz £ {0,1}, a corner solution where ao =  ai =  0 will not exist. The state 
therefore always has an incentive to sell some of its shares.
To sum up, the model shows that it might be rational to sell different stakes in dif­
ferent firms in order to maximize revenues in a situation of asymmetric information. 
Shares of firms with smaller gains due to corporate governance are held by the state 
until the informational asymmetries are reduced. A pooling equilibrium only exists 
if the state has important inside information varying significantly across individual 
firms’ assets, irrespective of potential corporate governance gains, or when the state
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does not expect the future to be very bright.
2.4 Social Welfare
Clearly, the above outcome is second best. The costs of signalling are the following: 
PROPOSITION 2.6:
(a) There are positive costs of signalling whenever the state of nature in period 2 is 
‘too’ good, i.e. if n > ramax.
(b) The costs in the pooling equilibrium of proposition 2.2 exceed the ones in the 
separating equilibrium.
Proof: A simple maximization of Voi and V\\ with respect to ao and a\ demonstrates 
that the value maximizing strategy of the state is: Ssmax = {1,1}- The strategies of 
investors do not affect the value of the firms. S smax only leads to a Nash-equilibrium 
when condition 2 .1 2  does not hold.
Under Ssmax the values of the two firms at t\ equal
J 2  tn +  / i (1) ] = £  [« +  ft  +  7i] (2-17)
If condition 2.12 does not hold, this value is smaller by C, a pure welfare loss.
C{n i1g,lb)=  £  7 i ( l - e ~ ^ )  if (2 .1 1 ) holds
ie{ 0,1}
2n
C (n ,igj b) ~  £  7t(l ~  e 79+7b) if (2-11) does not hold
*e{o,i},.?yi
Using the result in appendix A, the former is smaller than the latter. □
COROLLARY 2.1: For each type of equilibrium, the costs of signalling are larger 
the better the state of nature at ti and the larger the marginal gains of corporate 
governance 7 0  and 7 1 .
P roo f: The partial derivatives of C( ) with respect to n are positive in the separating 
equilibrium of proposition 2 .1  as well as in the pooling equilibrium of proposition
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2.18
2.2. However, it is not possible to make a global statement on n, i.e. on costs across 
different equilibria. While from proposition 2.6 a positive welfare cost is more likely 
the larger n, the welfare costs could also be affected by a switch from the separating 
equilibrium of proposition 2.1 to the pooling equilibrium of proposition 2.3 due to 
a change in n. From proposition 2.5 a separating equilibrium is more likely than 
a pooling equilibrium the larger n and from proposition 2 .6  the welfare costs of a 
separating equilibrium are smaller than the costs of a pooling one. This allows only 
for statements for a specific equilibrium.
The partial derivatives with respect to 7 * are
| e  =  l _ e- ^ ( l  +  ^ ) ,V ie { s , 6 } i f  (2 .1 1 ) holds and
=  1 -  (1  +  6  {g, b} i f  (2 .1 1 ) does not hold
Both partial derivatives are positive. This implies that the costs of signalling strictly 
increase with 7 * whenever n>m max. However, from proposition 2.4 it is not clear 
whether larger 7 * leads to the equilibrium of proposition 2.3 more often. Therefore, 
it is not possible to make a global statement about 7 *. □.
The intuition is the following: The larger n the fewer shares of the firms are sold at 
which increases the welfare cost. With respect to 7 * there are two effects, which 
are partly offsetting: On the one hand, the amount that is sold is larger the larger 
7 . On the other hand, the welfare cost from each unit not privatized increases the 
larger 7 . The direct welfare reducing effect of a larger 7  dominates the indirect 
effect.
Having shown the existence of a dead-weight loss, the question arises whether there 
could be a non-dissipative equilibrium. If it was possible to signal n in another 
(and cheaper) way than by holding on to share-packages, the dead-weight loss could 
be reduced. However, it is very unclear, what could be a different and cheaper 
signalling device. Grundy and Constantinides (1989) construct a non-dissipative 
signalling equilibrium, where a firm issues a security to finance investment as well 
as a stock repurchase. However, in our case an efficient equilibrium requires that the 
state gets rid of all voting rights of its stake and (to avoid principal-agent problems)
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also of all income rights attached to its shares. Therefore, it is not straight-forward 
to construct a non-dissipative signalling equilibrium along these lines.
Interpreting the model above very strictly (that is n will be in fact revealed to 
everyone at t\ and a similar problem does not arise between t\ and £2)5 there exists 
a very simple solution. An investor obtains all the shares in both firms for the 
price of /*( 1 ) and a contract is written where the investor promises to pay 2 n at 
ti, i.e. after the true n has been revealed. In practice, firms could be asked to 
make a payment at t\ amounting to the change in the value between to and t\ of 
a stock-market index consisting of firms that had already been completely private 
before. However, there is a problem with this solution. If this contract was written, 
it would probably lead to asset stripping from the investor between to and ti as the 
investor can not commit himself to pay up at t\. Subsequently, the investor would 
either disappear or go bankrupt. Secondly, if investors were wealth constrained, 
they would be unlikely to buy both firms. If they were also risk-averse, the proceeds 
for the state would be smaller, as there would be no way to signal which firm is good 
and which one is bad. On the other hand, the government could tell the markets n 
and commit itself to pay back the difference between the true n and the announced 
one at time t\ (adjusted for interest). But again, the government is unlikely to be 
able to commit itself, in particular as there might be a different government in power 
at t \(generating the fluctuations in n in the first place). Therefore, it appears likely 
that a second best result will be obtained due to asymmetric information and the 
non-contractibility of n.
Lastly, the effect of the sale on the welfare of the old shareholders needs to be 
analysed by examining changes in shareprices at the date of the announcement of 
the extent of the sales. The share-price directly prior to the announcement for each 
of the two firms is
2  ne+ Pi +
V^ =  1 ( 1 + r) <2* »
if conditions 2.11 and 2.12 hold with n replaced by ne. If condition 2.11 does not
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hold but condition 2 .1 2  does with n replaced by ne then the share-price would be
2 nc
2 ne+  X) Pi+  7 *e 7i+7j
yP _ _______»€{0,1}iJ7^
old ~  2(1 +  r)
If condition 2.12 does not hold (replacing n by ne), the shareprice would have been
2  nm+ X) Pi +  7i
yP' _ _______
°w “  2(1 +  r)
The changes in the shareprices at the announcement of Ss at to depend on the 
following: if conditions 2 .1 1  and 2 .1 2  hold for the true n, there are two effects. 
First, prices rise for one firm and fall for the other one as it is revealed which one 
is good. However, this effect could be more than offset by new information on n. If 
investors infer that n > ne prices could move upwards for all firms and downwards 
if n < ne. However, they will not move upwards by the whole extent of the higher 
revealed n because a higher than expected n means that fewer corporate governance
gains than expected are to be realized. If condition 2.11 or 2.12 does not hold for
the true n, there is only the second effect.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter offers an explanation for why a rational government committed to full
scale privatisation might nevertheless retain some of its shares. It is argued in the
context of a signalling model that this could happen because the state needs to 
signal to the assets’ buyers its inside information about the future value of those 
assets. The trade-off is then between selling shares immediately and obtaining the 
benefits from better corporate governance on the one hand and keeping some of the 
shares such that the market believes that the state really has inside information that 
justifies higher prices on the other. Furthermore, it is argued that the larger the 
gains from corporate governance (resulting from the sell-off) at that particular firm, 
the more of its shares are sold. Differing benefits from better corporate governance 
lead to differing costs of keeping the shares in state ownership and it would therefore
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be rational for the state to sell off different amounts in each firm. The model provides 
a competing theory to the explanations offered for partial privatisation (mostly in 
the context of Western economies). However, this model would be consistent with 
the argument of insufficient liquidity as a reason for partial privatisation if low 
liquidity was due to substantial asymmetric information. The model also provides a 
competing theory to the political economy explanations put forward for transition 
economies.
The model relies crucially on the assumption that the state is maximizing revenues 
from privatisation. While the introduction to this chapter has made the case for this 
assumption, it is nevertheless interesting to analyse different cases. Clearly, the set­
up of this model does not allow for any other objectives of the state. In particular, 
if the state was indifferent with respect to privatisation revenues, there would be no 
need to signal the true value of the firms. If the state instead cared about social 
welfare, it would sell off all shares immediately to maximize the gains from improved 
corporate governance. In case the privatisation program was driven exclusively by 
political considerations, the state would presumably allocate the shares to the group 
that is politically required to be bought off. However, it is important to realize 
that it is possible that political considerations (or social welfare considerations) are 
merely added constraints on the privatisation program, which still aims to maximize 
revenues. In that case the state would still solve the maximization problem described 
in section 2.2.6 under some additional constraints. Boycko et al imply that this was 
the underlying rationale for the Russian privatisation program in aggregate. While 
political constraints were fulfilled in the first stage of privatisation with its focus on 
insiders and the population, the second stage of privatisation might better reflect 
the intentions of the creators of the privatisation program. However, even during 
the second stage there might still be some political constraints existing.
The above model offers different starting points for empirical investigations. First, 
the model implies that governments should sell more shares in firms where the 
potential gains from corporate governance are large. It seems impractical to test 
this hypothesis as higher corporate governance gains (which could be measured by
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the shareprice performance) also can result from a larger extent of privatisation. 
Therefore, a system of equations would have to be specified and it is not clear 
whether the system could be identified. More interestingly, governments should 
hold on to their shares if they believe that the future macroeconomic state will be a 
good one. This would generate a pattern at odds with received wisdom. If an index 
of firms whose ownership structure remained unchanged over the sampling period 
was constructed, it could be tested whether these firms would perform better in 
countries where the state retained more of the shares in the privatized companies. 
Of course, many other factors would presumably need to be controlled for.
Alternatively, it would be possible to carry out event studies on the day of the 
announcements of the sale (and on the days of the sale). In the context of a pooling 
equilibrium (the same amount of shares are sold in different firms) prices should 
tend to fall in cases in which more shares are sold than expected and tend to rise 
if fewer shares than expected are sold. This is, of course, exactly what is in general 
observed. However, usually it is attributed to low liquidity of the markets and not 
directly to informational issues. However, ‘low liquidity’ might be just another label 
for the same story. After all, there is an extensive literature on how asymmetric 
information causes the market to be illiquid (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). If 
insiders are known to be in the market, market makers have to protect themselves 
against the possibility of trading with insiders (and losing money on these trades). 
They therefore demand a high spread between their bid and ask price and also adjust 
their prices downward if large blocks are to be sold. This means that it is expensive 
to sell a security, in particular in large quantities. This, in turn, is the essence of 
what is called an illiquid market. In the case of Russia, demand for these securities 
could potentially be very high (as capital flight worth several billion USD per year is 
occurring and foreigners are principally free to invest) and prices in 1996 were very 
low (Nash and Wilier, 1995). In this context asymmetric information is likely to be 
an important reason for downward pressure on prices when large blocks of shares 
are to be sold. It also could explain why prices remain low after the sell-off.
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2.6 A ppendix A
2.6.1 P roof o f Proposition 2.1
Suppose without loss of generality that c l q >  a\. The two first-order conditions of 
the state’s optimization problem following from equation 2 .8  are:
r , dhio 1 a>i dVii 1 ^ d h jo   ,  .. . . . . .hio + a,i— 1- ——------------— — Vii +  —— — 0, Vz G {0,1 ^  i (2.23)
ddi 1 +  r aflj 1 +  r ddi
Both and are discontinuous functions. A change in the amount of firm l ’s 
shares sold can affect the valuation of firm 0 and vice versa. This can be achieved
either by destroying the mechanism used to update the beliefs about n due to incon­
sistency or by changing the beliefs about the type of firm. It will be shown below 
that under conditions 2 .1 1  and 2 .1 2  it is not optimal to affect the valuation in this 
way. Therefore, these partial derivatives can be disregarded for now. In a fully 
revealing equilibrium it must be true that
hi0 =  y ^ K i,V *  £ {0,1} (2.24)
Now it is assumed that investors believe that the firm of which more shares are sold 
is the good firm. Later it will be shown that there can be no equilibrium where 
more shares of the bad firm are sold. Equations 2.23, 2.24 and 3.15 then result in
d^oo 1 M 1 \ j  dh10 1 , 1  ^ f ^——  =   ) tg and =  ——  (1 ------ bfe (2.25)
dd o 1 +  r do ddi 1-1- r  d\
Integrating equation 2.25 results in
f a  =  ~7« +  7«°o +  Co and h  =  -7 6 H a , )  +  W  +
1 +  r  1-1- r
where Co and C\ axe integration constants. The constants Co and C\ can be de­
termined by further equilibrium considerations. Suppose that in a signalling equi­
librium the state set a0 =l-e, where e is an arbitrarily small amount, and di=l-8, 
where 8>s, then, in the limit as e goes to 0 , it must be true that
=  T 7 7  (2-27)1 +  r
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If it was smaller than this value, competition among investors would drive the price 
up. If it was any larger, the state could sell firms for a price higher than their present 
value whenever the true n was close enough to 0. This can not be the case in a fully 
revealing equilibrium14. Therefore
Co =  - § -  (2.28)
1 +  r
The same line of argument holds for 6 approaching 0, which results in
C'l =  (2-29)
Substituting the value of these constants into equation 2.26 results in equation 
2.10. Substituting equation 2.10 into equation 2.23 and again disregarding the cross 
derivatives results in the optimal strategies for the state as stated in equation 3.17. 
Therefore, the belief of the investors that more of the good firm is sold off has been 
confirmed. It is easily shown that beliefs of investors that more of the bad firm is 
sold would not be confirmed and therefore cannot form an equilibrium.
It still needs to be verified under which conditions and 4 ^  can be disregarded. 
The state can affect the valuation of firm j by its choice of a* in three different ways. 
First, it can change the investor’s perception of which firm is good and which one 
is bad. Therefore, for the equilibrium above to hold it needs to be verified that the
state has no incentive to sell more of the bad firm than of the good firm (that is to
cheat). Telling the truth, the state receives the revenues R s:
2 n+  £  +
R* = ------------------------------ (230)1 +  r
n  n
Cheating would imply that the state sells e ^  of the bad firm and e of the good 
firm at tg. The investors then mistake the good firm for the bad firm. Only at 
t\ investors learn which firm is good and which is bad. This would result in state
14It should be noted that the beliefs that determine the integration constants are out of equilib­
rium beliefs whenever mmax >0.
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revenues of Rc-
X) [e“ (n +  pi +  7 ie~~i) +  (1  -  e~~i)(n +  fij +  7 ,e ^ ]
R c  =   :------------------------------------------ (2.31)
1 +  r
It can be easily shown that Rc < Rs  iff condition 2 .1 1  holds. Second, the state can 
affect the valuation of firm j by its choice of a* if it chose a* such that the two possible 
Bayesian updating procedures with the help of the two different a ’s would imply 
different n ’s. In this case of inconsistency, the signalling property of the equilibrium 
breaks down. What are investors to believe in this case ? The rational beliefs for 
investors in this case are derived by calculating a cut-off value for n (called m max) 
that makes the state just indifferent between signalling and selling off all shares 
without signalling. This is slightly complicated by the fact that there exists also a 
pooling equilibrium, as described by proposition 2 .2 , where the state sells off the 
same amount of shares in each firm and also signals the true n. Therefore, two 
cases must be distinguished. In the first line of equation 2.32, which is applicable 
if condition 2 .1 2  holds for the value of n in question, the right-hand-side represents 
the revenues in the separating equilibrium of proposition 2.1. The right-hand-side 
in the second fine, under the condition that a separating equilibrium does not exist 
for the n under question, represents the revenues in the case of a pooling equilibrium 
(as shown in proposition 2.2). The left hand side of equation 2.32 is the amount of 
revenue if the state sells off all shares without signalling, given the rational beliefs 
for n in the absence of signalling. If both revenues are equal, the state is indifferent 
between selling off everything at to and signalling the true n. The largest n for which 
this would be true is then used by the investors to make inferences about the true n 
in the absence of signalling. It is called nm and equals the conditional expectation 
of n given that the true n must be smaller than the largest n that would make the 
state indifferent between signalling and not signalling.
More formally, let M denote a set containing 0 and all positive values for m  that
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satisfy
 _________________________ ___ _rn
2E(n\n < m )+ X) l i  =  2 ra+ X) 7 *e ^
i£{g,b} ie{0,l}
i f  (Pg -  Pb) <  (7a -  7 t ) ( l-  E
(2.32)
  2 m
2 £J(n|n < m )+ X) 7 * =  2 ra+ X) 7 *e 79+76
i€{g,6} *£{0,1}
otherwise
Let mmax be the largest element in M. Furthermore, define nm as E(n\n < mmax). 
If n is larger than mmax it does not make sense for the state to signal given that nm 
are the beliefs about n in the absence of signalling. Whether there are any elements 
in M apart from 0 depends on the ex-ante distribution of n, Q(n).
The state would have an incentive to forego the possibility of signalling n when the 
corporate governance gains from selling everything at to would more than outweigh 
the higher n signalled by retaining some of the shares. Given the above definition 
of investors’ beliefs in the absence of signalling, the maximum revenue without 
signalling R n  would be
2 nm+  X) \Pi +  7 *]
R n  = -------- !7 1r -----------  (2-33)1 +  r
Clearly, R n < R s iff condition 2.12 holds. Lastly, the state can affect the valuation
of firm j by its choice of a* if it chose qq — a i — a- In this case, given the result of
proposition 2.2, the state revenues would be Rp\
   In
X) [n +  A +  7 *e 79+76 ]
RP =  ------ ------------------  (2.34)
1 +  r
It is easily shown that Rs >  Rp, iff
^ r  n_ 2n
2^ 7 *e 7i > (lg +  7fc)e 79+76 (2.35)
i£{g,b}
if  % = 7 b, condition 2.35 holds as an equality. The derivative of both sides of the 
above inequality with respect to 7 5 is
(1 -  x)ex (2.36)
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where x  on the left hand side corresponds to xl = — ^  and x on the right-hand-side 
corresponds to xr =  — ^  . If 7  ^ > 75  > 0 and n > 0 then xl > xr and the
derivative of the left hand side is always larger than the one on the right-hand-side. 
This implies that equation 2.35 always holds as a strict inequality for 7 g > > 0
so that Rs > Rp. □
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2.6.2 P roof o f Proposition 2.2
As has been shown above, the state would never choose ao =  ai =  a if a separating 
equilibrium was feasible and condition 2.12 holds. The only case when a separating 
equilibrium is not feasible because the state cannot commit not to cheat is when 
condition 2.11 does not hold. Therefore there exists a pooling equilibrium whenever 
condition 2.11 does not hold and condition 2.12 holds. To find this equilibrium it is 
necessary to start from the FOC of the state under the restriction that ao=ai=a. In 
this case hio=hoo =ho because investors can not differentiate which firm is which. 
Then the FOC is
2/i0 +  2 +  ^ )  -  —(^oi +  Vu ) = 0  (2.37)da 1 +  r da da 1 +  r
Given rational expectations it must be true that
ho = +  Vn ) (2.38)
Equations 2.37, 2.38 and 3.15 then result in
(Z 39 )
Integrating equation 2.39 results in
~{lg + 7b)ln(a)+ E  7ia 
K  = ---------------------2 ( 1 +  r ) -£{9't} ■ +  <? (2.40)
The constant C  can be determined by further equilibrium considerations. Suppose
in a signalling equilibrium the state sold everything at to- Then it must be the case 
that
E  A +  liO-
—  (2 -41)
If it was smaller than the above value, competition among investors would drive the
price up. If it was any larger, the state could sell firms for a price higher than their
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present value whenever the true n was 0. This cannot be the case in a fully revealing 
equilibrium. Therefore
C  =  A ± A  (2.42)
2 ( 1  +  r) v ’
Equations 2.40, 2.42 and 2.37 result in 2.13.D
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2.7 Appendix B
The above model is partly driven by /(a). Concerning this function two questions 
remain. First, it needs to be clarified what exactly is to be understood by large 
potential corporate governance improvements and how they come about. In partic­
ular, a theoretical foundation is needed for why f'(a) is positive for all a. Secondly, 
it needs to be clarified how the difference in the /?’s relate to the difference in the 7 ’s. 
Only then would it become clear whether separating equilibria should be a common 
phenomenon.
Concerning the first issue, there are two different rationales for arguing that the size 
of the sell-off affects the value of the firm. Holmstroem and Tirole (1993) argue that 
public trading of a firm leads to a situation, where there is more information about 
the performance of the firm in its share-price than can be extracted from the firm’s 
current or future profit data. Therefore, public trading of a firm makes it possible 
to write more efficient remuneration contracts for the firm’s managers based on 
the additional information conveyed by shareprices. Furthermore, Holmstroem and 
Tirole show that a decrease in concentration of the shareholdings (i.e. by making the 
market of the shares more liquid) increases market incentives to collect information 
about the firm. Therefore, a dilution of ownership increases the value of the firm. 
In our case, this implies the following: If the state sold its stake not to one, but to a 
continuum of investors, the value of the firms would increase due to better market 
monitoring. However, it is far from clear whether this mechanism can work in the 
nascent security markets in transition economies. Therefore, the focus is on another 
source of corporate governance gains: the threat of a potential take-over of the firm 
by a corporate raider15. As was first put forward by Grossmann and Hart (1980), 
there is a free-rider problem associated with this corporate governance mechanism:
15Given that there already was a take-over attempt in Russia in the summer of 1995, it might 
well be that take-overs are going to play a non-negligible role in corporate governance in Russia.
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With atomistic shareholders a raider can buy its target only for a price that is 
equivalent or bigger than the target’s value after the raider will have introduced all 
the improvements that it had identified. Given a costly take-over procedure, take­
overs will therefore not happen and potential improvement will not be made. This 
problem can be overcome by a large shareholder, as has been proposed by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986): The large shareholder may be able to internalize enough of 
the gains to cover the costs of the take-over. Given, that the stake of the state (in 
general) goes to one private shareholder, this shareholder can overcome the free-rider 
problem. The larger the stake a of this private shareholder, the more of the gains 
he can internalize. This, in turn, makes it more likely that it is rational for him to 
buy the (50 - a)% necessary to implement an improvement he has discovered. In 
addition, this increases the intensity with which he searches for improvements. In 
particular, Shleifer and Vishny prove that the value of the firm rises with an increase 
in a. The only assumption still needed is then that the state itself is not as efficient 
in searching for improvements and implementing them as private investors.
In the Shleifer and Vishny framework, the question can also be answered, whether 
the model should have more time periods, because the corporate governance gains
can presumably also be achieved after the state sold the rest of its shares at t\. If
this was the case, then the cost of keeping the shares is only due to the fact that the 
corporate governance gains need to be discounted for one more period. However, 
if (for exogenous reasons) a different investor will buy the rest of the shares at U, 
the corporate governance gains could be smaller than gains that would have been 
realized if everything was sold at U, even with a zero interest rate. The reason for 
this is that the size of the shareholding of the largest (outside) investor matters. 
Using the Shleifer and Vishny results and assuming that the values of potential 
improvements at firm i, Zi, are distributed uniformly on [0 , Zf1**], and that costs of 
participating in the auction are zero, the following relationship between a and the 
firm value is obtained:
4/4(a)2f“ a /„ .os
f i{a )  =  (1 +  2 a)* (2'43)
where 1(a) is a measure of the research intensity (which can be interpreted as the
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probability that an improvement that is distributed as described above in [0, Z™ax\ is 
actually found). Assuming a quadratic cost function of undertaking research (such 
that the cost function is convex), the following explicit function for the research 
intensity is obtained.
9  y m a x n 2
1(a) = °  , (2.44)v ' S ( l  +  2 o ) 4 '  '
resulting in
o f  y m a x \2  „3
where B > 0 and 2B I  is the marginal cost of doing research with intensity I. The 
firm value depends on a and f/(a) > 0 for all a. Furthermore, it depends positively 
on the maximum improvement that can be found by the investor. This is a natural 
interpretation of large potential corporate governance gains. Furthermore, it seems 
rather likely that the state has this information. In particular, it is not assumed that 
the state knows about an improvement, but cannot implement it itself. It is only 
assumed that the state knows the probability distribution of potential improvements.
It is to be noted, that the total state holding at to cannot be normalized to one in 
this case, but needs to represent the percentage of the shares the state has not yet 
privatized. Only then can the variable ‘a ’ be used in the same sense as in Shleifer 
and Vishny to denote the total amount the investor holds in the firm. The above 
derivation of f(a )  is only valid for a < since otherwise the investor has full 
control16. Linearising around ay, the following expression is obtained:
,  , N 16( Z ^ f a ) ( 2 a s -  1) _ 8 (Z f“ )2a3/ (3 -  2a/)
fi{a) =  B (l +  2 a/)«-------+  B (1  + 2at f  (246)
In this case a / should be the ex-ante expected sell-off, which must be the same for 
both firms as the ex-ante probability for a firm to have a large Z f3* is Then large 
7 ’s are associated with small /Ts because 2af — 1 is negative. This means that the
16This fits the Russian reality quite well, where stakes sold in the second stage of privatization 
are typically between 20% and 38% (see Russian Economic Trends). Furthermore, a fringe of small 
shareholders (as assumed in the Shleifer and Vishny model) exists as workers hold a large extent 
of the shares.
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non-cheating condition 2 .1 1  is rather likely to be true if the /3’s are interpreted as a 
result of the linearisation procedure.
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Chapter 3
Shareholder Rights in Russia: An 
Empirical Investigation
3.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to analyse the factors that determine whether firms in a sample 
of 140 Russian firms choose to introduce shareholder rights in order to mitigate the 
agency problems between managers and shareholders. In terms of existing literature, 
this chapter should be seen in the context of La Porta et al (1996). The authors 
have shown that the legal set-up matters with respect to the ownership arrangement 
of joint stock companies. Countries with relatively weak legal protection of share 
ownership tend to have more concentrated ownership structures. Russia presents a 
textbook case of a country where legal institutions are underdeveloped and where 
the enforcement of laws cannot be relied upon. It therefore provides an interesting 
case study.
Agency problems between new shareholders of privatized firms and management 
appear to be very serious in many transition economies. In particular, there is 
some evidence that management expropriate a substantial part of firms’ profits. For 
the case of Russia, there is some questionnaire evidence provided by the Russian
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Barometer, that 46% of workers believed that management would take funds out of 
the firm (see Rose, 1995). More concretely, Nash and W ilier (1995) observe that 
profits in the economy as recorded in the national accounts appear to be much larger 
than is shown in companies’ accounts. This is consistent with the assumption that a 
substantial part of profits (but presumably also a part of wages) remain unrecorded.
The agency problem arises from ’’weaknesses” in corporate governance. Accord­
ing to most surveys, management remained in control of privatized firms, in spite 
of not being the formal owners. Outside shareholders rarely had any influence on 
management behaviour. For the case of Russia, see for example Blasi and Shleifer 
(1996) or Klepach et al (1996)1. This largely unchecked separation of ownership 
and control creates a considerable scope for moral hazard and makes it likely that a 
substantial part of profits are diverted by management. This raises the question of 
why this agency problem is not mitigated by a well functioning system of corporate 
governance. So far, the literature has answered this question by drawing attention 
to the privatisation process which resulted in rather dispersed ownership. In partic­
ular, Boycko et al (1995) show that in the case of Russia the privatisation process 
allocated considerable amounts of shares to insiders (workers and management). 
Some of the remaining shares were partly given away for free to the population 
(voucher-privatisation) and partly sold to outside blockholders. The residual shares 
are still held by the State. In general Boycko et al show that the amount allocated 
to outside blockholders was rather small. They argue that since the owners of small 
share packages have little incentive to collect costly information to monitor man­
agement, many firms are still effectively controlled by management. However, the 
authors also predict that this problem would be mitigated over time. As workers or 
the population sell their shares, outside blockholders with an incentive to monitor 
will grow in importance. Furthermore, by selling the remaining state-owned shares
1 There is also some evidence from the ‘New Russia Barometer’ (Rose, 1995). 30% of employees 
agreed with the statement that real power was kept by management, and 41% agreed somewhat. 
Earle, Estrin and Leshchenko (1996) found that management was by far the most influential unit 
in a firm, even in firms where outsiders had substantial share ownership. The influence of outside 
shareholders therefore seemed to have been limited in 1995.
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directly to outside blockholders, the power of management would also be curbed.
This chapter will give some evidence that blockholders now exist in many of the 
140 largest Russian firms. The mean holding of the largest outside blockholder 
in this sample is 23% of share capital. However, even given such blockholders, 
the mechanism of corporate governance does not seem to be working optimally 
because property rights do not seem to be legally enforceable. This paper presents 
several indicators that are capturing some aspect of whether the property rights 
of shareholders are respected. The variation of these indicators across firms is very 
substantial. This variation implies that the management of a given firm can to some 
degree choose whether to honour shareholder rights or not. This is only possible if 
property rights are not legally enforceable, as otherwise all firms would be forced 
to honour shareholder rights2. For example, in October 1996 10% of the shares 
of Surgutneftegaz were issued and sold below market prices to the Surgut Holding 
company, which is controlled by insiders3. On the other hand, the institutional 
shortcoming of non-enforceable property rights does not appear to be a problem in 
every firm. The data presented in this chapter does indicate that some firms start 
to honour shareholder rights, although it is only a minority among the 140 largest 
Russian firms (by sales) whose shares are traded on the over the counter market4.
2It is worth noting that these problems are not specific to Russia. The 1995 International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) Factbook of Emerging Markets fists only 5 out of the 26 emerging 
markets it covers as having investor protection of an internationally acceptable quality. It also 
singles out the Chinese equity market for having especially poor investor protection. While this 
chapter focuses on Russia in its empirical investigation, which had not been included in the last
IFC ranking, the findings are relevant to other emerging markets as well.
3While the share issue had been authorized by shareholders at the annual shareholders meeting,
the price at which the sale took place might constitute a violation of the law on joint stock 
companies. This law lays out that new issues have to be sold at or above market prices. The 
Federal Securities Commission (FSC), the regulatory body for the Russian capital markets with 
ministerial rank, has examined the case and consequently an out-of-court settlement was reached
where the shares were sold at a higher price, but still below the market price.
4These shares are not necessarily very liquid. Only for about 50 firms there is reliable shareprice
information available. Shares in the other 80 firms are highly illiquid and only very few trades 
occur.
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This chapter develops a simple model that aims to determine which firms choose to 
honour shareholder rights in an environment where property rights are not legally 
enforceable. The benefits of honouring shareholder rights are that new capital can 
be raised to fund new projects. But this is at the cost of reduced possibilities for 
management to expropriate profits. This model generates several hypotheses on 
what could drive the introduction of shareholder rights. In particular, firms where 
the moral hazard problem is smaller (i.e. potential expropriation is low) have low 
costs of introducing shareholder rights and are more likely to do so. Also, firms with 
larger investment needs are, ceteris paribus, more likely to introduce shareholder 
rights. It is also shown that large blockholders with the power to force managers 
to introduce shareholder rights may do so and thereby mitigate the management’s 
expropriation rather than cooperate in this expropriation. The State might also 
force managers to introduce shareholder rights.
This model is tested with a (limited) data set. The key findings are the follow­
ing: Shareholder rights (i.e. the dependant variable) are proxied by five different 
variables, which are all significantly positively correlated. To the extent that the 
amount that can be expropriated in a given firm is positively correlated with size, 
the model is confirmed since larger firms turn out to be more likely to honour share­
holder rights. There is also some limited evidence that firms with a larger outside 
blockholder are more likely to honour shareholder rights and there is weak evidence 
that this is also true for the state as a blockholder. Investment needs, as proxied by 
different industry variables, are significant in some specifications. However, more 
shareholder friendly behaviour does not seem to be reflected in higher valuations of 
the firms’ shares.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the model. Section 3.3 
describes the (limited) data-set. Section 3.4 tests the hypothesis of section 3.2 and 
finally section 3.5 contains the conclusions.
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3.2 W hich Firms Honour Shareholder Rights ? A  
Simple Framework
Shareholder rights are modelled so as to prevent management from expropriating 
profits. This section derives two different but related models of the introduction 
of shareholder rights under different assumptions on the nature of the game played 
between management and outside blockholders in the absence of shareholder rights. 
The first section assumes that management has complete control over the firm in 
the absence of shareholder rights. The second section gives some bargaining power 
to outside blockholders. The only difference in the results will be that the size of 
outside blockholders is negatively correlated with the probability of the introduction 
of shareholder rights in the first case, and positively in the second.
3.2.1 Com plete M anagem ent Control
ASSUMPTION 3.1: In the absence of shareholder rights management has complete 
control over the firm, irrespective of the size of its own stake in the firm, denoted 
by M.
ASSUMPTION 3.2: In the absence of shareholder rights management can expro­
priate a part of profits with a present value of 6 . This amount is a function of 
firm size, as measured by employment e: 6 (e). Denote the value of the assets net of 
expropriation by a(e).
If there were significant economies of scale in monitoring firms, larger firms would
be more tightly observed and more often regulated by government institutions than
small ones. The tax authorities, regulatory bodies, ministries or former ministries
would be much more likely to scrutinize large firms than small ones5. This should
make it harder for these firms to expropriate on a large scale. Furthermore, the
5In 1996 the Russian State Tax Service created an extra unit to deal with the largest firms in 
an effort to improve tax compliance of large firms.
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punishment if caught stealing is likely to be higher for the large firms, because they 
are much more visible. It makes more sense to punish them severely to deter other 
firms from stealing. Therefore, the expected value of expropriation should decrease 
with size. On the other hand, it can be argued that larger firms operate in a more 
complex environment which increases the possibility to expropriate. Therefore, the 
empirical investigation should help to discover the correct sign of the derivative of b 
with respect to e. Apart from the possibility to steal, management also gets private 
benefits from running the company.
ASSUMPTION 3.3: Private benefits for management, c, are an increasing function 
of employment: c(e), d  > 0 .
With the introduction of shareholder rights, the game between management and 
outside blockholders changes as described by the following three assumptions.
ASSUMPTION 3.4: If shareholder rights are introduced, it is impossible to expro­
priate, i.e b =  0, Ve.
With the introduction of shareholder rights, management gives certain rights to 
outside investors and as a result might lose control. This is more likely the larger 
the stake of the largest outside blockholder, denoted by L, and the smaller its own 
stake in the company, M.
ASSUMPTION 3.5: If shareholder rights were introduced, management loses its 
private benefits c with probability p(M, L), where < q and dp(M,L) ^  q
ASSUMPTION 3.6: Only if shareholder rights were introduced is it possible to 
obtain external finance for a project whose present value accruing to old shareholders 
is n.
While this assumption is a simplification, it captures the idea that only if share­
holders have rights to affect control decisions in their interest, will they contribute 
funds. The same is likely to be the case for lenders. With respect to share-issues 
this chapter will provide some limited evidence for this assumption. With respect
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to lending decisions, see, for example, EBRD 6.
The objective for management is to maximize its expected return. In this set-up 
risk-neutral management compares the pay-offs with shareholder rights and without 
shareholder rights and therefore chooses to introduce shareholder rights, iff
E[Ma(e) + b(e)+c{e)\Q} < E{M[a(e) +  6 (e)] +  [1 -p{M ,L)]c{e) +  Mn\Q} (3.1)
where E denotes expectations, conditional on the information set of management of 
the firm, denoted by Q. Without shareholder rights management obtains its legal 
share of profits that are not expropriated plus the profits it can expropriate, plus 
the private benefits from control. With shareholder rights it would obtain its legal 
share of total profits (i.e. profits that had not been expropriated and that had 
been expropriated in the absence of shareholder rights) plus the expected value of 
private benefits (now lower as there is some chance of management losing control) 
plus management’s share of the new project.
This simplifies to
E[b(e)\Q] <  E[M l L Z ] ^ h jn] (3 .2)
It is straightforward to see how management’s choice is influenced by the different 
parameters. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3.1: Under Assumptions 3.1 to 3.6, shareholder friendly behaviour 
is more likely, the larger the gains of the new investment, n, and the larger the share 
of management, M. Shareholder friendly behaviour is less likely, the more can be
6In the context of the examination of shareholder rights, it would be natural to interpret the 
outside finance as raised by equity issues. However, bond issues are possible as well. To some 
extent the argument above can be applied to bond issues. After all, firms that do not expropriate 
presumably find it easier to raise finance by bonds. In any case, there are at present no markets 
for corporate debt, but there is a reasonably liquid one for equities. This would facilitate equity 
issues compared to debt issues. Apart from tradable debt, there is the possibility to obtain loans. 
However, up to the present time, there have not been many significant long-term loans (see Russian 
Economic Trends, Volume 1997.1).
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stolen in a given firm, 6 , the larger the private benefits, c, and the larger the stake 
of the outside blockholder, L.
The intuition behind these comparative statics exercises is straightforward. The 
more profitable the new investment for the old shareholders and the less manage­
ment loses by ceasing to expropriate profits, the more likely is it to introduce share­
holder rights7. Also, the smaller the private benefits for management, which are 
endangered in case shareholder rights are introduced, the more likely management 
is to introduce shareholder rights. Lastly, with respect to ownership, the likelihood of 
shareholder friendly behaviour in the above model increases with the share owned by 
management and decreases with the share owned by the largest outside shareholder. 
This is the case for two reasons. First, the more management owns, the smaller is 
the perceived threat to its control. Therefore, management gains less from trying 
to discourage active participation of outside shareholders in shareholder meetings. 
Second, the more management owns, the smaller are the incentives to expropriate 
since it owns a larger part of the profits legally8. The argument assumes that the 
different layers of management that own shares collude and act like one shareholder 
would. If instead they compete in stealing from the firm this effect is unlikely to be 
observed9. As regards employment, the effect is not clear. An additional argument 
on the potential impact of e are fixed costs to access capital markets. These fixed 
costs could deter smaller firms from aiming to tap these markets, which would re­
7Akamatsu (1995) reports an example of the former mechanism at work. Alfa Capital, who 
had bought 25% of Bolshevik Biscuit Company in December 1992, was not permitted into the 
shareholders meeting. Subsequently Alfa Capital applied to a court, but without success. Fi­
nally, management allowed Alfa Capital into the meeting after it had promised to raise money to
modernize the Bolshevik plant.
8In a sample of Klepach et al (1996) the firms with management as the largest blockholder are
more likely to implement an ”active survival” strategy than employee-, state- or outsider-controlled
firms. To the extent that this strategy comprises raising new funds, this finding supports the notion
that the more management owns, the more likely is it that shareholder rights are introduced.
9The very simple model above is static and cannot explain why a firm would switch from
shareholder unfriendly to shareholder friendly behaviour. The principal mechanism I would like to
suggest is that management buys up shares and an increase in M  would then lead to a switch in
behaviour. This mechanism will be modelled in the following chapter.
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duce their incentives to implement shareholder friendly policies. However, the fact 
that the sample only includes firms that are relatively large, makes this argument 
rather unconvincing.
3.2.2 Limited M anagem ent Control
The above model relies on the assumption that management behaviour is completely 
unchecked. In reality, the freedom of management is likely to be restricted by outside 
blockholders. Even though privatisation very often resulted in handing out large 
parts of the shares to insiders, the data presented in this chapter shows that there 
axe nevertheless quite a number of outside blockholders in many Russian enterprises. 
These outsiders can be banks, investment funds and brokerages, financial-industrial 
groups, non-financial firms or foreign firms.
ASSUMPTION 3.7: Outsiders succeed in introducing shareholder rights against the 
will of management with probability q(L, M) which depends positively on the size 
of the largest outside blockholder and negatively on the size of the share ownership 
of management, i.e. > 0 , < 0 .
The bargaining power depends on the relative stakes of the two parties. However, 
instead of pressing for shareholder rights, outside blockholders could collude with 
management. This is possible, as in this set-up it is assumed that management 
can make side-payments to the blockholder. If the blockholder is a supplier, this 
could take the form of a profitable contract granted to the blockholder. It could 
also be done by a direct bribe management pays out of its stolen profits b. If they 
collude, a bargaining game is played on how to split b. Abstracting from the possi­
bility of a change of management (that is of redistributing c) the fallback option for 
management in case the bargaining breaks down is
E{a(e)M  +  c(e) +  [1 -  q{L, M)]b(e) +  q(L, M)M(b(e) +  n)|fi} (3.3)
as it can continue to steal with probability q but will only receive the share M  of b 
with probability (1  — q). In case shareholder rights are introduced management will
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also receive its share of the pay-offs of the new project, Mn. The expected value of 
the fallback option of the outsider is
E[a(e)L +  q(L, M)L(b{e) +  n) \ Q] (3.4)
where denotes the information set of the outsiders concerning the firm. They get 
share L  of the non-expropriated profits in any case, and receive a part of the new 
project as well as of b with probability q. Assuming that fl =Q, the total amount 
the two parties can bargain over is
E[a(e)(L + M) + b(e) +  c(e)|fi] (3.5)
Collusion is the preferred strategy whenever there is a surplus over the fallback 
strategies for the two parties. This is true since the Nash bargaining mechanism 
makes both players with positive bargaining power strictly better off than their 
fallback option. Therefore, the two parties will not collude iff
(3'6)
which is (3.5)-(3.4)-(3.3). In this case shareholder rights will be introduced with 
probability q(L, M).
In this set-up it is still the case that management might introduce shareholder rights 
without any outside pressure, just as analysed in the previous section. Therefore, 
equation 3.2 is to be taken account of in this set-up as well. This results in three 
regions with varying likelihood of shareholder rights being introduced10:
In the figure point A is given by equation 3.2 and point B by equation 3.6. For firms 
with values of b between 0  and A, management introduces shareholder rights, just 
as in the case with 100% management control. Between points A and B, shareholder
10Again, this abstracts from threats to changes in private rents c. Furthermore, liquidity con­
siderations are disregarded in this set-up.
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Figure 3.1: The Effect of Stealing
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rights axe introduced with probability q(L, M ), if the outsider succeeds in pushing 
for shareholder rights. For values of b above point B, no shareholder rights are 
introduced as the outside blockholder and management collude. In this variation 
of the set-up, the comparative statics are essentially the same as above. The only 
exception is the change with respect to the share of the outside blockholder, L. This 
leads to the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.2: Under assumptions 3.2 to 3.7 the larger the share of the out­
sider, the more likely is it that shareholder rights are introduced.
Between points A and B the likelihood rises as the outsider becomes stronger and 
can push for these rights. At the same time point B shifts to the right, decreasing 
the region of collusion. This is true, as the benefit from taking advantage of the 
small outside shareholders decreases the larger the combined share of management 
and the large outsider11. This is the opposite of the case of 100% management 
control and an empirical investigation is necessary to see which of the two scenarios 
is more likely. If side payments were not possible, the likelihood of the introduction 
of shareholder rights in the area to the right of point B would be the same as between 
points A and B. Proposition 3.2 would therefore still hold.
11This is a similar prediction as the one made by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) who argue that 
cumulating shares reduces the free rider problem of monitoring management and therefore can 
make management more likely to maximize shareholders’ wealth.
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3.2.3 Two Caveats
Two caveats have to be discussed in this context. First, ownership is in general 
not exogenous. Although this chapter represents very much an initial look at the 
ownership structures as they emerged from the privatisation programme, it is still 
possible that the size of the largest outside stake may be endogenous. In particular, 
as argued by La Porta et al (1996), concentration in outside ownership could act 
as a substitute for poor legal protection. If this was true, one would expect large 
shareholders to invest in firms that do not honour shareholder rights (to subsequently 
use their bargaining power to collude in stealing or to push for shareholder rights). 
Smaller shareholders, who have little bargaining power, are more likely to pick firms 
where management is committed to honour shareholder rights. Furthermore, it is 
only large shareholders, in a situation where shareholder rights are not honoured 
and collusion does not take place, who have an incentive to increase their stake L. 
This is true because the value of their existing shares increases with q, which is a 
positive function of L. Under this scenario the size of the small outside blockholding 
should be associated with relatively high levels of shareholder protection, just as in 
the case when the management controls the firm exclusively12.
Second, apart from outside private blockholders, the State could play a role in 
controlling management. It is an important feature of large Russian enterprises that 
the State still holds substantial blocks of shares in many of them even after they 
have been privatised13. It has been asserted that the state does not in general use 
the control rights attached to the shares or is implicitly colluding with management 
(Frydman et al, 1996). However, it could be that this is only the case with respect 
to participation in strategic decisions, where the last decade has taught the State 
that it has no comparative advantage. It would seem more likely that the State does
12If shareholder unfriendly management could prevent shareholders from increasing their stakes, 
this could lead to the opposite bias. However, this crudest form of violation seems to have given 
way to more subtle ones, e.g. not disclosing information etc. Also, there exists in general a free 
float of shares for the firms in the sample, which could be bought up. See Brunswick Brokerage,
1996 E quity Report.
13This has been described in more detail in chapter 2.
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use its voting rights to press for the implementation of shareholder rights. This can 
be expected because the state is planning to sell-off its remaining stakes in the near 
future and should therefore be interested in higher shareprices. This commitment 
makes it different from the type of private outside blockholder who invests in the 
company for the long run. Apart from these private incentives as an owner, the 
State also has an interest to promote better corporate governance to increase the 
likelihood of successful restructuring. For this to happen a mechanism to re-allocate 
control rights is necessary, one of which could be the stockmarket. This possibility 
increases incentives for the state to push for shareholder friendly behaviour. As 
a matter of fact, the activities of the Federal Securities Commission (FSC) give 
some credibility to the hypothesis that the state recognizes its interest in promoting 
shareholder rights. More specifically, the government passed a resolution in February 
1995 under which it will not provide any budgetary funds to companies which violate 
shareholder rights. While it is clear that enforcement of this legislation is difficult 
through the legal system, it seems possible that directors elected to the boards to 
represent the State are better positioned to influence management’s decisions in this 
respect14. On the other hand, if the State has other objectives like, for example, 
avoiding unemployment, it is unlikely that it would push for shareholder rights15. 
This is true as outside shareholders are in general more likely to restructure the 
enterprises actively.
14In early 1998 the government used its shares to elect a reformer to the post of general manager
of UES, the electricity monopoly.
15See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). The authors show that public enterprises can
be encouraged by politicians subject to pressure from interest groups, such as labour unions, to 
employ too many people.
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3.3 The D ata
3.3.1 The D ependent Variables: Shareholder R ights Indica­
tors
Shareholder friendliness of management is difficult to measure, as it covers many 
aspects of management behaviour, only part of which can be directly observed by 
the econometrician. In this section, I present first some evidence about the impor­
tance of control rights of shares. Then several different indicators for measuring 
shareholder rights with respect to control rights as well as with respect to income 
rights are proposed, together with some institutional background to justify them. 
Subsequently, data is presented for the 140 largest traded Russian open joint stock 
companies. It is shown that the indicators for control rights are significantly posi­
tively correlated, which gives some evidence that they all might be valid measures 
of the underlying shareholder friendliness.
Shares give two different rights to its owners: rights of control and income-rights16. 
During transition, the more important feature of shares is arguably the control 
rights since the majority of privatized enterprises are in need of severe restructuring. 
Then, control rights matter even more than during ‘normal’ times because many 
long-term strategic decisions, that can involve substantial sunk costs, have to be 
made. Furthermore, to the extent that privatisation has not resulted in an allocation 
of control rights that facilitates restructuring, this shortcoming can be mitigated 
in the secondary market. At the same time, income of firms is in many cases 
relatively low during transition, but expected to grow fast, such that income rights 
during the first years are of relatively little importance. This is reflected in the 
discount preference shares are traded at (table 3.1). This table shows the premium 
of ordinary shares over preference shares over time for some of the most liquid 
Russian companies, for which data are available. Preference shares have been issued 
for free to employees by the firms that chose option 1 of privatisation (which roughly 
16For one of the earliest manifestations of this idea see, for example, Grossman and Hart (1980).
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25% did)17. These shares amount up to 25% of chartered capital. They have no 
voting rights attached but are in general guaranteed preferential treatment with 
respect to dividend payments. The details of this preferential treatment vary across 
firms and are laid down in the corporate charters. Most of these charters state that 
1 0 % of after tax profits, or the equivalent to the dividend on ordinaries, whichever 
is greater, have to be paid out as dividends to holders of preference shares.
Table 3.1: Premia of Ordinary Shares over Preference Shares as Percentage of Or- 
dinary Share Price______________________________________________
Date Rostelekom UES LUKOil Surgut-
neftegaz
Norilsk
Nickel
Noyabrsk-
neftegaz
2.10.95 95 85 8 8 87 62 8 6
10.1.96 93 6 8 83 82 57 8 6
1.4.96 6 8 62 70 67 29 72
3.7.96 56 74 65 78 62 69
26.9.96 41 46 40 49 50 49
Source: Prema-Invest
However, there are two other reasons for the discount the preference shares are 
trading at, apart from the missing voting rights. They are in general less liquid (see 
Rinaco Plus research report R+, 1997). Investors would therefore require a premium 
to be compensated for this illiquidity. However, liquidity would have been very likely 
to increase over time, as workers would be allowed to sell their shares. This should 
have been anticipated by rational investors. It seems unlikely that investors would 
have priced preferred shares at only 5% to 38% (depending on firm) of the value of 
the ordinary share in October 1995 because of only a temporarily reduced liquidity. 
The importance of the voting right is therefore likely to have played some part. 
Furthermore, as liquidity increased over time (see Rinaco Plus research report R+, 
1997) the premium did not fully disappear but remained very substantial.
Second, the discount could also be related to a risk that preference shares are going
to be swapped into ordinaries at unfavourable rates. However, holder of preference
shares have the right to vote on these matters. As a swap would necessitate a change
17The privatization process in Russia allowed for 3 different options to privatize a firm which 
differ by how much (and what type) of the shares are allocated to insiders.
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in the corporate charter which requires a 75% majority, this risk is rather small given 
that preference shares amount to 25% of charter capital. The risk is therefore mainly 
relevant if management is in effect not bound by the corporate charter18.
A discount of around 40% to 50% in Russia compares with much smaller discounts 
in the US (5%) but is similar in size to that found in Israel (31%) and Italy (45%). 
The latter two countries have much weaker protection of investors than the USA. 
This would also point towards the importance to shareholders to participate actively 
in shareholder meetings and the management of the company, in order to protect 
their investment in countries with weak legal enforcement mechanisms like Russia 
or Italy19.
As income rights of equities are not fully codified in commercial law (it is in the na­
ture of the equity contract that dividend payments cannot be enforced by a court), 
problems related to the difficulty of enforcing shareholder rights in Russia are mostly 
related to the control rights of shares. To examine the extent to which managers hon­
our control rights of shares this chapter focuses on: whether American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs) or similar instruments were issued, the independence of share­
holder registries and the provision of information to shareholders. In particular, five 
indicators, denoted by I\ to 15 are introduced. These are represented as the five 
columns in the matrix /(140x5)-
The first variable to proxy for shareholder friendliness, A, is a dummy variable on 
whether ADRs, Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) or Russian Depository Certifi­
cates (RDCs) have been issued. ADRs are certificates sold at an American securities
18The other striking feature of Table 1.1 is the large decrease of the premium of ordinary shares 
over preference shares over time. While this change is not directly relevant for the argument made 
in this chapter, this could have been the result of three different developments. First, as mentioned 
above, the increasing liquidity of preference shares reduced the premium of ordinary shares over 
preference shares. Second, it could have been the case that the differential in dividends between 
preference shares and ordinary shares grew over time. If, for example, dividends on ordinary shares 
fell strongly as firms were less profitable, but dividends on preference shares fell by less due to the 
statutes of the firm, this could also explain the observation in Table 3.1. However, this has not 
been the case for all the firms. For example, in the case of Rostelekom as well as in the case of 
Norilsk Nickel, the differential in dividends actually fell between 1996 and 1995. Lastly, Table 3.1 
is consistent with a decrease of the value of the voting right over time, as firms start to honour 
shareholder rights to a larger extent and regulatory progress is made
19See, for example, Levy (1982) or Zingales (1994)-
87
exchange, denominated in USD, that are backed by shares that are held in custody 
in Russia. GDRs are similar to ADRs, but traded at stock exchanges outside the 
US. RDCs are also very similar certificates backed by Russian shares, held in cus­
tody by ING bank of the Netherlands. The buyers of these instruments are allowed 
to exercise the voting rights of the underlying share. An issue of ADRs, for exam­
ple, indicates that management does honour shareholder rights to the extent that 
the costs of violating them increases if ADRs are outstanding. Theoretically, this 
seems plausible, as outstanding ADRs increase the likelihood that stealing profits 
is detected, as well as the likelihood of subsequent punishment. This is true as vio­
lations become more visible since the financial press covers them more thoroughly. 
This, in turn, is likely to increase the political pressure on management to undo 
or prevent such violations. The reason for this is that the Government might fear 
spill-over effects, that could damage the reputation of all Russian firms or even the 
reputation of the sovereign as a borrower20. For the case of Hong Kong, Cheung and 
Shum (1995) provide some empirical evidence on the reduction of risk associated 
with international stock listings. The authors examine events which increase the risk 
for the Hong Kong stockmarket but find that only the shares that are listed only 
in Hong Kong display a significant increase in their betas after the event, whereas 
shares fisted in addition on the London Stock Exchange do not on average change 
their risk characteristics significantly. By January 1996, 10% of the sampled firms 
had issued one of these instruments. Issuance of ADRs are positively correlated 
with the other measures of shareholders’ (control) rights.
The second aspect of shareholder friendly behaviour covered in this chapter is the 
openness with respect to information, covered by two variables; the survey measure 
/ 2 , and a dummy variable whether a firm has hired an international accounting 
company to do its accounts, / 521. I2 is the result of a survey by ‘Agenstvo Konsultii
20In an interview in the Moscow Times (16.11.96 ), management of Surgutneftegaz stated that 
‘competent analysts should have guessed that we were going to do this (the dilution) before the 
ADR issue (which is planned for later this year) because later it would be more difficult and more 
trouble’.
21 The variable measures whether accounts have been done by Western accounting firms, not 
whether the firm has accounts published according to international accounting standards. While it 
does at times happen that these firms are asked to produce Russian style accounts, this seems to be
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i Marketing’ (AK and M), who asked 308 participants in the survey to name up to 5 
firms that were particularly open about disclosing information to investors (in order 
of openness). This survey was carried out in Q1 1996. The answers were then used 
to calculate the index22.
The provision of information on the company to shareholders is an important part of 
shareholder rights. Information is necessary to evaluate the performance of manage­
ment and to use the control rights of the shares in exercising corporate governance 
in a meaningful way. The importance of this point is stressed by a presidential 
decree of March 1996 which lays out a comprehensive programme on investors’ and 
shareholders’ rights and demands higher disclosure requirements for firms23. The 
recent struggle between outside investors, controlling 40% of the Novolipetsk Metal­
lurgical Kombinat, and a management which refused to provide meaningful financial 
statements to the investors illustrates the problems inherent in this area24. / 5 is of 
importance as Russian accounting is still based on the necessities of a state econ­
omy and consequently does not provide information that helps to evaluate firms in 
a market environment. By January 1996 24% of the firms in the sample had (at 
least a partial) audit done by a international accounting firm. In September 1996, 
the government decided to grant tax reductions for firms that would adopt these 
international accounting principles25. I 2 and I 5 are significantly positively correlated 
(see table 3.2)26.
quite rare. Furthermore, even if this is the case, it still signals that management is comparatively 
shareholder-friendly, as accounts checked by a Western accounting firm with a reputation to lose 
are likely to be more reliable than the ones provided by a Russian firm.
22steps of 5) implying that the final rating would be between 0 and 9,240. In response to this 
question, 222 companies were mentioned.
23In addition, the law on the securities market, which came into effect in April 1996, details 
disclosure requirements for the case of the issue of new securities.
24See Financial Times, of 21.2.1997. While outside investors have recently won a court victory 
against management, the court decision has not been implemented as of yet.
25See M oscowTim es, September 18, 1996. As this policy has been announced after the data on 
international accounting standards has been collected, it is unlikely to have affected the choice of 
accounting rules in the sample.
26The issue of an insufficient provision of information is also relevant in other countries. The IFC 
Emerging Markets Handbook fists only 8 out of the 26 markets it covers as meeting accounting 
standards of an internationally acceptable quality. China and Indonesia have especially poor 
accounting standards. In Jordan there are not even interim financial disclosure requirements 
implemented.
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Turning now to the independence of shareholder registries, there are two different 
variables; survey data measures the ease of transferability of shares, J4, and a dummy 
variable measures whether the share-registries are licensed by the FSC, Is- h  is based 
on a survey carried out by AK and M in Q1 1996. In this survey, 308 participants 
in the Russian stock market (150 Moscow firms and 158 regional firms) were asked 
to name up to 5 companies for which they found it particularly easy to transfer the 
ownership of stock (in order of convenience)27.
The institutional background is the following: The issue of the reliability of share 
registries was historically the first concern of foreign investors with respect to share­
holder rights. In particular, several well publicized instances occurred during 1994 
and 1995, where management manipulated share registries or refused to register 
new shareholders28. Since share registries are the only proof of share-ownership 
in Russia this amounted in effect to negating property rights of outside investors. 
Subsequently, several steps were taken to mitigate this problem: a presidential de­
cree was introduced in 1995 which makes independent share-registries for firms with 
more than 1,000 employees obligatory. Based on this decree the FSC issued interim 
regulations on the maintenance of share registers in July 1995. These regulations 
determine how lawful entries into the share registries are to be made and also in­
troduced a liability of the registrar for any improper performance of its duties. 
Furthermore, the regulations stipulate that share registries need to obtain a licence 
from the FSC. By August 30th, 1996, licences to 104 share registries in 49 regions 
have been granted. By September 1996, 17% of the largest 140 Russian firms had 
their shares registered by a licensed share registry. As is to be expected, the Z4 and 
Is are significantly positively correlated (see table 3.2). This seems to indicate that 
the licensing procedure of the FSC is effective in the sense that licensed registries 
seem to involve lower risk of improper handling of entries than unregistered ones.
27 Since another question in the survey related more directly to the liquidity of the share, this 
question is likely to pick up mainly legal aspects and differences in transaction costs of re-registering 
shares. These, in turn, can be directly controlled by management
28For example, in 1994 the director of the Krasnoyarsk Aluminium Factory cancelled out a 20% 
shareholding of a British metal firm. However, this shareholding was subsequently reinstated due 
to political pressure on management.
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With respect to income rights, the dividend policy for ordinary shares of firms is 
analysed29. The average dividend payout ratio announced in 1995 (for the fiscal year 
of 1994) was 2.5% of profits, with a minimum of 0% and maximum of 76%. For 1994 
unfortunately there exists only a dummy variable for whether a dividend payment 
was announced (for the fiscal year of 1993). Because there was no liquid market 
for many of the shares in the sample, there are often no meaningful shareprices 
available. Therefore this chapter uses the payout-ratio (‘Div’) instead of dividend 
yields.
Table 3.2: Corre ation of Indicators of Shareholc er Rights
IAS ADR Disclosure Div Licence Transfer
IAS
ADR
Disclosure
Div
Licence
Transfer
1.000 0.345
(0 .0 0 0 )
1.000
0.326
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.577
(0 .0 0 0 )
1.000
-0 .0 0 1
(0.986)
0 .1 2 2
(0.150)
0.139
(0 .1 0 1 )
1.000
0.233
(0.005)
0.274
(0 .0 0 1 )
0.314
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.047
(0.579)
1.000
0.301
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.488
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.883
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.065
(0.443)
0.350
(0 .0 0 0 )
1.000
p-values in brackets
All indicators relating to control rights of shares are significantly positively corre­
lated. This gives some evidence that the underlying management behaviour with 
respect to outside shareholders is captured at least to some extent by these vari­
ables. However, as some of the variables are binary the coefficient of correlation is 
not necessarily the most appropriate statistic. In the appendix alternative measures 
for the correlation of the binary variables are provided. It is noteworthy that the 
dividend yield is not significantly positively correlated with the other indicators, 
although dividends could in general be a used to signal that shareholder rights are
29In this context, it is important to focus on dividends paid on ordinary shares and not on 
preference shares. This is true as during the privatization process preference shares were only 
issued to employees, not to any outsiders. Subsequent trading in these shares was very limited as 
workers were obliged to keep these shares for three years after privatization. Therefore, dividends 
on preference shares mainly reflect payments to insiders and do not indicate good behaviour with 
respect to outside shareholders.
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honoured30. This could indicate that the agency costs of outside finance are so large 
in Russia, that they more than outweigh the benefits of signalling the high quality 
of management31.
3.3.2 Independent Variables
As opposed to the enterprise surveys carried out by the World Bank and by Blasi 
and Shleifer (1996), who use data directly collected from the firms, this chapter anal­
yses data on enterprises collected by brokerages and financial information services. 
Therefore, all the firms in the sample are organized as open joint stock compa­
nies. Furthermore, the data set comprises only information on the largest Russian 
firms (by sales), as the interest of investors is naturally highest in these firms. This 
makes this study complementary to the ones mentioned above, which focus mainly 
on small and medium sized firms. Furthermore, the focus on large firms should 
give the study some macroeconomic relevance, as the firms in the sample represent 
a significant amount of the total industrial workforce (27%). Given that data is 
collected in a transition economy the quality of the data might be questioned. In 
particular, it is unclear to what extent managers reveal information truthfully. It 
seems likely that differences in the quality of data between direct sampling and using 
information of brokerages are slight, as these institutions obtain their information by 
visiting the enterprise and interviewing management as well. Since brokerages are 
likely to have other sources of information on these firms, it could be the case that 
they find it easier to cross-check the data and improve its reliability. For example, 
information on the ownership structure of a firm can be cross-checked by observing 
its annual shareholders’ meeting - which brokerages do to some extent. Furthermore, 
these brokerages have access to the products of financial information providers such 
as Skatepress and Dun and Bradstreet, which also interview companies and their 
management. Nevertheless, it is possible that some outside blockholdings are omit­
30Formally, a dividend signaling model along the lines of Ross (1977) or Bhattarchaya (1979) 
could be constructed to fit this case. The model developed in chapter 4 generates similar 
predictions.
31 This is consistent with Mayer (1989) who argues that in environments where external inter­
vention is costly internal finance will dominate.
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ted in the data used. This problem should be more important for relatively small 
stakes, as these shareholdings are not necessarily disclosed during the annual meet­
ing. Therefore, in the regression analysis I focus on the stake of the largest outside 
blockholder, where omissions should be less significant. The sample of this chap­
ter was constructed by merging data from different sources into one dataset. Since 
the data originates from three different sources, Brunswick Brokerage, Renaissance 
Capital and Troika Dialog, it is possible that different series have different numbers 
of observations.
The sample used contains 140 firms with overall employment of 3.9 million. The 
mean employment is 25,300. The firms are concentrated in the following industries: 
communications, electricity, metallurgy, transport as well as oil32. The majority of 
firms are registered in Moscow, but the location of firms varies considerably. The 
clustering of firms in the Moscow area does not necessarily imply a regional bias, 
since a firm whose production facilities are all located in Siberia could get registered 
in Moscow33.
Ownership data is given as of the end of January 1996. The average number of 
outside blockholders is 1.7, the median is 1.0. Blockholders are defined as institutions 
or individuals that hold more than 5% of the outstanding shares of a firm. These 
blockholders hold together on average 29.7% of the shares, with a median of 27.6. 
The largest of the blockholders holds on average 23.0 %, the median being 20% of a 
firm’s equity. In 17% of firms, no outside blockholder is reported. These values are 
similar to the ones found by the Blasi and Shleifer survey (BSS) of medium sized 
firms (see table 3.3). They report for the end of 1995 an average stake of outsiders 
of 31.2%. However, the composition of outside blockholders is very different in the 
two samples. The following numbers report the average of the largest owner of a 
given type in a given firm34: The outside owner with the largest average stake were
32 For a detailed breakdown by industry see the appendix.
33 To some extent it can even be argued that it is a sign of shareholder friendly behaviour to 
register a firm in Moscow, as outside shareholders might find it easier to attend the annual meeting. 
Therefore, it is not advisable to control for the region in which the firm is registered when running 
the regressions that are supposed to explain whether shareholder rights are honoured.
34This means, that if two investment funds have a block in a given company, the average includes 
only the block held by the larger of the two.
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holding-companies and officially registered financial-industrial groups (FIGs) with 
an average equity holding of 11.4%. The second largest outside stake is held by non- 
financial firms, which hold on average 6.7% of outstanding shares. Investment funds 
(including brokerages) have the same average stake as banks (3.5%). Lastly, foreign 
financial firms own an average stake of 2.1% of the firms in the sample35. However, 
the distribution is highly uneven. The median for all these ownership classes is 0%, 
i.e. in more than 50% of firms, the given type of investor does not own any shares. 
The ownership structure by industry is given in the Appendix. Compared to BSS, 
where holding companies or FIGs own on average 4.9%, this sample has a much 
higher average ownership by this type of institution and a much lower ownership by 
Russian commercial firms.
Apart from outside owners, there are also pronounced differences in the stake the 
State still holds in these firms, denoted by ’State’. In my sample, the average stake 
amounts to 13%, as opposed to 9% in BSS. In both cases the median is 0 , pointing 
once more to the concentration of stakes. These numbers also could imply that the 
state is more actively involved in the management of the larger firms.
35It should be noted that January 1996 was a point where foreign involvement in the Russian 
equity market was at its lowest point this year. Therefore, one would expect much higher values 
for foreign ownership in late 1996.
Table 3.3: Ownership of Russian Firms
This Sample BSS
Sample Size 140 185
Date Jan-96 Q4-95
Mean Employment 25,300 2,444
Mean number of outside blockholders 1.7 NA
Mean holding of outside blockholders 29.7 31.0
Mean holding of largest blockholder 23.0 NA
of which
Holdings or FIGs 11.4 2 .6
Non-financial firms 6.7 14.6
Investment Funds 3.5 4.9
Banks 3.5 2 .0
Foreign financial firms 2 .1 0 .0
State 13.0 9.0
There is unfortunately no data available covering insider ownership. Furthermore, 
there is no obvious proxy for this variable. This is a clear deficiency of my dataset. 
However, to the extent that this chapter provides an initial look at ownership struc­
tures as they resulted from privatisation, this omission should not bias the results. 
In particular, the first stage of privatisation should have resulted in a broadly sim­
ilar extent of management ownership in the different firms. While the purchase 
of additional shares by management can be expected to take place over time, this 
development is likely to be slowed down to the extent that management is wealth 
constrained. This is in line with data reported by Blasi et al, who show that the 
increase in management shareholding has so far been slow. The dynamic aspects of 
insider ownership are examined in more detail in the following chapter.
Some of the variables in the simple model outlined above are not directly observ­
able. Ideally, in order to capture the benefits from raising capital, n, investment 
needs would need to be observed directly, for example by an estimate of the change 
in demand for the products of a particular firm as well as the replacement needs 
with respect to existing capital. In this chapter industry dummies are used to cap-
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ture n. In particular, a dummy for the communications industry (‘Comm’); for the 
electricity industry (‘Electricity’); for the oil and gas industry (‘Oil’), for the metal 
industry (‘Metal’) and for transportation (‘Transport’) are used36. The set of indus­
try dummies is denoted by D. One approach to determine which industries have 
particularly high investment needs would be to focus on replacement needs. As­
suming that the physical assets of all firms have to be replaced to a similar extent, 
replacement needs of fixed capital depend on the percentage of fixed assets on the 
balance sheet. While it can be shown that industry dummies pick up significant 
differences in the percentage of fixed assets on the balance sheet (with the commu­
nications industry having the highest ratio of fixed assets and the metal industry 
the lowest one), the fact that these ratios axe taken from the firm’s Russian financial 
accounts, which cannot be compared to the Western equivalent, implies that those 
figures should only be used with extreme caution. Instead, the table below focuses 
on the cumulative change in production over the period between 1995 and 1990, 
the beginning of the transition. Assuming that supply has been largely fixed over 
this period (or has fallen to a similar extent) as investment during the first years 
of transition was very low (see Russian Economic Trends), the majority of changes 
in prices and quantities is presumably due to changes in demand. If this was true, 
the industries where output fell the least and prices (deflated by the industrial price 
index) rose the most, axe the ones where demand dropped the least. These should 
be the industries with the highest investment needs in order to replace a sufficient 
amount of the depreciated assets in order to meet this demand. Under these as­
sumptions table 3.4 indicates that the communications industry and the electricity 
industry are the industries with the highest investment needs, whereas the metal 
industry has the lowest investment needs37.
While this approach does not allow for firm specific differences in investment needs, 
there does not seem to be an obvious way around this problem without having to
36A list of all variables used in this chapter is attached in the appendix.
37It is indeed plausible that the investment needs in the communications industry are particularly 
high as demand for communications services multiplied with the change of the economic system 
in Russia. It is also worth noting that the first (and to date only) Russian firm to issue a level 3 
ADR was the telecom provider Vimplecom.
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Table 3.4: Fall in Output and Change in Prices by Industry
Industry Change in Price* Change in Output**
Comm 267 +350***
Electricity 239 - 2 0
Transport**** 164 -40
Oil 191 -35
Metal 117 -45
Source: Goskomstat
* change in prices between end 1990 and end 1995, deflated by the PPI,
** change in real output between 1990 and 1995,
*** international telephone calls,
**** cargo
rely on accounting records drawn up according to Russian accounting standards. 
However, it could be argued that the large Russian firms are more homogenous than 
their Western counterparts. This could be true as the firms in the same industry 
were set-up by the same planning agency which could imply that they have similar 
investment needs.
3.4 Testing the H ypotheses
The main aim of this section is to test the hypotheses of proposition 3.1 and propo­
sition 3.2, using the limited dataset described in the previous section. This is imple­
mented with the following set of regressions (the ‘shareholder rights’ regressions):
J =  C  -I-  ol\ D  - |-  ol26 +  OL^StatB +  a± L  - |-  £
where C  is a constant, /  is a vector of the five different indicators with respect to 
control rights of shareholders, D is the vector containing five industry dummies (and 
ol\ consequently (5 x 1 ) vector) and e is assumed to be an identical and independently 
distributed (iid) error term. As the data seems to indicate that the relationship with 
respect to L  is not linear, L 2 is also added to give a second specification.
/ =  C +  cx.\D -(- ct2& +  cx^Stdtc -|- cx^L -|- QC5L 2 +  v  (^'^)
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where v  is assumed to be iid. As there are no instruments available for L  OLS 
regressions are run under the assumption that the independent variables, and in 
particular L, are all exogenous. However, the equation is also run without L  in a 
third specification to avoid the problem that the results are driven by a potential 
endogeneity of the largest outside stake.
I — C OL\D -f- QL2& “H CSL^ StdtB “I- 6
Again, e is assumed to be iid distributed. OLS is used for the estimation of I2 and 
Z4 and Probit for estimation of i i, I3 and 75, the binary variables.
Subsequently, this section tests the strong assumption 3.6. In particular, it had been 
assumed that firms can only raise new capital if they honour shareholder rights. 
This section gives some evidence that the number of share issues is indeed positively 
correlated with the five indicators of shareholder rights. It then tests whether the 
p /e  ratio is higher in firms that honour shareholder rights. If this is true, this would 
also give some evidence for assumption 3.6, as it would imply that management can 
raise finance more cheaply by issuing shares. Such a result would be in the spirit 
of assumption 3.6. To implement this test I use the Gordon and Shapiro (1956) 
growth model. According to this model the p/e  ratio (PE) can be expressed as
Div
P E  = —  3.10
r — g
where Div is the dividend pay-out ratio, r is the required rate of return and g is the 
growth rate of the firms’ profits. The required rate of return, r, in the framework of 
the CAPM (in its ex-post empirically testable form) would be
r  =  7  +  (3rm +  77 (3.11)
where 7  in the Sharpe-Lintner framework would be (1  — /9)ry, where 7 7  is the risk 
free rate of return, /3 is the beta of the share, i.e. the covariance between the return 
of the market portfolio and the return of the share divided by the variance of the 
return on the market portfolio and rm is the return of the market portfolio. This 
Gordon and Shapiro model together with the CAPM has, for example, been tested
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over a cross-section of countries by K im  and Koveos (1994). However, the model 
in section 3.2 implies that the cost of capital r depends also on whether shareholder 
rights are honoured:
r = r(P1z1) (3.12)
where the > 0  and < 0. A higher degree of shareholder friendliness should 
lower the cost of capital. To capture differences in expected future growth industry 
dummies are used. This is consistent with the use of industry dummies as proxies 
for investment needs, at least under the assumption that the old capital stock has 
to be replaced to a similar extent in all firms. Equations 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 result 
in the following regression for the augmented Gordon and Shapiro model (the ‘PE’ 
regression):
P E  =  7 1 Z1 +  7 2T> +  isD iv  +  7 4 /? -f £ (3.13)
where £ is the iid disturbance term. From the above analysis, the hypothesis for the 
augmented Gordon and Shapiro model would be the following:
PROPOSITION 3.3: In regression 3.13 71  > 0 , 7 3  > 0 , 7 4  <  0
The regressions 3.7 and 3.13 (or 3.9 and 3.13 respectively) form a system of equations 
as the dependent variable in regression 3.7 is an independent variable in regression
3.13. The system is a recursive one. This allows to estimate equation 3.13 by two 
stage least squares, using State , L  and e as instruments. Given the limited number 
of instruments and the high positive correlation among the I\ to / 5 an index z\ is 
constructed to reduce the problem of multi-colhnearity. The index is constructed by 
applying the method of principal components. The use of principal components is 
an attempt to extract from a set of collinear variables a small number of variables 
that account for most or all of the variation in the set of variables (for details see 
appendix). The largest weight is given to I2 (49%), followed by I4 (35%), 7i (12%), 
h  (8 %) and Iz (7%).
Before this system is estimated, two questions need to be raised: First, should P E
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also be a variable on the right hand side of equation 3.7 ? It could be argued that 
to the extent that the industry dummies do not pick up the true investment needs 
of the firms, high investment needs might be reflected in a higher p /e  ratio. This 
approach is only used in the appendix. This is partly dictated by the data. As 
there are only 6 6  observations of the p/e ratio and only 32 stocks for which there is 
sufficient price data to attempt to estimate /?, because many of the shares were very 
illiquid and therefore there is no meaningful price data for them, the sample would 
be reduced by more than 75% if the p/e ratio was included. Nevertheless, to show 
that P E  is not significant, regressions including this variable on the right hand side 
are reported in the appendix, using 3SLS. This is done for the system of equation 
containing I2 , I  a and P E  as the endogenous variables. A further system of equations 
also including Ji, J3 or J5 as endogenous variables has not been constructed as the 
order condition would indicate that the number of instrumental variables would 
be insufficient. Furthermore, a system of equations containing endogenous binary 
variables as well as non-binary variables is not straight-forward to estimate, unless 
strong assumptions on the nature of the binary variables are made. The results 
from estimating both systems of equations imply that not much would be gained by 
making P E  endogenous. In particular, P E  is insignificant at the 10% level in the 
3SLS regressions. Few variables remain significant in those regressions, presumably 
partly due to the sharply lower number of observations, but potentially also due to 
the correlation structure between P E  and some of the exogenous variables. However, 
employment remains significant in most of the specifications and the variable ‘State’ 
is significant at the 10% in the J4 regression. A more fundamental reason for not 
including P E  (which also casts some doubt over the P E  regressions estimated below) 
is that earnings are taken from the Russian accounts. Therefore, they have to be 
interpreted with extreme caution and are not easily comparable with the Western 
concept of earnings (see Coopers and Lybrand, 1996). Lastly, as argued above, 
large Russian firms in a given industry are likely to be more homogenous than their 
Western counterparts which could imply that firm level variation in investment needs 
is smaller them in the West.
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Second, the question remains whether the index Z\ should be used as a right-hand- 
side variable in equation 3.13 or whether one should allow the data to determine 
the weights individually. Using the index has two advantages. First, the number 
of instruments is limited: ‘State’, ‘L’ and ‘e’. This means that the system is not 
identified by the order condition if all five variables are put into equation 3.13. One 
would then have to make a subjective choice of which three variables to use. Sec­
ond, using all five indicators creates a very substantial problem of multicollinearity. 
Therefore, the paper uses the index when estimating equation 3.13. However, this 
chapter will also provide the results when using two subsets of individual indicators.
As White tests indicated that the hypothesis of non-heteroskedasticity has to be 
rejected at the 5% level for these regressions, the OLS as well as the probit regressions 
were run with a robust variance-covariance matrix. As F tests indicate that the 
relationship with respect to L  is non-linear, the following table (3.5) reports the 
estimation of 3.8. The estimation of 3.7 is reported in the appendix.
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Table 3.5: OLS regressions with L
OLS with robust 
standard errors
OLS with robust 
standard errors
Dependent variable I 2 (Disclosure) It (Transfer)
Comm 214.913 387.784
(0.908) (1.030)
Electricity 202.915* 421.267**
(1.919) (2.064)
Metal -72.755 -24.042
(-1.326) (-0.566)
Oil -20.165 -34.790
(-0.274) (-0.395)
Trans -86.292 -35.109
(-1.328) (-0.410)
e 0.004*** 0.004
(3.428) (1.563)
L 5.900* 11.294**
(1.839) (2.449)
L2 -0.153** -0.232**
(-2.569) (-2.548)
State 2.962 5.304
(1.434) (1.599)
C -3.911 -98.142
(-0.050) (-1.233)
N 140 140
R2 0.3053 0.2596
adj. R2 0.2573 0.2084
F-statistics 2 .2 2 1.33
Prob (F-statistics) 0.0411 0.2269
t-values given in brackets. * denotes significance at the 1 0 % level, 
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level
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Table 3.6: PROBIT regressions with L
probit with robust 
standard errors 
marginal effects
probit with robust 
standard errors 
marginal effects
probit with robust 
standard errors 
marginal effects
Dependent variable I\ (ADR) / 3 (Indep) h  (IAS)
Comm 0.196 0.034 0.106
(1.479) (0.256) (0.659)
Electricity 0.046 0.327* -0.113
(0.456) (1.924) (-0.749)
Metal -0 .1 1 0 -0.126 -0 .1 2 0
(-1.543) (-1.581) (-1.153)
Oil -0.033 0 .1 1 2 0.136
(-0.473) (1.089) (1.183)
Trans 0.059 -0.867 0.088
(-0.530) (-0.761) (0.560)
e 8.98E-07* 1.37E-7 4.39E-6***
(1.685) (0.230) (3.274)
L -0 .0 0 1 0.004 0.007
(-0.167) (0.677) (1.096)
L2 1.96E-5 -9.64E-5 -1.00E-4
(0.279) (-1.034) (-0.997)
State -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 2
(-0.144) (0.924) (1.024)
N 140 140 140
Pseudo R2 0.124 0.123 0 .2 1 1
Prob^chi2 0.298 0.018 0 .0 0 2
t-values given in brackets. * denotes significance at the 1 0 % level,
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level
For the dummy variables the marginal effect is for a discrete change from 0 to 1
The I 2 regression, as reported in the first column of table 3.5, has an adjusted R2 
of 0.26 and is significant at the 5% level. Employment ‘e’ has a positive coefficient 
which is significant at the 1% level. Formally, I cannot distinguish whether this is 
due to fixed costs of entering the capital market or due to the higher expected value 
of expropriation in small firms. However, the latter argument is more plausible, as 
even the smaller firms in the sample are likely to have investment needs that are 
large enough to make the fixed costs of equity issues negligible. Then the derivative
of b with respect to e would be positive. There is no evidence that expropriation 
in larger firms is facilitated due to the more complex environment. Furthermore, if 
private benefits to management of running the firm, c, are positively correlated with 
‘e’, they are more than outweighed by the expropriation.
The variable ‘State’ has a positive coefficient, which is, however, not significant at 
the 10% level. The hypothesis that the State hinders the introduction of shareholder 
rights because it wants to avoid restructuring for exogenous reasons is clearly not 
borne out by the data. On the other hand, although the government aims to push 
for increased shareholder rights, as evident in recent presidential decrees38, there 
is only very weak evidence that it uses its voting rights to cause management to 
honour shareholder rights.
With respect to ‘L’ the underlying specification seems to be quadratic, as the t- 
statistics of ‘L2’ is larger than 2  and a Wald-test rejects the hypothesis that the 
coefficient of both variables should be 0 at the 5% level. The coefficient for ‘L’ is 
positive (and significant at the 1 0 % level), but the coefficient of ‘L2’ is negative 
and significant at the 5% level. The estimated coefficients imply that for outside 
stakes larger than 39%, shareholder friendliness starts to decrease. As ‘L’ is in 
general smaller than 39%, the basic effect of this variable is positive, but at a 
decreasing rate39. This would lend some credibility to proposition 3.2, i.e. that 
outside shareholders bargain with management. As their bargaining power increases, 
they tend to be more successful in pushing for shareholder rights. They are also less 
likely to collude with management, as they can benefit less from expropriation. The 
data does not suggest that management has unlimited control in the absence of
38For example, a presidential decree of July, 1, 1996 explicitly states the following: ‘The cap­
italization of Russian companies should be increased in the following ways: Implementation of 
measures to increase the liquidity of the market, mainly by developing a system of protections for 
investor rights, including ... reducing the costs and risks of the system of securities circulation and 
servicing, and providing for greater information transparency of the market.’
390n ly  in 13% of cases is the stake of the largest outside holder larger than 39%. The negative 
effect in the case of the very large outside holdings could be due to the fact that management, 
together with the largest outside blockholder, own so many shares that it is impossible to commit 
not to expropriate minority interests. This might be the case if together they own more than 
75% and therefore can change the company charter at their discretion. They will not introduce 
shareholder rights if there are some arbitrarily small costs associated with the introduction.
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shareholder rights and proposition 3.1 would seem to be rejected by the data, as for 
this case the model in section 3.2.1 would imply a negative sign for lL \  The positive 
coefficient would also make it harder to argue that ‘L’ is endogenous. If it was, it 
would be expected that following La Porta et al (1996) concentrated shareholdings 
act as a substitute for shareholder rights. This does not seem to be the case.
With respect to the industry dummies, only ‘Electricity’ is significant (at the 10% 
level) and has a positive coefficient. The communications industry has the largest 
(and positive) coefficient of all industries, but is insignificant at the 1 0 % level. 
‘Metal’ has the smallest coefficient, but it is not significant at the 10% level. This is 
roughly in fine with investment needs, as indicated by growth and price changes in 
the different industries. According to this measure, it is the communications indus­
try which has the largest, and the metals industry which has the lowest investment 
needs. Therefore, there is some weak evidence that the industry dummies act as a 
proxy for returns from future investment, n 40. With respect to / 4 the coefficients 
of the independent variables have the same sign and similar significance levels, but 
the overall regression is not significant.
With respect to the regressions for the binary indicators / 1, Is and / 5, it should first 
be noted that the Ii regression is not significant at the 10% level. Consequently 
the focus should be on the other two regressions. With respect to the Is- and 
the / 5-regressions, the signs of the coefficients are the same as they are for the 
continuous variables. However, fewer of them are significant at the 10% level. For 
the / 5-regression only the coefficient of ‘e’ is significant (at the 1 % level) and for the 
/ 3-regression it is only the coefficient of ‘Electricity’ which is significant (at the 10% 
level). The ordering of the coefficients for the industry dummies is roughly in fine 
with the I 2 and / 4 regressions, but the oil industry has a relatively larger coefficient. 
Overall, it seems that the model outlined can explain more of the behaviour of firms 
with respect to information disclosure (/2 , 1 5) than with respect to the independence
40It is noteworthy that the investment needs relevant for this analysis are the ones that are to 
be fulfilled by share-issues. In the case of oil-firms, for example, it could be the case that new 
projects are mainly implemented by joint ventures with foreign firms, which would raise a large 
part of the required finance.
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of shareholder registries (h ,h )  or whether ADRs are outstanding. One hypothesis to 
explain this would be that improvements with respect to the protection of property 
rights of shareholder have led to a situation where the most obvious violations, 
like the obstruction of the transfer of ownership of shares by management, are not 
possible any more, even in case shareholder registries are not fully independent. 
Therefore, violations might now be more reflected in problems of the provision of 
information, which is why shareholders as well as firms might focus more on these 
issues.
The regressions of tables 3.5 and 3.6 have to be interpreted with care as it is not en­
tirely clear whether lU  is truly exogenous. However, there is no obvious instrument 
available and it turns out that the sign of the coefficient is the opposite of what one 
would expect under the hypothesis of endogeneity. Nevertheless, the following table 
(3.7) reports the results when omitting lL \
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Table 3.7: OLS regressions without L
OLS with robust 
standard errors
OLS with robust 
standard errors
Dependent variable I2 (Disclosure) 24 (Transfer)
Comm 190.824 392.494
(0.822) (1.073)
Electricity 103.478 329.884*
(1.059) (1.825)
Metal -89.202 -46.221
(-1.653) (-1.177)
Oil -62.790 -63.785
(-0.802) (-0.651)
Trans -95.316 -42.835
(-1.405) (-0.487)
e 0.003*** 0.003
(3.318) (1.483)
State 3.650* 5.366
(1.675) (1.517)
C 19.598 -13.029
(0.744) (-0 .2 0 2 )
N 140 140
R2 0.2795 0.2357
adj. R2 0.2413 0.1932
F-statistics 2.44 1.36
Prob (F-statistics) 0 .0 2 2 0 0.2277
t-values given in brackets. * denotes significance at the 1 0 % level, 
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level
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Table 3.8: PROBIT regressions without L
probit with robust 
standard errors 
marginal effects
probit with robust 
standard errors 
marginal effects
probit with robust 
standard errors 
marginal effects
Dependent variable h  (ADR) I3 (Indep) h  (IAS)
Comm 0 .2 1 0 0.013 0.148
(1.596) (0.105) (0.912)
Electricity 0.066 0 .2 2 2 * -0 .1 1 0
(0.720) (1.721) (-0.806)
Metal -0.109 -0.130 -0.127
(-1.544) (-1.619) (-1.225)
Oil -0.025 0.085 0.153
(-0.431) (0.913) (1.374)
Trans 0.062 -0.088 0.087
(0.559) (-0.746) (0.556)
e 9.17E-7* 1.30E-7 4.39E-6***
(1.651) (0.219) (3.433)
State -0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 1
(-0.331) (1.334) (0.678)
N 140 140 140
Pseudo R2 0.124 0.115 0.204
Prob^chi2 0.298 0.026 0 .0 0 1
t-values given in brackets. * denotes significance at the 1 0 % level,
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level
For the dummy variables the marginal effect is for a discrete change from 0 to 1
Overall, dropping the ‘L’ and ‘L2’ does not affect the coefficients of the remaining 
variables. It is still the case that the coefficient of ‘e’ is positive and significant. The 
relative signs of the coefficients of the industry dummies are still roughly in fine with 
the hypothesis on investment needs, but remain mostly insignificant. The only new 
result is that in the I2 regression the variable ‘State’ is now significant at the 5% 
level, giving some limited evidence for an active state involvement with respect to 
the issue of shareholder rights. In the appendix, I provide regressions with lL \  but 
without ‘L2’. In most of the regressions, ‘L’ alone is insignificant. The appendix also 
reports the 3SLS estimate of the system of equations when P E  is included in the 
‘shareholder rights’ regressions. It is noteworthy, that P E  is never significant and
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in some specifications has a negative sign (i.e. contrary to the theoretical prediction 
if it was to proxy for growth potential).
The following tables aim to provide a test of proposition 3.3, by estimating equation
3.13. In particular, it is tested whether increased shareholder friendliness is reflected 
in a higher valuation of the firm. The p/e ratio is for the end of January 1996. As 
has been argued above, the indicators for shareholder rights are endogenous and 
therefore have to be instrumented. Given the regressions in table 3.5 the obvious 
instruments are ‘State’, ‘e’ and lL \  In the first set of regressions, only the index z\ 
is used to capture shareholder friendliness to minimize problems of multicollinearity 
among the different measures of shareholder friendliness. Only using z\ also means 
that there are a sufficient number of instruments. However, as pointed out above, 
the index is to some extent still arbitrary, in spite of the principal components 
analysis. Therefore, the second set of equations uses individual indicators. As the 
number of instruments limits the number of indicators , two different equations 
are estimated: First, 7 2 , 73 and 7s are put into the regression, as the individual 
regressions explaining those three variables were the most significant ones. Second, 
the indicators I i , l 2 and 7* are put into the regression, as those were identified by 
the principal components analysis to be the three indicators which account for most 
of the variation in the five indicators. As discussed above, industry dummies are put 
in as a proxy for growth prospects. Lastly, an estimate for beta is included into the 
regression to control for the required return on capital. This beta has been estimated 
using weekly returns which were available for 32 shares between 29 November 1995 
and 13 September 1996 under the assumption that beta has been constant over 
time. As the market portfolio the ‘RTS’ (Russian Trading System) index was used. 
Although there is no turnover data available, the pattern of price changes suggests 
that there could be a non-trading bias in the estimates for beta. However, there 
is not sufficient data to estimate the Scholes-Williams estimator for beta which 
would correct for this problem. Scholes and W illiams (1977) have shown that 
the infrequent trading bias leads to the estimated beta to be higher than the true 
beta for the more illiquid stocks and to be lower for the more liquid stocks. While
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this problem might bias results, it is in the absence of volume data unclear how 
serious the problem is. Potentially the shareprice data represents another deficiency 
in my dataset. Furthermore, to the extent that foreigners are the marginal investors 
in the Russian equity market, it might be the case that the correlation with the 
Russian market portfolio is misleading. Therefore, I also run the regression using 
the standard deviation (‘stddev’) to proxy for risk as opposed to the beta.
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Table 3.9: PE regressions
IV with robust 
standard errors
IV with robust 
standard errors
Dependent variable PE PE
Zl 5.778 6 .6 6 6
(0.258) (0.429)
Div -26.954 -34.296
(-0.038) (-0.070)
Stddev 0.099
(0.214)
Beta 50.149
(1.254)
Comm -0.932 -6.239
(-0.013) (-0.128)
Electricity -8.129 12.923
(-0.123) (0.321)
Metal 2.073 -8.303
(0.046) (-0.304)
Oil 10.261 -9.066
(0.177) (-0.247)
Trans 130.564 130.876
(1.327) (1.457)
C -1.105 -8.528
(-0 .0 2 1 ) (-0 .2 1 0 )
N 32 32
R2 0.3649 0.4031
adj. R2 0.1439 0.1955
F-statistics 0.73 0.76
Prob (F-statistics) 0.6611 0.6386
t-values given in brackets. * denotes significance at the 1 0 % level, 
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level
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As it turns out, none of the regressions or variables has any significance41. This 
implies that proposition 3.3 is rejected by the data. Estimating the system with 
3SLS by introducing P E  into the shareholder rights regressions, as reported in the 
appendix, results in a positive and significant coefficient of I 2 in both systems of 
equations with ‘beta’ as well as with ‘stddev’ to proxy for risk. However, in the 
system with ‘beta’ the variable I2 has a negative and significant coefficient. As only 
the coefficient of ‘stddev’ has the expected negative sign (but is not significant), 
whereas the coefficient of ‘beta’ has a positive coefficient, the specification with 
‘stddev’ seems more reliable and the negative coefficient of I 2 should probably not 
be over-interpreted. While some of the conflicting results are presumably due to 
the poor quality of the data and the rather small sample, it nevertheless poses the 
question whether assumption 3.6 can be justified. In this sense, the above regressions 
show a limitation of the static model, in that the hypothesis that a higher P E  should 
be associated with a higher shareholder friendliness depends on implicit assumptions 
on future expropriation. Depending on the assumption of how stealing develops over 
time one could also construct models, where the p /e  ratio is negatively associated 
with the shareholder rights. If, for example, managers can only expropriate profits 
that have not been announced, stealing would be reflected in the announced p/e 
ratio. If, furthermore, some mechanism would stop expropriation in the future, the 
correlation between the p/e ratio and shareholder friendliness would be negative. 
Market prices would reflect that there will be a jump in announced profits at the 
time when expropriation will stop. In the next chapter a model is proposed where 
the timing of the end of stealing is endogenously derived. A more fundamental 
problem with the P E  regressions has already been mentioned above: the earnings 
from the Russian accounts need not be correlated with earnings derived according 
to the international accounting principles.
There is some more direct evidence for assumption 3.6. Table 3.11 shows that the
41 However, Nash and Wilier (1995) use a different measure for the valuation of some firms in 
the oil-industry and find that the variable ‘Transfer’ helps to explain differences in valuation.
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Table 3.10: PE regressions without index
IV with 
robust 
std errors
IV with 
robust 
std errors
IV with 
robust 
std errors
IV with 
robust 
std errors
Dep. Var. PE PE PE PE
Disclosure 0.269 -0.928 -0.144 -0.138
(0.150) (-0.072) (-0.533) (-0.577)
Transfer 0.080 0.074
(0.610) (0.664)
ADR -57.056 -1.566
(-0.419) (-0 .0 1 2 )
Indep 798.815 -1514.313
(0.132) (-0.075)
IAS -333.110 621.026
(-0.145) (0.072)
Div -3373.646 12799.27 1072.399 806.019
(-0.141) (0.074) (0.804) (0.715)
Stddev -12.588 -0.255
(-0.074) (-0.483)
Beta 7.785 67.541
(0 .0 2 1 ) (1.071)
Comm -613.683 1688.224 58.907 32.008
(-0.134) (0.075) (0.644) (0.395)
Electricity -789.745 2295.474 39.870 11.106
(-0.131) (0.074) (0.572) (0.170)
Metal -454.736 1346.702 -12.208 7.653
(-0.136) (0.075) (-0.324) (0.214)
Oil -494.940 1523.574 25.852 43.435
(-0.133) (0.075) (0.472) (0.810)
Trans -89.152 692.754 148.427 124.902
(-0.051) (0.093) (1.288) (1.232)
C 305.595 -872.882 -44.049 -23.805
(0.136) (-0.074) (-0.731) (-0.539)
N 32 32 32 32
R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.1189 0.2269
adj. R2 - - -0.3081 -0.1412
F-statistics 0.06 0.19 0.25 0.41
Prob (F-statistics) 1.000 0.9946 0.9370 0.9242
t-values given in brackets. * denotes significance at the 1 0 % level, 
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level
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correlation of the number of share-issues a firm has undertaken and the indicators 
of behaviour towards shareholders are positively correlated. This implies that man­
agement indeed treats shareholders well in order to raise new capital.
Table 3.11: Correlation Between Issues and Shareholder Rights
License 0 .2 0 2
(0.019)
Transfer 0.141
(0.105)
IAS 0.177
(0.040)
Disclose 0.277
(0 .0 0 1 )
ADR 0.294
(0 .0 0 1 )
p-values in brackets
However, it has to be borne in mind that in many of these share-issues no new 
capital has been raised. In general, most of the new shares were allocated to the 
shareholders when the capital of a firm was revalued; the firms did not receive any 
new capital. However, these re-valuations occurred equally frequently in all firms. 
Once a year the Ministry of Finance released instructions to change the charter 
capital and it is likely that most firms followed those instructions. Therefore, a 
higher than average number of issues is likely to reflect genuine share issues that did 
raise new capital. This effect is illustrated by table 3. I I 42.
3.5 Conclusion
To the extent that privatisation resulted in strong de facto insider control, which 
is not necessarily reflected in formal ownership, there is likely to be a significant 
agency problem. While in principle the resulting problems can be mitigated by 
introducing laws on property rights (i.e. on shareholder as well as creditor rights), 
law enforcement is often difficult during the development of capital markets. In
42 One of the most publicized share issues had been carried out by the Red October Chocolate 
Factory in 1995.
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particular, management is likely to expropriate shareholders. This, in turn, is likely 
to lead to underinvestment. However, this chapter shows that some firms seem to 
honour shareholder rights to some extent. This might partly be due to two different 
factors.
First, self interest might cause management to start to honour shareholder rights. 
If the potential returns to investment that accrue to management in its role as 
a shareholder outweigh the utility-loss from reduced control over the firm, man­
agement might be more willing to honour shareholder rights. The significance of 
employment, which I take as a proxy for the expected value of expropriation, would 
tend to support this hypothesis. Furthermore, weak evidence that investment needs 
as proxied by industry dummies matter also gives some evidence that this effect 
plays a role.
Second, outside pressures might be strong enough to force management to intro­
duce shareholder rights. This chapter has presented some limited evidence that the 
largest outside investor has some bargaining power that can be used to introduce 
shareholder rights. However, this effect becomes weaker for very large shareholders 
(who might not necessarily choose to push for shareholder rights). Furthermore, 
there is some limited evidence that at the very least the state does not hinder the 
introduction of shareholder rights and might even be a (weak) positive force.
The study of how shareholder rights are related to forward looking measures of 
market valuation of firms shows that the static analysis of this chapter has to be 
complemented by an analysis of the dynamics and the changes in ownership in 
particular. This is examined theoretically in the following chapter.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 T he index z \
Algebraically, the principal components analysis aims to find the linear combination 
of the set of variables that provides the best fit to all individual variables. This is 
done by a regression of the linear combination
zi = Ici (3.14)
on / ,  where C\ is a vector that contains the weights for the individual indices Ii to 
/ 5. Since the regressions of any column of I  on z\ will be equivalent for any scalar 
multiple of cithe indeterminacy can be removed by imposing
z\zY =  1. (3.15)
Minimizing the residuals of the regression results in a vector c\ and with
z\ =  I  c\ (3.16)
gives the index z\. Applying this method to the five indicators I\ to 7s, standardized
to mean 0  and standard deviation of 1 , leads to the following principal component:
z\ = I
0.119
0.491
0.074
0.347
0.082
(3.17)
The first principal component accounts for 90% of the variation in the five variables.
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3.6.2 A dditional data and regressions
Table 3.12: List of Variables
ADR Dummy for outstanding issue of ADR, GDR or RDC, as of 08/1996
beta covariance of returns of share with RTS index over
variance of RTS index for 11/1995 to 9/1996
Comm Dummy for communications industry
Disclosure Survey measure for openness with respect to information, Q1 1996
Div Dividend pay-out ratio for fiscal year 1994, announced 1995
e Employment, as of 01/1996
Electricity Dummy for electricity industry
IAS Dummy for hiring international accountancy firm for fiscal year 1995
L Amount of shares of largest outside blockholder, as of 01/1996
License Dummy for use of licensed share registry, as of 08/1996
Metal Dummy for metal industry
Oil Dummy for oil and gaz and chemical industry
PE price earnings ratio as of 01/1996
Stddev standard deviation of returns of share for 11/1995 to 9/1996
Transport Dummy for transportation industry
Transfer Survey measure concerning ease of transfer of ownership, Q1 1996
State Amount of shares held by the state, as of 01/1996
z— 1 index of shareholder rights
weighted average of Disclosure, Transfer, ADR, IAS, License
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Table 3.13: Shareholder Rights by Industry
Comm Elec­ Metal Oil k Trans­ Other Sum
tricity gas port
% in industry 6.4 9.3 29.3 23.6 8.5 22.9 1 0 0 .0
with
ADR 33.3 23.1 2.4 1 2 .1 8.3 6.4 1 0 .0
IAS 33.3 15.4 9.8 45.5 25.0 2 1 .8 24.3
License (LR) 2 2 .2 38.5 4.9 27.3 8.3 15.3 17.1
ADR k  IAS 33.3 15.4 0 .0 1 2 .1 0 .0 2.9 7.1
ADR k  LR 2 2 .2 23.1 0 .0 6 .1 0 .0 0 .0 5.0
IAS k  LR 2 2 .2 15.4 0 .0 15.2 8.3 2.9 7.8
ADR k  IAS k  LR 2 2 .2 15.4 0 .0 6 .1 0 .0 0 .0 4.3
Table 3.14: Owners lip by Industry
Mean number 
of outside
Comm Elec­
tricity
Metal Oil&
gas
Trans­
port
Other Sum
blocks
Mean holding:
1 .6 1.5 1 .6 1.5 1.5 2 .2 1.7
Outside blocks 31.8 48.4 26.3 31.2 19.3 28.1 29.7
Largest block 27.7 44.3 18.1 27.7 12.7 18.3 23.0
Holding/FIG 2 2 .1 43.6 1 .0 2 0 .6 0 .0 3.4 11.4
Non-fin. firm 2 .2 2 .1 10.5 1.7 6 .6 1 0 .2 6.7
Investment fund 0 .8 0 .0 4.6 1 .2 4.5 6.3 3.5
Bank 0 .6 0 .0 5.7 4.4 2.4 2.4 3.5
Frgn. fin. firm 4.5 1.7 2 .0 2 .2 3.1 1 .2 2 .1
State 25.0 5.5 8.9 16.9 25.7 9.2 13.0
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Table 3.15: Measures of Association*
Independent
ADR
Variables
Indep IAS Disclosure Transfer
Dependent Variables 
ADR 3.263 3.777 3.487 3.010
Indep 3.263 - 2.680 2.653 2.567
IAS 3.777 2.680 - 2.563 2.422
*: t-statistic of logit regressions of dependent variable on
one independent variable including constant
Table 3.16: OLS regressions without L 2
OLS with robust 
standard errors
OLS with robust 
standard errors
Dependent variable Z4 (Transfer) I 2 (Disclosure)
Comm 404.958 226.286
(1.077) (0.957)
Electricity 347.714* 154.207
(1.803) (1.507)
Metal -45.415 -86.909
(-1.170) (-1.635)
Oil -53.053 -32.259
(-0.575) (-0.438)
Trans -41.045 -90.223
(-0.471) (-1.384)
E 0.003 0.003***
(1.474) (3.226)
L -0.723 -2.058*
(-0.451) (-1.661)
State 5.070 2.807
(1.541) (1.380)
C -2 .0 2 1 62.418
(0.036) (0.930)
N 140 140
R2 0.2362 0.2865
F-statistics 1.29 2 .1 2
Prob (F-statistics) 0.2545 0.0382
t-values given in brackets. * denotes significance at the 1 0 % level, 
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level
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Table 3.17: PROBIT regressions without L2
probit with robust 
standard errors 
marginal effects
probit with robust 
standard errors 
marginal effects
probit with robust 
standard errors 
marginal effects
Dep. var. h  (ADR) / 3 (Indep) h  (IAS)
Comm 0.192 0.039 0 .1 1 1
(1.452) (0.290) (0.683)
Electricity 0.050 0.272* -0.136
(0.504) (1.829) (-0.947)
Metal -0.109 -0.128 -0.128
(-1.531) (-1.596) (-1.227)
Oil -0.032 0.107 0.127
(-0.468) (1.054) (1.095)
Trans 0.060 -0.086 0.083
(0.544) (-0.726) (0.527)
E 5.54E-6* 9.23E-7 4.32E-6***
(1.696) (0.165) (3.356)
L 0.003 -0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 2
(0.312) (-0.622) (0.754)
State -0 .0 0 1 1.89E-4 0 .0 0 2
(-0.132) (0.937) (0.977)
N 140 140 140
Pseudo R2 0.124 0.117 0 .2 0 1
Prob ichi2 0.225 0.042 0 .0 0 1
t-values given in brackets. * denotes significance at the 1 0 % level,
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level
For the dummy variables the marginal effect is for a discrete change from 0 to 1
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Table 3.18: Three stage least squares regressions without index
3SLS 3SLS
Dep. Var. PE Disci. Transfer PE Disci. Transfer
Comm 5.346 -150.488 -230.931 -34.767 79.365 466.684
(0.073) (-0.319) (-0.326) (-0.466) (0.140) (0.826)
Electricity -20.014 110.498 423.587 -56.194 79.866 502.929
(-0.327) (0.331) (0.845) (-0.972) (0.191) (1.180)
Metal -20.712 -433.249 -294.695 -93.122 -420.735 -110.458
(-0.402) (-1.377) (-0.617) (-1.555) (-1.042) (-0.276)
Oil 24.704 -5.283 -286.466 -15.999 156.255 430.797
(0.420) (-0 .0 1 2 ) (-0.443) (-0.280) (0.359) (0.991)
Trans 104.439** -226.634 -2472.044 55.185 603.711 805.001
(2.208) (-0.164) (-1.209) (0.999) (0.541) (0.694)
E 0.005* 0.004 0.007*** 0 .0 1 0 ***
(1.855) (1.085) (2.903) (3.679)
L -4.341 60.111 -28.498 -26.865
(-0.077) (0.696) (-0.651) (-0.559)
L2 -0.059 -1.115 0.407 0.416
(-0.057) (-0.706) (0.526) (0.474)
State 6.895 14.553* 3.046 7.017
(1.289) (1.932) (0.501) (1.069)
C -4.943 299.919 -449.279 17.766 381.513 -50.286
(-0.104) (0.801) (-0.784) (0.350) (0.983) (-0.127)
PE -0.917 15.991 -5.660 -4.795
(-0.108) (1.274) (0.983) (0.693)
Div 802.071 1305.915
(0.860) (1.498)
Stddev -0.137
(-0.254)
Beta 48.954
(1.037)
Disci. -0 .2 0 1 -0.431***
(-1.382) (-2.621)
Transfer 0 .1 2 2 * 0.260***
(1.690) (2.861)
N 32 32 32 32 32 32
R2 0.0688 0.4940 -0.6801 -1.0870 0.0939 0.4348
chi2 22.646 35.647 32.152 29.665 20.491 41.289
Prob (chi2) 0.0070 0 .0 0 0 1 0.0004 0.005 0.0249 0 .0 0 0 0
t-values given in brackets. * denotes significance at the 1 0 % level, 
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1 % level
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Chapter 4
Corporate Governance in the 
Absence of State Guaranteed 
Shareholder Rights
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter a simple model has been proposed to provide a framework 
to analyse the behaviour of management with respect to outside shareholders. The 
main limitation of that model is that it is embedded in a static setting and does 
not allow for changes in ownership. However, as reported in chapter 1, Blasi and 
Shleifer (1996) and Blasi et al (1997) find that the ownership of top management is 
increasing over time. This chapter addresses these dynamic aspects by developing 
a richer model where management can acquire or sell shares in the firm. The chap­
ter argues that the problem of the lack of shareholder rights should be mitigated 
over time because it can be in the interest of management to honour shareholder 
rights either immediately or with some delay. In particular, this chapter analyses a 
game between managers and investors, where managers have the choice to introduce 
shareholder rights or not. The introduction of shareholder rights limits the amount
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of profits that can be stolen1. Investors are only willing to finance new projects 
if they anticipate earning the required rate of return. In such a set-up managers 
realize that they can be better off honouring shareholder rights as the amount of 
new projects they can undertake can be very limited without the guarantee of such 
rights. Furthermore, if managers want to sell some of their own shares they are 
interested in high shareprices and therefore in honouring shareholder rights. How­
ever, this chapter shows that in the short run, these effects are only strong enough if 
management already owns a large enough percentage of shares at the outset. This is 
true since introducing shareholder rights also carries a cost. In particular, outsiders 
might gain control once shareholder rights have been introduced and consequently 
management might lose its private benefits from running the firm. If it wants to 
remain in control, management has in general to buy up further shares. The intro­
duction of shareholder rights increases the price of the shares management wants to 
acquire. Secondly, a commitment to shareholder rights decreases the opportunities 
to divert profits for management’s personal consumption. The smaller the fraction 
of profits management owns formally, the more valuable is the possibility to divert 
profits. As a result, these costs outweigh the benefits if management owns an insuf­
ficient amount of shares at the outset. Only if management owns enough shares as a 
result of the privatisation procedures, the problem of weak enforcement mechanisms 
of state-guaranteed shareholder rights is mitigated in the short rim. Alternatively, 
if it is very difficult for management to ‘launder’ the profits they have diverted and 
to re-deploy them inside their firm, shareholder rights also might be introduced.
In the long run, more firms start to honour shareholder rights, even if management 
did not receive any shares in the privatisation process and if money laundering is 
possible. This is true, as management can steal profits for some time and use these 
stolen profits to build up a stake in the firm sufficiently large to signal to investors 
that shareholder rights will be introduced in the subsequent period. The share
1 Evidence for stealing by management is, for example, provided by the surveys of the ‘New 
Russia Barometer’ (Rose, 1995). When employees were asked whether management would take 
money or assets from the enterprise for their private benefit, 16% of the respondents answered ‘to 
a great extent’ and another 30% ‘to some extent’ (excluding the ‘Don’t knows’ from the sample).
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ownership of management then serves as a commitment device for the introduction 
of shareholder rights in the future. However, the fewer shares management received, 
the longer it can take until shareholder rights are introduced.
The chapter is to be seen in the context of the literature on management behaviour 
in transition economies. The focus of the existing literature has been on how the 
behaviour of management is effected by privatisation, or the threat thereof (e.g. 
Aghion et al (1994), or Kocerba(1996)). In particular, the Aghion et al model 
derives a policy conclusion similar to my model: managers should obtain shares in 
order to make them more willing to restructure. However, this chapter is not directly 
concerned with questions of what management does to the operation of the firm, but 
what it does to its ownership structure2. In this sense, the chapter is more closely 
related to parts of the finance literature. By focusing only on equity, it does not 
attempt to explain the capital structure of firms in transition economies. Gomes 
(1996) addresses similar issues (i.e. managements’ choice of how many benefits 
to extract). He uses an asymmetric information setting where the true type of 
management is revealed over time by the observed level of extracted benefits. This 
makes the model very different from my model which is based on a moral hazard 
setting. Furthermore, his setting is one of an IPO decision, where management aims 
to sell shares. In my model, management does in general want to acquire more 
shares to consolidate control. Also, his paper is primarily concerned with private 
benefits (which are presumably very important, since it would otherwise be possible 
in many more cases to bribe incompetent management out of their jobs), whereas 
this chapter mainly focuses on financial (and contractible) benefits. This seems 
fair in the context of transition economies, where a large part of profits tends to 
disappear unrecorded (see Nash and Wilier, 1995).
In spite of all these differences, the serious question must be posed whether an asym­
metric information setting or a moral hazard setting is more appropriate as a model 
strategy. I believe that the moral hazard approach is appropriate for several reasons. 
First, on a very general level, the transition to market economies is largely one of
2However, in this model management chooses the size of the capital stock.
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changing incentives and changing behaviour in response to new incentives. Second, 
in the environment of transition economies, where information is very scarce as well 
as highly noisy, it is, ceteris paribus, more difficult to signal types of management to 
potential investors than in OECD type economies. In particular, the level of private 
benefit expropriation is unlikely to be observed. Third, models that are based on 
reputation building run into the problem that in the last period of a game there is 
no gain from keeping up a reputation. As transition in general means progressing 
from one state to another, it is natural to think of transition of a process that has a 
last period. Once firms have reached the state where they have caught up with their 
capital expenditure program, they would tend to expropriate investors. Similar to 
the models of external borrowing (for example Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz, 1986), 
this would be anticipated by investors and Russian firms would in general not receive 
any capital. In this context it seems more appropriate to think about a bonding 
device as opposed to reputation building. Nevertheless, similar results might well 
be obtained in an asymmetric information setting. There could well be good and 
bad managers, i.e. ‘stealing’ and ‘honest’ ones. Honest managers have an exoge­
nously given utility function where they derive negative utility from stealing. The 
signal managers can send might be to refrain from diluting shareholders, as dilution 
seems more easily observable than stealing of profits. Depending on the associated 
costs and benefits, there might well be separating as well as pooling equilibria. In 
the pooling equilibrium, both stealing and honest managers do not dilute and get 
access to capital, but only slowly over time as their reputation for honesty grows. 
In a separating equilibrium costs and benefits are such that stealing management 
would choose to dilute, whereas honest management would not dilute. This would 
increase the speed with which honest managers would get access to capital. At the 
same time it would mean that stealing management would not get any capital at 
all. In such a model, the problem that management wants to remain in control 
would also slow down the maximum speed of the accumulation of capital, just as in 
my model. As long as the assumption is made that management wants to remain 
in control, the social optimum is in general not reached even if other modelling 
techniques are employed, at least if the funding possibilities are restricted to equity
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issues. The main difference between a reputation building model outlined above and 
my model would be that there would be even more heterogeneity between different 
firms, whereas in my model the difference is likely to disappear over time. However, 
to assume exogenously that there are managers with a disutility from stealing and 
others without such disutility is a strong assumption.
On a more general level, the chapter addresses the issue of corporate control. Hart 
and Moore (1990) and Aghion and Bolton (1992) are the classic papers in this 
domain. These papers address the question how to get borrowers to transfer non- 
verifiable revenues to the lender. In my case, revenues are known, but the legal 
system is insufficient to force firms to make such transfers. A more important 
difference is that Hart and Moore as well as Aghion and Bolton focus mostly on 
debt, whereas this chapter analyses equity in its role of allocating control rights. In 
this sense, the chapter is more closely related to Grossman and Hart (1980) who 
analyse the take-over mechanism and its efficiency in allocating control over the 
firms. In my model there are no differences in ability between different managers or 
owners and therefore, allocative efficiency is not of prime importance. Instead, this 
chapter analyses constraints of investment due to the desire of management to keep 
in control. For illustrative purposes this chapter refers to the case of Russia, but it 
is to be seen in the wider context of transition economies.
In the following section, the basic set-up of a two-period model is described. In 
particular, the decision problem for both players, management and investors, is laid 
out, followed by a description of the precise timing and the equilibrium concept. 
The analysis of the two-period model starts with a characterization of the optimal 
dividend policy, which is the starting point for the analysis of whether shareholder 
rights are introduced. Overall, in the two-period case, three cases need to be consid­
ered. First, Section 4.2.6 describes the ‘excess profitability case’, where shareholder 
rights are never introduced. After deriving the capital stocks with and without 
shareholder rights, Section 4.2.7 describes two cases where shareholder rights axe 
introduced: the cases of ‘managerial entrenchment’ and ‘money-laundering’. The 
third part extends the model to three periods. Section 4.3.1 slightly changes the
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assumptions of the model in such a way that shareholder rights are not going to 
be introduced for the same reasons they were introduced in the two-period model. 
This allows to focus exclusively on an additional reason for their introduction which 
becomes relevant when a third period is added to the model. This new case, the 
‘commitment case’ is described in section 4.3.2. The chapter concludes summarizing 
the model and derives hypotheses for empirical testing3.
4.2 The Two Period M odel
In the game to be analysed, there are two players: management and investors. The 
following section outlines their decision problems, followed by the timing of the game 
and the equilibrium concept employed.
4.2.1 M anagem ent
The firms in an economy are at present controlled by their incumbent management, 
irrespective of the formal ownership structure. Shareholder rights have initially not 
been introduced. The introduction of shareholder rights is parameterised as a choice 
over the percentage of profits management can steal, ipt. It can take on two values: 
<Pt, given by the technology in the particular industry in the absence of shareholder 
rights, and (< ¥?f) if management introduces shareholder rights, for example, by
~t
passing a company charter that guarantees such rights. Once shareholder rights have 
been introduced, ipt is assumed to remain at the level for all subsequent periods.
~t
In this sense a corporate charter serves as a commitment device as in Grossman and 
Hart (1980), such that management can credibly commit to stop diverting profits4. 
For algebraic convenience I set =  0.
~t
3 A list of the variables is in appendix A. All proofs are delegated to appendix B.
4For example, many Russian firms have a clause in their charter which states that the maximum
amount of votes an individual investor can exert at a shareholder meeting is 1% of total votes -
even if this investor owns a much higher percentage of the outstanding shares. Once this clause is
removed from the charter, it would seem difficult to re-introduce it as this requires a 75% majority.
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Management maximizes its utility of the following form
max U(C0, P0) +  (Ci, Pi) (4.1)
where Ct denotes the consumption of a single good at time t, (3 is a discount factor 
and Pt are private (non-contractible) benefits the manager obtains from being in 
control of the firm, for t E [0,1]. For simplicity I assume a linear utility function in 
order to be able to abstract from the issue of consumption smoothing. This seems 
appropriate since consumption smoothing does not seem to be the driving force 
behind the development of corporate governance in transition economies5. Further­
more, I set the rate of time preference /? =  yT_, where r is the risk-free interest 
rate.
If management is in control, private benefits amount to p , otherwise they are 0. 
There are two ways to achieve this control. Either management does not introduce 
shareholder rights (and then is in control by default), or it does introduce shareholder 
rights but then must own more than 6  percent of the total shares outstanding in 
order to obtain p . Private benefits can thus be summarized in the following form:
p  i f  > 9 or (pt =(Pt 
Pt = { n ~  ,V< e  [0 , 1]. (4.2)
0  otherwise
Here at represents the number of shares management owns in period t and r* denotes
Also, disclosing information can help to commit to steal less. If, for example, the size of oil 
reserves and the production capabilities are disclosed (employing an independent auditor) this 
information is unlikely to alter very quickly. This can make it harder for management to steal 
profits from oil production.
Other potential commitment devices include issuing American Depository Receipts (ADRs) 
which tend to increase the costs of the violation of shareholder rights. This is true as such a 
violation would get much more publicity and as a result increases the likelihood of state interven­
tion (see chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion).
While the assumption of complete irreversibility is somewhat strong, it does seem to be the case 
that management can make a reversal more expensive. Whether these costs axe sufficiently high
to prevent reversals fully is an empirical question.
5The results and mechanisms are robust when a standard logarithmic utility function is used.
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the total amount of shares outstanding in the same period. Private benefits p  are 
assumed to be so large, that management is under no circumstances willing to lose 
control of the firm. Some evidence for this assumption is given by Blasi et al (1997). 
They report that in 1994 outsiders were in general denied directors on the board, 
although they owned on average 2 1 % of the firm in their sample. Only in a few 
cases did outsiders and insiders find a compromise which resulted in some outside 
representation on the boards. This left the large majority of firms in the control 
of management. Prom 1995 the representation of outsiders rose. This was mainly 
achieved not through open voting in shareholder meetings, but through private 
deals between management and some outsiders. In 1996 31% of seats were held 
by outsiders. However, this figure is likely to overstate the true extent of outside 
influence, as firms controlled by management might be included among investors 
labelled as outside investors. Also, it is likely, that outsiders gain representation 
more easily in firms which are less valuable (where more restructuring is necessary), 
as insiders fight less in order to keep these assets under their control. In any case, 
even a board representation of 31% is not enough to exert control against the 69% 
held by management and the state, in particular, as the state until 1996 in general 
voted in fine with managements’ proposals. This would still leave the majority of 
Russia’s valuable firms in the control of management. Similarly, Blasi et al (1997) 
report that of the 30% of firms that had exchanged their directors between 1992 
and 1996, 80% of the replacements were from within the company. Furthermore, as 
late as in 1996, 60% of managers were opposed to making financial data available to 
outside investors6. Boycko et al (1995) also report that some managers physically 
threaten challengers at shareholder meetings, rig shareholder votes or illegally change 
corporate charters. All these pieces of evidence show how management aims to stay 
in control of the firms. Therefore, 21 > 9 becomes an additional restriction in case
’  Ti  —
management introduces shareholder rights.
6 A good example of how management cannot easily be made accountable to outside shareholders 
is the case of Komineft, where management in 1994 diluted outside shareholders in an apparently 
illegal manner. This violation could not be rectified by a court as laws were unclear and the local 
administration on the side of management.
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The firm under management’s control is the only source of management’s income 
and management has zero wealth at the outset of the game. Management’s budget 
constraint therefore depends on the profit of the firm 7r( ), which is increasing in last 
period’s capital stock , K t~\.
[ f t  +  ^ -^ (1  -  ( f t h t \ A K t - i )  =  (<*t -  a t - i ) P t  +  C u  Vt G [0,1] (4.3)
T t - 1
where 7 * is the percentage of the remaining profit (after management diverted the 
fraction (pt) that is paid out as dividends to shareholders. The income of manage-, 
ment consists therefore of the percentage of profit it diverts ( ( f t ) ,  as well as its share 
(~ ~ )  of the remaining profit, which is paid out as dividends. This income is used 
either for consumption or for purchases of further shares by management. Shares 
trade at the price pt. Management can also sell shares to boost its income in a given 
period. It is assumed that it is not possible for management or the firm to borrow
money (or to sell the stock short). The fact that the majority of firms in transition
economies are in fact not able to obtain credit apart from very short-term working 
capital credits justifies this assumption7. The profit function takes the form
(1  +  a)Kt~i i f  K t- i  < K*
n(K t- 1) = { K 1 ,V t€  0 ,1] (4.4)
0 i f  K t_x > K '
where a, the marginal product of capital, is larger than the interest rate r. Profits 
are modelled as gross profits and are always larger than K t - 1 because depreciation 
is for simplicity set to 1 0 0 %.
The capital stock at the end of period £, K t, depends on management’s choice of 
how much of this period’s profits to divert and how much to pay out in the form of
7Interestingly, one of the few significant lenders in many transition economies, the EBRD, does 
not lend to firms that violate shareholder rights (See EBRD, 1997). If such behaviour of potential 
lenders was widespread, the incentives to introduce shareholder rights might be even stronger than 
in a model without debt.
Lending is also not explicitly modelled. While in reality managers axe able to lend, this restriction 
is of no importance since I assume that the firms’ projects are so profitable at the given level of 
investment that management would never choose to lend at rate r.
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dividends. The remaining profit is complemented by proceeds from a share issue, 
such that K t is of the following form:
Kt = (1 -  7 t)(l -  (pt)7r(Kt-i)  +  stpt (4.5)
where st is the number of new shares issued by management in period t at price pt. 
A strategy Sm for management comprises for every period t the set {cpt+1 , at ,
The parameters s0 and ip2 are irrelevant since the game finishes after period 1. 
Figure 4.1 provides an overview over management’s actions and shareholdings as 
well as over the development of the capital stock:
Figure 4.1: The Game Managers Play
Period O Period 1
t - 1
State Variables Decisions
Q—1 
T - 1
Co
7o
<t>\
so
State Variables Decisions
QQT_l+S0
K 0
a  i 
Ci 
7i
ti
4.2.2 Investors
In my model, there is an infinite amount of investors who act competitively. They 
have access not only to purchasing shares in firms but also to a risk-free asset which 
pays the rate r. Given that there is no uncertainty in the model, investors face 
no risk and require at least the return r if they are to acquire shares. When in 
period 0  investors compute the maximum price po that would guarantee a return 
r, they have to take into account the amount of profits that are going to be stolen 
by management, as well as how many new shares are going to be issued. Investors
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can infer management’s actions at any given future period. The maximum price 
investors would be prepared to pay in period 0  is
in period 0. The underlying assumption is that the new shareholders acquire shares
is 0, because the game ends before any dividends can be paid. A strategy Si for 
investors comprises for every period t the maximum price they are willing to pay, 
given by the sequence {pt}.
In both periods management first determines whether to introduce shareholder rights 
or not. Consumption in period t equals management’s residual income. At the same 
time, management decides how many new shares to issue. Having learned whether 
shareholder rights are introduced or not as well as how many shares are being issued 
and how large the capital stock will be, investors determine the maximum price at 
which they are willing to buy or sell shares. The total number of outstanding shares 
in the next period is the sum of the new shares and the existing ones:
4.2.4 Equilibrium Concept
DEFINITION 4.1: An equilibrium is a pair of strategies (Sm, Si), such that
(4.6)
The shareprice in period 0 equals the dividends paid out of post-stealing profits in 
the following (and last) period 1 , discounted with the required rate of return r and 
divided by the amount of shares outstanding at the end of period 1, t q . This is the 
ex-dividend price, i.e. the price after 7 0 % of non-stolen profits have been paid out
after dividends have been paid in period 0. In such a set-up the price in period 1
4.2.3 Tim ing
Tt =  T _i +  S0 (4.7)
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(i) Sm is a solution to the following problem
„ max [/(C0> P0) +  Pi), s.t.Ct,Kt,at,st,vt 1 +  r
[<Pt + ------(1 -  <Ptht]n(Kt-i)  = K  -  ott-i)pt +  Ct
Tt-l
K t = ( 1 -  <pt)( 1 -  it)ir(K t-i) +  stpt
Tt = t_ i +  s0
P i f  % > 0  or (pt =<pt
Pt — {
0  otherwise
Ct > 0 , Kt > 0 , s* > —r_ i , 0  < a t , 0  < 7 t < 1 , (ft G (V7 , ^t)
~t
Vi € {0 , 1 }, given initial conditions i^_i a_i and r_i.
(ii) Si consists of the following prices
a r_ 7 i( l-¥ > lW ^ b ) _
5< =  {P0 =  To(l +  r) ’Pl =  0}
Condition (i) states that, given the prices set by investors, management maximizes 
its utility by choosing an optimal consumption stream as well as whether to stay in 
control of the firm. Condition (ii) requires that investors optimise in the following 
way: given that at least two homogeneous investors compete in a Bertrand fashion, 
they know that they will only obtain the shares if they bid at least the discounted 
expected value of the firm. Since investors can work out what actions management 
is going to implement they can use backward induction to determine the present 
value of the shares. They would never bid any more than that expected value since 
they would incur a loss.
The basic aim of this chapter is to analyse when management would choose to 
introduce shareholder rights, i.e. when to set (pi = 0. The basic trade-off is the 
following: Management can under some conditions increase the capital stock to 
higher levels by introducing shareholder rights. On the other hand, introducing 
shareholder rights means that less funds can be stolen (and consumed) in period
1. This would tend to make the introduction of shareholder rights more costly for 
management.
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4.2.5 Optimal D ividends
This section serves to state the results concerning the dividend policy up front in 
order to facilitate the subsequent analysis.
LEMMA 4.1: It is optimal for management to pay out dividends worth 100% of 
profits in period 1 and it is never sub-optimal to not pay any dividends in period 0  
if K* is sufficiently large.
The intuition for the first part of the lemma is trivial. Given that the game finishes 
in period 1 , it is optimal to consume all profits. Therefore, these profits must be 
paid out as dividends. The second half of the lemma needs a little explanation. If 
shareholder rights are introduced, it does not matter which pay-out ratio is chosen 
by management. In case more dividends are paid out, more new shares need to be 
issued. This means that management needs to buy up more new shares to remain 
in control. However, management also receives the dividends and therefore can 
afford to buy up the additional shares. As a result, the pay-out ratio does not 
matter. However, if shareholder rights are not going to be introduced, it is always 
optimal not to pay out any dividends. This is true because management profits 
more the larger the capital stock. And given that the capital stock in the absence of 
shareholder rights is constrained, management would never pay out any dividends. 
After all, such pay-outs would not only reduce the capital stock by the amount of 
the actual dividends, but would also leave less capital to back the new shares to be 
issued. For algebraic simplicity 71  will be set to 1 and 7 0  to 0 for the rest of the 
chapter, although in the case of the introduction of shareholder rights there are also 
equilibria where 7 0  is positive (associated with a larger share-issue s q ) .
The result that firms which do not introduce shareholder rights do not pay out 
dividends is one testable implication of the model. The intuition is that management 
in firms without shareholder rights will always have an incentive to dilute existing 
shareholders. In this environment, any dividend would be like a gift to outside 
shareholders, which is not in the interest of management. However, the timing of 
dividend payments derived above is only due to the finite horizon of the game, and
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is not robust to increasing the number of periods of the model.
4.2.6 A  Case where Shareholder Rights sire Never Intro­
duced
This section presents the ‘excess profitability’ case, in which shareholder rights will 
never be introduced. The rest of this chapter will abstract from this case.
PROPOSITION 4.1: In case (1 — <^i)(l +  a) > (1 +  r*) management never introduces 
shareholder rights.
In case (1 — ^ i)( l +  a) > (1  +  r), the post-stealing return of the investment is 
large enough to cover the required rate of return for the new investors. Therefore, 
management can raise any required capital stock even in the absence of shareholder 
rights. Given that the only benefit of shareholder rights is that a higher capital 
stock might be reached if they are introduced, management never has an incentive 
to introduce such rights in this case. Clearly, the more interesting case is the one 
where (1 — <£>i)(l+a) < (1 +r). Prom now on, this chapter assumes that this condition 
holds, requiring that post-stealing returns of the new project are too small to yield 
the required rate of return for new investors.
4.2.7 Two Cases where Shareholder Rights are Introduced
The benefit of introducing shareholder rights is a potentially higher capital stock, 
which results in higher profits. However, there are also costs of introducing share­
holder rights. As a result, it is a necessary and not a sufficient condition for the 
capital stock to be higher with than without shareholder rights. In order to facil­
itate a clear presentation, this section first derives the necessary condition for the 
introduction of shareholder rights by calculating the capital stocks with and without 
shareholder rights. Only afterwards the sufficient condition for the introduction of 
shareholder rights is derived.
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It is important to notice that even if new capital does not provide sufficient returns 
to investors in the absence of shareholder rights, management is nevertheless able 
to raise some finance without introducing shareholder rights:
LEMMA 4.2 (Dilution): If management finds it in its interest not to introduce share­
holder rights and if the maximum capital stock, A*, is sufficiently large, manage­
ment always dilutes the present owners of the firm (including themselves) perfectly 
by issuing an infinite amount of shares, i.e. setting so— > oo.
The intuition is the following: If (1— ^ i)( l  +  o) < (1  +  r), the post-stealing returns 
of investment are not sufficient to pay for the required rate of return. Nevertheless, 
the firm can raise some finance if it has some old assets in place. The part of the 
old assets (and their returns) that cannot be stolen can assure to new investors that 
they will receive the required rate of return r. This works in the following way: 
The part of the new capital (and its profits) that cannot be stolen increases the 
value of the firm. By itself this increase would not be enough to pay for the cost of 
capital. Therefore, the share-price must fall, such that the new shareholders obtain 
the required return r. Such a fall decreases the wealth of the old shareholders. 
Issuing new shares is therefore like a wealth transfer to new shareholders. The 
wealth of the old shareholders is reduced and this reduction in wealth is used to 
compensate the new shareholders for the difference between the return on the new 
investment, (1 — <^i)(l +  a), and the required return (1  +  r). Since new shareholders 
always obtain the required return r, which is smaller than the return on the new 
capital, a, management must always gain from raising new capital (provided it is 
still smaller than K*). The maximum capital stock is reached if the total wealth of 
the old shareholders is transferred to the new shareholders. This can be achieved 
by issuing an infinite amount of shares, perfectly diluting the old shareholders. It 
is noteworthy that dilution takes place, although shares are issued at the market 
price. However, this is the market price conditional on the fact that part of the new 
capital is going to be stolen. Therefore, this is similar to a situation where shares 
are sold below their market price. In appendix B it is shown that this results in the
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capital stock
K nr _  ( l -  yo)n(.K~_i)(i +  r) . .
0 1 +  r -  (1 -  £ 0 ( 1  + a)
The interpretation of K q R is straightforward: management steals <^o in period 0 and 
its remaining income is (1 — <£>o)n(A"_i), since it dilutes the other owners perfectly. 
Multiplying this by (1  +  r) translates period 0 into period 1 income. Of this income 
it must pledge (1  +  r) — (1 — ^ i)( l  +  a) for every unit of new capital it attracts, 
which it does by giving 100% of ownership to the new investors. This results in 
capital stock K q R.
In the next step this capital stock is compared with the one in the absence of 
shareholder rights.
LEMMA 4.3: The capital stock with shareholder rights is larger than the one without 
shareholder rights iff
e <  2 = 1  vi + ° [ 1 +  r - ( 1 - ^ ) ( i  +  a ) l  =  e * ( 4 .9 )
T_ i (1 — ^o)(l +  a)
The intuition is the following: With shareholder rights, the maximum capital stock 
is also restrained if 9 is larger than some level of management ownership needed to 
remain in control, 6 ** (which is derived in appendix B, where it is also shown that 
9** is always smaller than 9*). This time the restriction on the capital stock comes 
from management’s desire to remain in control. The income of management equals
[6 > + — ( l -  )]n(^_!),T- 1
i.e. the amount it steals in period 0 , <^ o5 plus its share of the remaining profits, 
multiplied by (1  +  r) to account for its value in period 1 . For every unit of new 
capital management has to purchase shares with a (period 1 ) value of 0 ( 1  +  a) to 
remain in control. However, it owns already shares. These go up in value with 
an increase in the amount of capital, but not by the full amount of the returns, but 
by a — r , since new investors obtain 1 +  r. The difference between the two represents 
the resources needed by management to remain in control with every additional
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unit of capital. If the restriction on control is binding the maximum capital stock 
corresponds to
[ y o + ^ ( l - W A - - i ) ( l  + r)
0(1 +  a) -  ^ ( a  -  r) 1 ' ° }
If 0 < 6** (i.e. if the stake management needs to control the firm is rather small), 
every unit of increase in K  increases the value of the shares management already 
holds by an amount which is sufficient to buy up additional shares to remain in 
control even after the new shares have been issued. In this situation management 
can reach K*.
A comparison of KqR and K q R results in inequality 4.9. One of the crucial param­
eters of the inequality is <£>o, the amount that can be stolen in period 0. The amount 
that is stolen in period 0  cannot be added to the capital stock if no shareholder 
rights axe introduced. Therefore it cannot be used to back new finance and has to 
be consumed in period 0. However, if shareholder rights are in place, the profits 
stolen in period 0  can be used to acquire new shares for management, relaxing the 
constraint on the capital stock. Therefore a larger <^o increases the capital stock 
in the presence of shareholder rights. This difference is the more important, the 
bigger the implicit subsidy 1 +  r —(1— V?i)(l +  a) management has to use for every 
new unit of capital in the case of no shareholder rights. It is less important the 
more management has to pay for the new shaxes it has to acquire, which depends 
on (1  +  a).
Abstracting from this effect (i.e. setting <^0= 0 ), the share of the firm (post-investment) 
management must own to remain in control must be sufficiently small (smaller than 
to allow for a large investment program. With 7 0  =  0 it is always the case that 
management cannot raise any new capital if 6  > 2 =1 , because it would always have 
to buy back some shaxes in order to remain in control, i.e. to set sq < 0. Therefore, 
the capital stock with shareholder rights has to be smaller than the total income 
of management, i.e. smaller than n(A _i). Without shareholder rights, on the 
other hand, even if <P\ is very large and therefore the scope to raise new capital is
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very limited, management could at least invest H (K-i). Therefore, the capital stock 
is always smaller with shareholder rights if 9 > Lastly, the larger the amount 
of stealing, <£>i, the more likely is it that the capital stock is larger with shareholder 
rights, since without shareholder rights the amount of old capital necessary to back 
each unit of new capital is relatively large.
While it is a necessary condition for the introduction of shareholder rights that the 
capital stock is larger with shareholder rights, it is not a sufficient one, because 
management might obtain a smaller part of the period 1 profits if it refrains from 
stealing. The sufficient condition is stated in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4.2: Management chooses to introduce shareholder rights iff
-  (1+ «)(!_ £0) [ ^ ( a - r ) +  ( l - £ i )  *,(!+<»)] ~ ’
and
K m > [------------ ( 1 +  a) +  r ^ (.ft:-i) (4.12)
-  ll + r - ( l  + a)(l-Vi) t_!J f f f (a -r )
The interesting condition is condition 4.11, which states, similarly to condition 4.9, 
that 9 must be sufficiently small for management to introduce shareholder rights. 
The second condition states that K* must be sufficiently large and is equivalent to 
9** < 9***, as can be seen in figure 4.2, which shows that if 9** = 9***,KqR =  K*. 
In case a) condition 4.12 holds, in case b) it does not. The intuition for condition 
4.12 is the following: If K* is too small, it can be the case that even if K* can 
be reached with shareholder rights, management is still worse off, because it can 
steal less in period 1. Parameters can be such that this is the case, even though 
K* > K q R. K* limits the maximum difference between the capital stock with and 
without shareholder rights. Given that these differences in capital stocks set the 
incentives for the introduction of shareholder rights, such rights are never going to 
be introduced if the difference between the capital stocks cannot be sufficiently large 
(i.e. if condition 4.12 does not hold).
The intuition of condition 4.11 is very similar to the one of differences in the capital 
stock. This is not very surprising, since the only force working in favour of the
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Figure 4.2: Relative Size of Capital Stocks and Controlling Stakes
Case a:
1— ■ ■
0**
-- 1-------Qirk* 0* 1
K§R = K *>  K £ R K * > K$R > K[?R K g R > K$R
shareholder rights no shareholder rights
Case b:
1Qirtrk 0** 0* i
K$R = K* > K g R K* > K$R > K g R K $ R > K$r
no shareholder rights
introduction of shareholder rights is a larger capital stock. Again, the larger <^ o5 
the more likely is it that shareholder rights will be introduced (^=— > 0). This is 
the ‘money-laundering’ case: since the model does not allow the manager to add 
the profit stolen in period 0  to the capital stock (and leverage it by the new capital 
raised), they might introduce shareholder rights.
An easy way to abstract from this effect is to set &o= 0 , which results in
(a -  r) f=i
9 ~  ^ ( a  —r) + ( l - f ^ ) V i  (1 +  a) (413)
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This is the case of ‘managerial entrenchment’, where management already owns a 
sufficient amount of shares. For this case it is again necessary that 9 must be smaller 
than - for the same reason as above. If it is too large, management has to spend 
too many resources on acquiring further shares. It is also still true that the larger 
<Pi the more likely is the introduction of shareholder rights, since in the absence of 
shareholder rights management needs more capital to subsidize the new shareholders. 
However, this is only the case because the game has a last period. If it was an 
infinite game dilution would be impossible because investors would anticipate to be 
diluted as well. Then a larger would make it less likely that shareholder rights 
are introduced because the implicit transfer to the old shareholders would be the 
larger, the more can be stolen. This effect is picked up in Chapter 3. Furthermore, 
shareholder rights are more likely to be introduced if a is large and r is small. This 
is true as these parameter values translate a larger capital stock into larger profits8.
Table 4.1: Shareholder Rights in the Two Period Case
0 o — 0 0 o > 0
(1 - 0 0 ( 1  4- a) managerial entrenchment money- laundering
< (1  +  r)
(a—r)<f>i (1+a)
SR iff 9 < „ w , M~ (1+°)["t3 (^a—r)~^ ( "tZj") ( a)l
SR iff 0 <  9***
( l - 0 i)( l +  a) excess probitability excess profitability
> (1  +  r) NSR NSR
To summarize the two-period case, there are two reasons why management might 
introduce shareholder rights. In the case of ‘money-laundering’, management might 
steal a substantial part of period 0  profits and has no other way to add this money 
back to the capital stock. Indeed, one would hope that management has some prob­
lems ‘laundering’ its stolen money. Balance of payments data for Russia indicates
8With a logarithmic utility function the condition under which it is optimal to introduce share­
holder rights is more restrictive, whenever management has to acquire further shares to stay in 
control. These acquisitions lead to a depressed consumption in the first period, boosting con­
sumption in the second. With a logarithmic utility, this effect works against the introduction of 
shareholder rights.
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that flight capital has not yet returned and kept leaving the country even in 1997. 
At the same time there were large capital inflows from foreign investors, attracted 
by very high yields. This might partly be due to the difficulties involved in launder­
ing stolen money. However, it is presumably also linked to the attempt by Russian 
investors to diversify their asset holdings in order to reduce the risk. Second, in the 
case of ‘managerial entrenchment’ shareholder rights are introduced by management 
in case they had exogenously (through privatisation) received enough shares to keep 
control even after the introduction of shareholder rights. This does not mean that 
management does not acquire further shaxes. In general, management would use all 
its period 0  income to buy further shares to keep control after the new share issue. 
Nevertheless, management must own some minimum amount of shares from the 
outset. Furthermore, in case projects are excessively profitable, shareholder rights 
might not be introduced, simply because projects can also be financed without them.
To explain why management in some firms finds it profitable to introduce share­
holder rights even without management owning a controlling stake from the outset 
and abstracting from the case of money laundering, the implications of increasing 
the time horizon need to be investigated.
4.3 The Three Period Game
The aim of analysing a three-period game is to show that in a multi-period frame­
work, management might introduce shareholder rights, even if the privatisation 
procedure has allocated less than 9 % of the shares to management and ‘money- 
laundering’ is possible.
\
In a first step the game in the third period is described. In the next section, the 
set-up of the two-period game is generalized to allow for ‘money-laundering’. Pre­
viously, the fact that money-laundering was not possible provided one reason for 
the introduction of shareholder rights. Allowing for money laundering to take place 
therefore helps to focus on a new case in which shareholder rights are introduced
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in a multi-period setting, the so-called ‘commitment case’. The conditions for this 
case to hold are derived in section 4.3.1.
In order to focus on the ‘commitment case’ this section abstracts from the ‘manage­
rial entrenchment’ case. This is done by analysing an extreme situation, where the 
share ownership of management at the beginning of period -1 , ( f f j) , is set to 0 , i.e. 
a case where management has not received any shares in the privatisation procedure. 
Furthermore, throughout this section, it is still assumed that (1+r) > (1— <Pt){l+ o ) 
for period 0 as well as for period 1. This eliminates the case of ‘excess profitability’. 
Lastly, it will be assumed that K* is larger than the maximum capital stock in 
period 1 with as well as without shareholder rights.
When adding a period -1 to the game analysed above, the time line remains the same 
as in the two-period game except that management can also set action parameters 
in period -1. In particular, management can introduce shareholder rights either in 
period -1 for period 0 or in period 0 for period 1 . In period -1 management obtains 
income i U (K -2) because it does not own any shares initially. It allocates that 
income between consumption C-\ and increasing its share ownership from 0  to a_i. 
Management also sets dividends in this period, 7 _i, and determines the number 
of new shares issued, s_i. With respect to the introduction of shareholder rights, 
management has three possible strategies. First, management can choose not to 
introduce shareholder rights ever, i.e. it will steal in all periods (ipo =¥?o> — P^\
). Second, it can introduce shareholder rights in period -1 , which implies that 
shareholder rights will be honoured as well in the subsequent periods (tpo = <pi — 0 ). 
Third, it can keep stealing in period 0, but introduces shareholder rights for the last 
period (</?0 =<£o, <Pi = 0 ).
If management is to benefit from the last strategy, it is essential that investors believe 
that shareholder rights will indeed be honoured in the next period. Only then do 
share-prices reflect this future change in behaviour. This would allow management 
to sell shares in period -1, backed by the full amount of profits in period 1. The way 
to commit to a delayed introduction of shareholder rights in the following period is 
for management to buy up a sufficient amount of shares, such that it is optimal to
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introduce shareholder rights in period 1. This requires that ^  is large enough for 
condition 4.11 to hold. If this condition is violated, investors will anticipate that 
shareholder rights will not be introduced in the following period either.
4.3.1 Allowing for M oney-Laundering
Since this section of the chapter aims to abstract from the case where shareholder 
rights are introduced because money-laundering is not possible, the set-up is now 
slightly modified and management is allowed to re-invest its stolen profits. As the 
three-period model is to be solved by backward induction, this section first derives 
how this change affects the strategies in the two-period model (or, to be more precise, 
in the last two periods of the three-period model). In particular, a new condition 
for the minimum management share ownership for the introduction of shareholder 
rights is derived. Allowing for money laundering only affects the outcome in the 
absence of shareholder rights, since only then is management forced to consume a 
positive amount (v?o n(K -i))  in period 0 instead of reinvesting it. Therefore, the 
capital stock in the absence of shareholder rights changes when money laundering 
is allowed. This section also derives this capital stock.
Allowing for money-laundering makes the introduction of shareholder rights less 
likely in the two-period set-up and condition 4.11 for the introduction of share­
holder rights in period 0 consequently becomes stricter. If what had previously 
been consumed in period 0  is added to the capital stock K q instead, the capital 
stock in period 1 is — , resulting in consumption of (1  +  a)—-^ ~ ;(l+o) •
1+r 1+r
Given that consumption under shareholder rights remains as previously analysed, 
condition 4.11 is now replaced by
a-i ^  (1 + a )- <^o [(1 + r) -  (1 + o )(l-  / a - . V  . .
t _ 2  +  S-! ~  0 (1 - ¥>o)[(l + »•) -  (1 + “ ) ( ! -  Vi))+ Vi ( a -  r) \T - i  )
Only if condition 4.14 holds, it is credible that management will introduce share­
holder rights for period 1. If it does not hold and management does not introduce 
shareholder rights in period -1 , investors anticipate that there won’t be shareholder
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rights in the following periods either. With the possibility of money laundering, the 
capital stock in the three-period game is given by the following Lemma.
LEMMA 4.4: If condition 4.14 does not hold and if management does not introduce 
shareholder rights for period 0  and money laundering is possible, the capital stock 
at the end of period 0  is
rfNSR _ (i + a)n(ir_2) ,. v
0 t  (1-yQd+a) ’ 1 • '
1 (1+r)
In the first period the maximum capital stock in the absence of shareholder rights is 
restricted to the level of income the manager obtains from the firm. In this repeated 
game it is not possible to use the existing capital to secure new investment (by 
diluting the existing shareholders) since the potential new shareholders anticipate 
to be diluted in the next round. Only in the second round is dilution going to take 
place. Therefore, the capital stock increases by only (1  -f a) in the first period.
4.3.2 Conditions for Introduction o f Shareholder Rights
This section compares the different strategies in a three-period set-up. First, the 
strategy of introducing shareholder rights immediately ((po =  0 , p\ =  0 ) is compared 
with the strategy of never introducing shareholder rights ((po =^o> pi =<Pi). It to n s  
out that the latter is always superior given the assumptions introduced above. In the 
next step the commitment strategy (po =<Po, (f \ = 0 ) is compared with the strategy 
of never introducing shareholder rights ((po =Po, Pi =(Pi)-
First, comparing the introduction of shareholder rights already in the first period 
with the situation of never introducing shareholder rights results in the following 
proposition:
PROPOSITION 4.3: With =  0 and if money laundering is possible, management 
never introduces shareholder rights in period -1  in the three-period game.
Although management in the absence of shareholder rights cannot raise capital by 
diluting existing outside shareholders, it is still the case that shareholder rights
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will never be introduced when allowing for money-laundering and excluding large 
initial ownership by management. It can even be shown that the increase in the 
capital stock due to adding a third period is larger if there are no shareholder rights 
in either period, than if shareholder rights are implemented in both periods. The 
intuition is the following: without shareholder rights, there is no share issue in the 
first period, but all profits it(K -2) are re-invested in the firm. This will result in 
profits of (1 +  a)7r(K_2) in the following period. This capital stock is then used to 
raise new capital by diluting existing shareholders. When comparing the two- and 
the three-period case, the capital stock rises by (1  +  a) due to the additional period. 
With shareholder rights, the capital stock of period -1 also rises by (1 +a), but at the 
same time, shares of the firm become more expensive by the factor As a result, 
management’s wealth becomes a stricter constraint and the capital stock rises by 
less than (1  +  a) when adding a third period. Given that the only reason for the 
introduction of shareholder rights is a potentially larger capital stock, this implies 
shareholder rights will never be introduced in the three-period case if they are not 
implemented in the two-period case. Because the analysis for the three-period case 
abstracts from the two cases that led to the introduction of shareholder rights in 
the two-period game, this must mean that shareholder rights are never introduced 
in this three-period setting.
It is more interesting to analyse the case where management commits to introduce 
shareholder rights in the subsequent period by purchasing a sufficient amount of 
shares in period -1. The next proposition compares the strategy of never introduc­
ing shareholder rights (cpo =<Po, =&i) with the strategy to commit to a delayed
introduction (</?0 =  0, =V+):
PROPOSITION 4.4 (Commitment Case): Management does commit to introduce 
shareholder rights for period 1 by purchasing r_ ^ _ 1 =  (ff^) shares in period -1 , 
if
P .,  (1 +  r)»+ y 0 (! +  «)(! +  r) > Vl (4.16)
1 1 + r
The costs of the commitment strategy are the following: for large , manage­
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ment needs considerable resources in order to convince investors that shareholder 
rights will be introduced in the next period by buying up a sufficient amount of 
shares. This keeps the capital stock at the end of period -1 rather small and reduces 
consumption at the end of period 1. To clarify the benefits of the commitment 
strategy the equilibrium in which all period 0  profits are paid out as dividends is 
analysed. For a given capital stock at the end of the game, share-prices under the 
commitment strategy are lower than if shareholder rights are introduced immedi­
ately, because V?0 % of period 0 profits are stolen. Furthermore, these stolen profits 
are then used to buy up shares such that management can issue additional shares 
without losing control. Stealing in period -1  can therefore increase the amount of 
capital management can raise without losing control. The smaller a and the larger r, 
the cheaper are the shares and the easier it is for management to buy up a sufficient 
stake in order to commit to the introduction of shareholder rights. The sign of the 
derivatives with respect to a and r  are different from the ones in the two-period 
case. The reason is that in the three-period case management has to acquire 6 % 
of shares. Therefore, the price of the shares constrain management’s capability to 
raise new capital while remaining in control. The shareprice is higher, the larger 
a and the smaller r. In the two-period case, management might own a sufficiently 
large stake in the firm from the outset. Then its wealth increases the larger a, since 
a large a relaxes the constraint on the capital expenditure program. Furthermore, 
the larger <£>i, the more binding the constraint in the absence of shareholder rights, 
because more existing capital is necessary to back the new shares.
Another way to interpret inequality 4.16 is to note that if multiplied by 7r(X_2), the 
right hand side would equal consumption at the end of period 1 in the absence of 
shareholder rights. The left hand side would then be the terminal value of income 
management obtains in period -1 and 0. Management invests <£>_i tt(K -2) in shares 
in period -1  and <£>o (1 +  a)7r(AT_2) in shares in period 0. Since the shares result in 
return r per period, the left hand side of condition 4.16 is the amount management 
can consume in period 1. If that amount is larger than consumption in the absence 
of shareholder rights, such rights will be introduced. If management can steal for
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one more period, it decreases the value of the shares of existing shareholders. This 
decreases the size of the transfer to the existing shareholders in case shareholder 
rights are introduced. The larger <£>o, the more likely is it that the transfer to 
existing shareholders by introducing shareholder rights are more than compensated 
for by the larger capital stock.
It is noteworthy that the introduction of shareholder rights does not depend on total 
wealth of management, i.e. on its period -1  income 7r(/f_2)), but only on . 
Higher profits at the outset, i.e. larger 7r(AT_2), increase management’s wealth, but 
also increase the extent to which the firm can finance itself without the introduction 
of shareholders rights. However, if management can increase its income by stealing 
a larger proportion of profits (i.e. a higher management is more likely to
introduce shareholder rights.
4.4 Social Welfare
It is clear that a social planner would allocate enough capital to the firm that it
can reach K* in the first period. Without shareholder rights, K* is in general
not reached because outsiders are unwilling to fund the new project, as part of its
returns will be stolen. With shareholder rights, this level might not be reached
because management wants to stay in control. This results in an inefficiently low
capital stock. Even if management commits to refrain from stealing (by introducing
shareholder rights) the efficient capital stock is in general still not reached, because
»
this commitment might result in a loss of private benefits of control. As those 
benefits are not contractible, the first best outcome is in general not achieved.
Apart from the inefficiency mentioned above, there is a second inefficiency. It could 
be the case that the capital stock with shareholder rights is smaller than K* , but 
larger than the capital stock without shareholder rights. Nevertheless, management 
might choose not to introduce shareholder rights, such that even the second best is 
not reached. This can happen because of a free-rider situation, similar to Gross­
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man and Hart (1980). If shareholder rights are not introduced the shares of the 
existing investors are worthless. If investors transfered these shares to management, 
shareholder rights might be introduced so that the shares would become valuable. 
Every (atomistic) shareholder does not take into account that its action changes the 
probability that shareholder rights are introduced and therefore does not tender the 
shares. As a result, shareholder rights are not introduced.
The obvious policy conclusion would be to give a majority of shares to management 
at the outset of the privatisation procedure. Alternatively, dual-class shares could 
offer a solution, where the shares management obtains carry more voting rights than 
other shares. Both policies would shorten the period of time it takes until manage­
ment introduces shareholder rights. Both policy conclusions have been implemented 
in Russia only up to a point. On the one hand, preference shares have been issued 
to employees in many firms, amounting in general to 25% of charter capital. This 
would facilitate it for management to keep control of the firm after the introduction 
of shareholder rights, as only 50% of the shares that carry a voting premium have 
to be acquired. On the other hand, management ownership directly after the pri­
vatisation program fell significantly short of the levels required for management to 
remain in control after the introduction of shareholder rights. Blasi (1994) reports 
that top management held on average only 9% of shares (which presumably includes 
non-voting shares, though). Policy makers had apparently decided that the post­
privatisation ownership of management should only be limited. In particular, it can 
be argued that significant management ownership is detrimental to restructuring in 
case it is necessary to replace management, which often lacks the necessary skills to 
operate in a market economy. Barberis et al (1995) present some evidence from Rus­
sian privatized retail shops that restructuring was not significantly correlated with 
management’s incentive schemes, but strongly with new management. Johnson and 
Loveman (1995) obtain similar conclusions from Polish case studies. However, it is 
a priori not clear whether this means that management should own only few shares. 
On the one hand, if management owns a lot of shares, it is harder to replace it against 
its will. However, management would also gain more from improved efficiency as a
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major shareholder. In any case, this chapter focuses on an environment where the 
state is not strong enough to enforce rules that could force management out of its 
job. Some evidence for this assumption has been given earlier in this chapter and in 
the introduction for the case of Russia. This chapter demonstrates that in that case 
it can be better if management consolidates its control quickly instead of letting the 
consolidation happen over a long period of time which depresses investment. The 
weakness of the state was presumably not sufficiently taken into account when the 
privatisation process had been devised.
Figure 4.3: Two Inefficiencies
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potential 2 nd inefficiency
4.5 Conclusion
The conclusions of the model axe that there are market forces which push manage­
ment towards the voluntary introduction of shareholder rights even in the absence 
of state guaranteed shareholder rights. In particular, there are cases where a larger 
capital stock can be reached once shareholder rights have been introduced. How­
ever, this is not always the case in an environment where management wants to 
stay in control of the firm. For example, if projects are so profitable that they can 
be financed in spite of the fact that management steals part of the profits, forces 
which work towards the introduction of shareholder rights are weak. Also, if man­
agement does not own a sufficient amount of shares at the outset, which makes it
150
prohibitively expensive to buy up enough shares for management to remain in con­
trol, in equilibrium no shareholder rights are introduced in the short rim. Lastly, if 
‘money-laundering’ is possible, i.e. if the profits stolen can be used to increase the 
firm’s capital stock, this would also weaken the incentives to introduce shareholder 
rights in the short run. However, in a three-period model, more firms introduce share­
holder rights, but only after they have stolen enough profits (and invested them in 
the firm) that they are not going to lose control by introducing shareholder rights.
While a third period is sufficient to show that management might introduce share­
holder rights once it has diminished the value of the claims of the old shareholders, it 
is interesting to analyse the introduction of additional periods. Interpreting the last 
period as the period where firms have completed their capital expenditure program, 
new periods are added before period -1 , i.e. period - 2  etc. Allowing for such periods 
results in more firms introducing shareholder rights. The reason is the following: one 
strategy for management (not necessarily the optimal one) would be to steal some 
profits in a previous period (i.e. period -2) and to invest them in the firm. Then the 
extra period would change nothing in the set-up apart from the fact that manage­
ment now holds some positive fraction of the shares at the beginning of period -1 . 
Therefore, the constraint on capital formation in the presence of shareholder rights 
is less binding and some additional firms would introduce shareholder rights. At the 
same time, some of the firms whose management is committed to introduce share­
holder rights in the second period of the three-period game will commit to introduce 
such rights already in the second period of the four-period game. However, manage­
ment of some other firms might commit to introduce such rights only in the third 
period. This is true, because it has been shown in proposition 4.3 that firms which 
do not introduce shareholder rights for the last period, will never introduce them 
for the last two periods. However, some firms which do introduce shareholder rights 
for the last period, might not introduce them for the last two periods. This implies 
that the stake management must acquire in the first period in order to commit to 
introduce shareholder rights in the following period is likely to be larger for the 
four-period game than for the three-period game. Therefore, management of some
firms could find it profitable to delay the introduction of shareholder rights by one 
period. The underlying reason is that shares become more expensive when another 
period is added. Then the ownership constraint on the capital stock with share­
holder rights becomes stricter for a given level of management ownership. Lastly, if 
there was no last period, the introduction of shareholder rights would be more likely. 
This is true as there can be no infinite dilution in the absence of shareholder rights 
because no-one would buy the shares, fearing a dilution in the subsequent period. 
This would reduce the potential capital stock with shareholder rights and therefore 
increase the likelihood of the introduction of shareholder rights. It also would imply 
that it is not true that firms, where a large share of profits can be stolen, are more 
likely to introduce shareholder rights. After all, the size of the subsidy such firms 
would need to pay to attract new capital would go to infinity, independent of i{>\. 
Then the other effect, that giving up a larger benefit from stealing entails a larger 
transfer to existing shareholders, would be dominant. Therefore, firms where only a 
small fraction of profits can be stolen would be more likely to introduce shareholder 
rights.
The model generates a number of testable predictions, the most important of which 
is that managers might introduce shareholder rights even in the absence of state 
enforced laws on these issues. Furthermore, there are some testable hypotheses of 
interest from the comparative statics of the propositions derived above: First, firms 
which do not introduce shareholder rights should not pay any dividends9. This 
would be consistent with the finding of chapter 3 that large firms (with a possibly 
smaller expected value of stealing) are more likely to pay dividends. However, div­
idend payments are not positively linked to the introduction of shareholder rights. 
This might be due to particularities in the institutional context of Russia (see chap­
ter 3). However, on a more general level, studies in developed markets find that 
dividend payments are at times used to signal good information, possibly about the
9If the model was extended to include some uncertainty (i.e. over how much can be stolen in 
•a given firm), the payment of dividends could be used to signal to investors that the potential for 
stealing is limited.
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type of management10. This would be broadly consistent with this model. Sec­
ond, if management does not introduce shareholder rights, it might choose to dilute 
existing shareholders. Dilutions have indeed occurred in Russia, the most recent 
case being the oil subsidiaries of SiDanCo. However, a detailed study of how these 
dilutions interact with the introduction of shareholder rights has not been carried 
out so far. Third, shareholder rights are more likely to be introduced (or more 
quickly introduced) in firms where management owns a large portion of the shares 
from the privatisation procedure, or where a large part of profits can be stolen in 
the direct aftermath of privatisation (high <£>_ 1 ,^ 0 ), such that it can quickly buy 
up more shares. Significant potential for stealing in the periods close to the end of 
the capital expenditure program (y?i) would make the introduction of shareholder 
rights less likely. The amount of share ownership by management would presumably 
be in excess of the moderate ownership advocated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
to mitigate the standard agency problems. Unfortunately, there is no reliable data 
on ownership of managers for the firms that are actively traded. However, Earle 
and Estrin (1996) find that it is in particular management ownership which spurs 
increases in productivity as well as long-term restructuring. Given that access to 
new capital, which is clearly necessary for restructuring to occur, is limited in the 
absence of shareholder rights, their evidence would be somewhat supportive of my 
hypothesis. Also, Blasi et al (1997) provide some evidence that management is 
indeed buying up shares from workers. In their sample of small and medium sized 
firms insiders owned in 1996 58% of shares, down from 65% in 1994. Top manage­
ment held 10%, up from 7% directly after the privatisation in 1994. In a separate 
question, management professed on average to aim for ownership of 50%. Lastly, 
the smaller the amount of shares needed to control a firm, the more likely is the 
introduction of shareholder rights. This hypothesis could be tested by analysing 
in detail corporate charters. If management never requires 75% of votes for any
10For theoretical models, see Bhattarchaya (1980) and for empirical evidence, for example, 
Asquith and Mullins (1983).
Furthermore, Ravid and Sudit (1994) present a model where dividend payments ensure that 
inefficiencies due to power seeking managers are mitigated.
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actions, it should be more likely to introduce shareholder rights than managers in 
firms which do require such a majority for many decisions.
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4.6 Appendix A
Table 4.2: Definition of Variables
Ct Consumption of management, period t
Pt Private benefits of management, period t
K t Capital stock, end of period t
It Dividend pay-out ratio, period t
s t Number of new shares issued, period t
at Number of shares owned by management, period t
Tt Number of outstanding shares, period t
4>t Profits stolen in period t, set in period t-1
a Return on projects
r Required return
Pt Share price, period t
4.7 A ppendix B
4.7.1 P roof o f Lem m a 4.1
It is clear that in case of a two-period model, the dividend payout ratio for the 
second period, 7 1 , is set to 1 since there is no need to maintain a capital stock for 
the future. Furthermore, the dividend-payout ratio in period 0, 7 0 , can optimally 
be set equal to 0. This is a direct result of the linearity of the utility function. Since 
management earns a higher return than required (a > r) if the profit of period 0  is 
used to increase the capital stock (and not for consumption) and since there is no 
gain from consumption smoothing, management always sets Co to 0  as long as the 
resulting capital stock is smaller than K*. Without shareholder rights, where the 
ability to raise outside capital might be restricted because of stealing, the capital 
stock is largest if no dividends are paid out. With shareholder rights, the capital 
stock might be restricted by the fact that management wants to remain in control 
and has to buy up shares to achieve this aim. Since it buys up these shares with its 
period 0  cash-flows, one might be tempted to believe that this might require that
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the optimal dividend payout ratio is positive. However, positive dividends are never 
necessary to reach the optimal capital stock, since there are two instruments, 7 0  as 
well as the amount of shares issues, so- Only one of these two variables is necessary 
to reach the optimal capital stock if shareholder rights have been introduced. If a 
positive dividend is paid out, management can buy up more shares and therefore the 
share issue can be larger without management losing control. However, the capital 
stock is decreased by the fact that part of last period’s profits are paid out instead 
of being added to the capital stock. The two effects exactly offset each other. It is 
therefore never sub-optimal to set 7 0  =  Off shareholder rights were introduced1 Ln
4.7.2 P roof of Proposition 4.1
In case (1 — <£>i)(l +  a) < (1 -1- r) the post-stealing return of the investment is
large enough to cover the required rate of return for the new investors. Therefore,
management can raise any required capital stock even in the absence of shareholder
rights. Given the above profit function it is clear that in the absence of shareholder
rights it is always optimal to set K$ =  K*. On the other hand, the capital stock
with shareholder rights might be smaller than K* as the number of new shares
to be issued is restricted by management’s desire to stay in control (see Lemma
4.4). Therefore, if the capital stock without shareholder rights is not constrained
by stealing, the capital stock with shareholder rights will always be smaller. This
makes it suboptimal to introduce shareholder rights12.□
11 In case there are insufficient funds for purchasing new shares to remain in control with the
introduction of shareholder rights, there has to be a buy-back of shares, such that management
can remain in control even with shareholder rights, in spite of the limited cash-flow in period 0.
12This result is so clear-cut because of the linearity of the profit function. With a concave profit
function the first-best level for the capital stock would in general not be reached in the absence of
shareholder rights.
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4.7.3 P roof o f Lemma 4.2
If (1— ^ i) ( l  +  a) < (1  +  r) from equations 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 it follows that
( l -T b X l -W tf . ! )
K ° =    > (4 -17)
( r _ i+ s 0) ( l+ r )
which is maximized as so goes to infinity and 7 0  =  0. The capital stock in the 
absence of shareholder rights is then
k n r  = (1-  y0)n(-g-i)(i + r)  lg^
l + r - ( l - V i ) ( l  +  a)
In case management does not find it advantageous to introduce shareholder rights, 
it profits most from this increased capital stock (the new investors only obtain a 
return r, smaller than the return of the new assets, a, and the old investors receive 
nothing in case so goes to infinity), management is better off the larger K q, as long 
as K* > K 0. □
4.7.4 P roof o f Lemma 4.3
With shareholder rights two cases need to be distinguished. If
8  < ^  + [Vo + ^ ( 1 "  W,)](l +  r ) ^ -  = fT  (4.19)
there is no restriction on the capital stock and management then sets Kq =  K*. 
This is true since for every unit of increase in K  the value of the shares management 
already holds in period 0  increases by an amount which is sufficient to buy up the 
extra shares to remain in control even after new shares have been issued to fund 
the extra unit of K . If 6  < 0** and K* is larger than K q R, it is obvious that the 
capital stock with shareholder rights is larger than without. In this case it is also 
in general true that management can in addition afford to consume something in 
period 0  without decreasing the capital stock.
If 9 > 0**, the capital stock in the presence of shareholder rights is restricted by the 
fact that management wants to remain in control. The more shares it has to buy
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in period 0, the less it can consume in this period. Since returns to investment, a, 
are higher than required returns, r, which are used to discount period 1 utility, it is 
optimal for management to set consumption in period 0 to zero, if K* is sufficiently 
large. The resulting capital stock for period 1 is then
0 0 ( 1  +  a) -  ^ ( a  -  r) ( ' ’
which is independent of 7 0  and sq, as there is an infinite amount of combinations 
of these two variables to reach K RR. K q R is smaller than K RR if the inequality 4.9 
holds. Given that (1— V?i)(l +  a) < (1 +  r) and K* > K q R condition 4.19 always 
holds if condition 4.9 does. It follows that 6 ** < 0*. Therefore, K RR > K q SR iff 
condition 4.9 holds. □
4.7.5 P roof o f Proposition 4.2
It can be shown that condition 4.12 is equivalent to the condition 6 ** < $***. As­
suming that this condition holds, consumption in period 0  with shareholder rights 
is zero and 0(1 +  c l ) K q R  in period 1. In the absence of shareholder rights, consump­
tion amounts to </?o II in period 0 and (1 +  cl)KqR in period 1. Comparing 
the present value of the pay-offs of both strategies results in the inequality 4.11. 
However, if 6 ** > 6 *** (i.e. condition 4.12 does not hold) the capital stock with 
shareholder rights for values of 6  < 6 *** would be larger than K*, which is never 
optimal due to the shape of the profit function. Therefore, if condition 4.12 does 
not hold, the capital stock will be K* and shareholder rights are never introduced. □
4.7.6 P roof o f Lemm a 4.4
Given the analysis of the strategy management plays in the last two periods of the 
game, it is clear that if condition 4.14 does not hold and if management does not 
introduce shareholder rights in period 0 , it will dilute all existing shareholders in 
period 1. Furthermore, there are no dividends going to be paid in period 1. This
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is anticipated by investors. The price at which they are willing to buy shares in 
period - 1  therefore drops to 0. As a result, no new share-issue can take place and 
s_i =  0 . Also, management sets dividends 7 _i to 0 , such that it earns the higher 
rate of return, a, on that capital. If it is assumed that management can reinvest its 
stolen profits <£>_i II(A_2) and consequently does not consume anything in period 
-1 , it earns (1  +  a)% on the full period -1  profit and enters period 0  with a profit of 
(1  +  a ) n ( A L 2). Again, management will then not pay any dividends (7 0  =  0) and 
re-invests the stolen profits <Po (1 +  a)U (K-2), which results in Co =  0. Therefore, 
the full amount of last period’s profits, (1  +  a)n(A _2 ), can be used to subsidize new 
capital in the last period.□
4.7.7 P roof o f Proposition 4.3
By assumption it is not possible to reverse the process of the introduction of share­
holder rights. Therefore, if (fo is set to 0, (fi must be 0  as well. Since returns to 
investment, a, are higher than the discount rate, r, it is optimal for management to 
set consumption in period - 1  as well as in period 0  to zero, such that a comparatively 
large amount of income can be spent on the acquisition of new shares. This results 
in the following capital stock:
tsSR _  1 (1 +  a)n(AT_2) ( l +  r ) 2 ,. *
K °  ~  0(1 + a)2
Again, the capital stock at period 1 , K f R, is independent of 7 0  and So, as well 
as of 7 _i and s_i, as there is an infinite amount of combinations for each pair of 
variables. It is straightforward to see that consumption with shareholder rights, 
0(1 +  a)K%R, is always smaller than consumption in the absence of shareholder 
rights, <Pi (1  +  a)KQSR.n
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4.7.8 P roof of Proposition 4.4
If management does not introduce shareholder rights in period -1, but commits to 
do so for period 0 , the capital stock is
K sm =  *-1 + f e ) *  W  + ")n(g-»)(l + r)2
(2=i)* [(a -  r)(l + a) t>0 + (1- %)(1 + a)20]
This is the case because management sets - • To commit to introduce
shareholder rights in the subsequent period, management needs to fulfil condition 
4.14. It would never choose to set r_ ° ^ _ 1 > ( f f f )  » 3 5  this would restrict the capital 
stock at the end of period -1 even further. Therefore, it would set r i  =  (— ■) • 
When management announces the acquisition of shares, investors realize that
management will introduce shareholder rights in the next period and that dilution 
will not occur. Therefore, the shareprice in period -1 is positive. Focusing on the 
equilibrium with zero dividend payments (which is only one out of an infinite amount 
of pay-off equivalent equilibria) the shareprice in period -1  is therefore
(1 + a)K§"*
1 (r_2 +  s_ i +  s0)(l +  r )2
Since returns to investment, a, are higher than the discount rate, r, it is optimal 
for management to set consumption in period - 1  as well as in period 0  to zero, such 
that a comparatively large amount of income can be spent on the acquisition of 
new shares. This results in K f R2. Again, the capital stock at period 1, K f R2, is 
independent of 7 0  and sq, as well as of 7 _i and s_i, as there is an infinite amount 
of combinations for each pair of variables. Condition 4.16 directly follows from 
comparing 6(1 +  a)K RR2, consumption at the end of period 1 under the strategy 
{<£0 =  0}, with <£>i (1 +  cl)K q SR, consumption under the strategy {<^ o —^ 0
, cpi = ^ 1}. If condition 4.16 holds the utility of management is always highest with 
the strategy {y?0 =V0 , =  ()}.□
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